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The annual Contemporary Strategy and Landpower Essay Award, formerly the Elihu
Root Prize, recognizes and rewards authors outside the US Army War College for the most
significant contributions on contemporary strategy and landpower in a volume of the US Army
War College Quarterly, Parameters. The journal’s editorial board selects winners based upon the
article’s analytical depth and rigor. The Contemporary Strategy and Landpower Essay Award is
made possible by the generous support of the US Army War College Foundation.
WINNERS FOR VOLUME YEAR 2020
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Nina Jankowicz and Henry Collis
“Enduring Information Vigilance: Government after COVID-19”
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Ryan J. Scott, Odelle J. Means, and Patricia M. Shields
“The COVID-19 Enemy Is Still Advancing”
Parameters 50, no. 3 (Autumn 2020): 33–44
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From the Editor in Chief
Our Summer issue’s In Focus: Senior Leader Dissent features “Matthew
Ridgway and the Value of Persistent Dissent.” Author Conrad Crane
contends there are times, be they rare, when senior leaders must strongly
object to strategic or operational courses of action which they believe
may put too much of the nation’s blood and treasure at risk.
Our first forum, entitled Two Sides of COIN, offers opposing
contributions to the ongoing debate on the efficacy of counterinsurgency
approaches. In “COIN Doctrine is Wrong,” Chris Mason maintains the
central premises of counterinsurgency doctrine are flawed—based on
evidence he deems quantifiable. In contrast, Darren Colby’s “Toward
Successful COIN: Shining Path’s Decline” suggests some elements of
counterinsurgency theories have indeed proven effective in Peru.
This issue’s second forum, Allies and Partners, offers two essays. In
“Europe: A Strategy for a Regional and Middle Power,” Jean-Yves Haine
and Cynthia Salloum discuss a way ahead for Europe post-COVID-19;
Europeans must choose cohesion over inaction, policy over process,
and regional imperatives over global ambitions. In “Greater Security
Cooperation: US Allies in Europe and East Asia,” Tongfi Kim and
Luis Simón highlight opportunities for better cooperation between two
geographically distant US alliance networks—which in turn would help
address the threat of greater Sino-Russian coordination.
The third forum for this issue, Strateg y and Doctrine, contains three
perspectives. In “The Coercive Logic of Militant Drone Use,” Austin
Doctor and James Walsh argue the increased use of drones by militant
groups does not add appreciably to the coercive power of such groups.
In “JDN 2-19: Hitting the Target but Missing the Mark,” Ann Mezzell
and J. Wesley Hutto warn recent changes in Joint doctrine are distorting
the logic of military strategy and thus opening the door to future
ineffectiveness. In “Integrated Planning and Campaigning for Complex
Problems,” Robert Ehlers and Patrick Blannin suggest inefficiencies in
traditional planning and campaigning can be rectified through new
organizational structures and processes. ~AJE
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In Focus: Senior Leader Dissent

Matthew Ridgway and the Value
of Persistent Dissent
Conrad C. Crane
©2021 Conrad C. Crane

ABSTRACT: Army General Matthew Ridgway’s actions throughout
his career provide a valuable example of the appropriate time and
place for serious dissent by military leaders. Ridgway demonstrated
the importance of selectively and pragmatically expressing open
disagreement in response to operational decisions a military leader
deems unnecessarily risk American lives and economic resources.

A

n article in a recent edition of Parameters described General
Matthew Ridgway as a model of the traditional American
approach to military advice to civilian authorities, an officer who
provided unquestioning support for the final national security decisions
of his civilian leadership. Ridgway’s memoir states his civilian superiors:
“ ‘could expect fearless and forthright expressions of honest, objective
professional opinion up to the moment when they themselves, the civilian
commanders, announced their decisions. Thereafter, they could expect
completely loyal and diligent execution of those decisions.’ ”1 In the
memoir paragraph before, however, Ridgway notes: “civilian authorities
must scrupulously respect the integrity, the intellectual honesty, of its
officer corps. Any effort to force unanimity of view, to compel adherence
to some political-military ‘party line’ against the honestly expressed views
of responsible officers . . . is a pernicious practice which jeopardizes
rather than protects the integrity of the military profession.”2
Ridgway elaborated on this position in later pages. “I learned early
in my career that it is not enough, when great issues are involved, to
express your views verbally and let it go at that. It is necessary to put
them down in writing, over your signature. In that way they become
part of the historical record.”3 Ridgway believed civilian leaders had the
authority to disagree with military advice and take a different course, but
he also believed they should bear the responsibility for any outcomes. He
condemned “a deliberate effort to soothe and lull the public by placing
responsibility where it did not rest, by conveying the false impression
that there was unanimous agreement between the civilian authorities
and their military advisers.”4

1. John C. Binkley, “Revisiting the 2006 Revolt of the Generals,” Parameters 50, no 1 (Spring
2020): 25, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol50/iss1/1/.
2. Matthew B. Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway as Told to Harold H. Martin
(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956), 270.
3. Ridgway, Soldier, 287.
4. Ridgway, Soldier, 288.

Dr. Conrad C. Crane,
chief of analysis and
research at the Army
Heritage and Education
Center, is the author
of American Airpower
Strategy in World War II:
Bombs, Cities, Civilians, and
Oil (2016).
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Here Ridgway was specifically referring to his open disagreements
with the Eisenhower administration on its New Look defense policies,
which led to his tenure as chief of staff of the Army lasting only two
years. As he also stated in his memoir, “Under no circumstances,
regardless of pressures from whatever source or motive, should the
professional military man yield, or compromise his judgment for other
than convincing military reasons.”5
He applied similar logic to his treatment of directives from his military
superiors. In 1966, Ridgway gave an address at the US Army Command
and General Staff College in which he counseled the assembly about
opposition to orders. He acknowledged military services properly
deal harshly . . . with failure to carry out orders in battle. . . . Yet when faced
with different situations from those anticipated, as well as in the transition
from plans to orders, there sometimes comes the challenge to one’s
conscience, the compelling urge to oppose foolhardy operations before it is
too late, before the orders are issued and lives are needlessly thrown away.6

Ridgway asserted the hardest decisions to make were “those involved
in speaking your mind about some harebrained scheme which proposes
to commit troops to action under conditions where failure seems almost
certain, and the only results will be the needless sacrifice of priceless
lives. . . . For a battle commander to ever condone the unnecessary
sacrifice of his men is inexcusable.” 7 Quoting General George C.
Marshall, he observed, “ ‘It is hard to get men to do this, for this is
when you lay your career, perhaps your commission, on the line.’ ”8
For Ridgway, it did not matter if the “harebrained scheme” came from
civilian or military leaders.
In his 1966 address, Ridgway cited two examples where he battled
to stop “needless sacrifice[s]” while commanding the 82nd Airborne
Division in Italy. In one case, he opposed a proposed attack by his
division across the Volturno River, over open ground with enemy fire
from both flanks and the front, which he considered a suicide mission
with only a small chance of success. He initially discussed his opposition
with General Lucien Truscott of the 3rd Infantry Division, who agreed
with Ridgway’s assessment. Following that discussion, Ridgway took his
complaints to his corps commander, and then to the Army commander,
before finally getting the operation cancelled.9
And opposition based on best military judgment did not cease
just because a decision had been made to execute the operation. In the
second example, Ridgway’s division received orders to drop on Rome
in September 1943 for Operation Giant II, in support of landings in
Salerno. General Sir Harold Alexander, 15th Army Group commander,
told Ridgway he should expect ground forces to link up with him “in
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Ridgway, Soldier, 272.
Matthew B. Ridgway, “Leadership,” Military Review 46, no. 10 (October 1966): 44–45.
Ridgway, “Leadership,” 45.
Ridgway, “Leadership,” 45.
Ridgway, “Leadership,” 45.
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three days—five at the most.”10 Assumptions included light opposition
despite six German divisions near the city, and help from the Italians
who were ready to sever their alliance with Germany.
Ridgway was appalled. The mission would place his division outside
the range of supporting fighters and dive-bombers. Moreover, he knew
ground forces would never reach the city in time to save his soldiers
from a dreadful mauling. While his troops continued to prepare for the
operation, Ridgway mounted his campaign to stop it. He reached out
to a strong proponent of the operation, General Walter Bedell Smith,
then chief of staff for the theater commander, General Dwight D.
Eisenhower. Bedell Smith recommended Ridgway approach Alexander.
While he did not cancel the drop, Alexander did approve the dispatch of
a clandestine delegation, led by Ridgway’s artillery commander Brigadier
General Maxwell Taylor, to Rome to assess Italian preparations. Taylor
was horrified by what he found and sent four cables supporting cancelling
the operation, the last one mere hours before the first aircraft were to
take off.11
By this time, Eisenhower had received further intelligence about the
lack of Italian capability and readiness, and after Taylor’s last message,
Alexander sent an order to Ridgway cancelling Operation Giant II.
But no acknowledgment was received. Eisenhower ordered Brigadier
General Lyman Lemnitzer, Alexander’s American deputy, to deliver the
cancellation order personally to Ridgway by air.
Sixty-two transports were already circling the airfield at Licata
when Lemnitzer arrived, and he started frantically shooting flares to
get everyone’s attention. The takeoffs stopped, Lemnitzer landed, and
he found Ridgway wearing his parachute, preparing to climb into a
C-47. Ridgway had spent the day reconciling himself to an operation
that would destroy his division, after his failed attempts to dissuade his
leadership from this course of action. Immediately, Ridgway recalled
paratroopers in the air, while the rest were returned to their bivouacs.
“Exhausted and relieved, Ridgway stumbled into a tent where one
of his officers sat trembling on a cot. Ridgway poured two drinks
from a whiskey bottle, and as darkness fell and calm again enveloped
Licata South, they sat slumped together, silent but for the sound of
their weeping.”12

Limits of Airpower

In his memoir, Ridgway expresses great pride in contributing to
another of “that list of tragic accidents that fortunately never happened,”
namely, an American intervention to bail out the French in Indochina in
1954, initially with major air attacks.13 The series of events that led to the
10. Ridgway, Soldier, 81.
11. Ridgway, Soldier, 80–82; and D. K. R. Crosswell, Beetle: The Life of General Walter Bedell Smith,
American Warrior Series (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2010), 502–3.
12. Crosswell, Beetle, 504; and Rick Atkinson, The Day of Battle: The War in Sicily and Italy, 1943–
1944 (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2007), 194–95.
13. Ridgway, Soldier, 278.
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death of Operation Vulture began in April 1951 when General Douglas
MacArthur was relieved of his command of UN forces in Korea. Though
UN forces and their airpower had been successful initially in destroying
most of the North Korean People’s Army and reaching the Yalu River,
massive Communist Chinese intervention had driven MacArthur’s
command back down the peninsula in November and December. Only
in February had the rejuvenated Eighth Army under Ridgway begun to
regain the initiative.
By April, public anxiety was high in the United States. Public
opinion polls revealed most Americans favored air attacks on
Manchuria, and a third of those polled advocated general war with
China. President Harry Truman ordered Strategic Air Command
bombers with atomic weapons to Okinawa on April 6, 1951, in response
to a buildup of Soviet forces in the Far East and ominous Chinese air
and ground preparations for their spring offensive. MacArthur’s firing
raised fears the Communists might escalate the war to take advantage
of opportunities created by the change in UN command to Ridgway.
But in May the new commander’s forces stopped the massive Chinese
fifth-phase offensive and began a series of vigorous counterattacks.
Ridgway’s slow but inexorable advance was only stopped by the opening
of armistice negotiations in July.14
After replacing MacArthur and stopping the Communist advance,
Ridgway faced the challenge of negotiating with a difficult enemy
while his military options for leverage at the peace table were limited.
Once battle lines stabilized along an entrenched front and armistice
talks began, he determined airpower would be his best option to exert
coercive military pressure on the enemy. On July 13, 1951, he instructed
his Far East Air Forces (FEAF) and naval air units, “desire action during
this period of negotiations to exploit full capabilities of air power to reap
maximum benefit of our ability to punish enemy wherever he may be
in [Korea].”15
Though Ridgway believed ratcheting up bombing would produce
results at the peace talks, he still had to deal with American leaders in
Washington who did not want to escalate the war any further. They
were particularly sensitive about attacks on major North Korean cities.
On July 21, Ridgway informed the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) that
a key part of his plan “for unrelenting pressure on Communist forces”
was “an all out air strike on Pyongyang” with 140 medium and light
bombers and 230 fighters, to be executed on the first clear day after July
24. This operation would “take advantage of the accelerated buildup
14. Mark Andrew O’Neill, “The Other Side of the Yalu: Soviet Pilots in the Korean War,
Phase One, 1 November 1950–12 April 1951,” (PhD diss., Florida State University, 1996), 273–74;
Roger Dingman, “Atomic Diplomacy during the Korean War,” International Security 13, no. 3 (Winter
1988–1989): 69–79; Roger M. Anders, “The Atomic Bomb and the Korean War: Gordon Dean and
the Issue of Civilian Control,” Military Affairs 52, no. 1 (January 1988): 1–3; and Conrad C. Crane,
“Killing Vultures, Containing Communism, and Venting Pressure: International Impacts of the
Korean War,” Annual War History Research Report 10, no. 3 (2007): 90.
15. Ridgway to Hickey, message, UNC-071, July 13, 1951, file K720.1622, 1950–51, Air Force
Historical Research Agency (AFHRA), Maxwell Air Force Base, AL.
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of supplies and personnel” in the area, “strike a devastating blow at
the North Korean capital,” and make up for the many recent sorties
canceled by bad weather.16
Ridgway’s concerns about bad weather proved well founded. When
the all-out attack on Pyongyang was finally mounted on July 30 after
approval by the JCS, deteriorating weather conditions forced the
diversion of light and medium bombers to secondary targets, while
smoke and cloud cover made any assessment of the 620 fighter and
fighter-bomber sorties very difficult. Results were deemed indecisive,
so another full-scale assault on the capital by FEAF Bomber Command
was carried out on August 14, 1951. Two Strategic Air Command B-29
wings had to use radar to deliver bombs through cloud cover. Ridgway
was disappointed with the poor results and collateral civilian casualties,
instructing FEAF to wait for excellent weather for any more major raids.17
Encouraged by his success in gaining JCS permission to bomb
Pyongyang, Ridgway revisited a proposed attack of the port of Rashin,
a city close to the Soviet border. Aerial reconnaissance revealed an
extensive buildup of materiel and supplies that could be funneled south
through the highway and rail complex there. In reply to queries about
his specific plans, Ridgway assured the Joint Chiefs that he would not
violate the border with air strikes.
In this endeavor, Ridgway had the strong support of the US Air
Force Air Staff who thought the raids would hamper enemy supply
buildup and pressure Communist negotiators at the armistice talks by
proving “all of their sanctuaries [were] not privileged.”18 Rashin was
also considered “the last major profitable strategic target in Korea.”19
The Air Staff discounted diplomatic concerns because the Soviets
had not responded to similar attacks. The Joint Chiefs agreed and
obtained presidential approval to authorize the bombing raid. Naval
aircraft provided cover for 35 B-29s who pummeled the port with
300 tons of bombs on August 25 in good weather. No follow-up raids
were necessary.20
16. CINCFE to Subordinate Commands, message, CX 60410, April 19, 1951, section 45;
CINCFE to Subordinate Commands, message, C 61367, April 30, 1951, section 46, box 31; CINCFE
to Subordinate Commands, message, C 67474, July 21, 1951, section 54, box 33, geographic file
1951–53, 383.21 Korea (3-19-45), record group 218, National Archives II, College Park, MD;
Ridgway to Hickey, message, UNC-071, July 13, 1951; and Crane, “Killing Vultures,” 91–92.
17. CINCFE to JCS, message, C 68064, July 31, 1951, box 1, incoming messages, May 29, 1950–
August 3, 1951, RG 218; Terrill to Power, letter, August 16, 1951, file B-12789, box B198, Curtis
LeMay Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress; Matthew B. Ridgway, notes on conference
with General Weyland, August 30, 1951, folder, special file April 1951–January 1952, Matthew B.
Ridgway Papers, US Army Heritage and Education Center (USAHEC), Carlisle, PA.
18. Joseph Smith to General Vandenberg, memorandum, “Removal of Restriction against
Attacks on Najin (Rashin),” file OPD 381 Korea (May 9, 1947), section 12, box 894, RG 341.
19. Joseph Smith to General Vandenberg, memorandum (May 9, 1947).
20. JCS 1776/244 with enclosures, “Removal of Restriction Against Attacks on Najin
(Rashin),” August 10, 1951, section 57, box 33, geographic file 1951–53, 383.21 Korea (3-19-45),
RG 218; Joseph Smith to General Vandenberg, memorandum (May 9, 1947); United States Air Force
Operations in the Korean Conflict, 1 November 1950–30 June 1952, US Air Force Historical Study No. 72
(Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: US Air Force Historical Division, Air University, July 1, 1955), 145.
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Ultimately, the increased use of airpower had no impact on the
armistice talks. Even after his attempts to influence negotiations that
summer, Ridgway’s air priorities remained focused on coercing through
interdiction, a difficult task in Korea in 1951, but the best he thought he
could accomplish with the limitations on military operations imposed
by the Joint Chiefs. The FEAF did not have enough aircraft or the
proper technology to interdict at night, while the enemy had plenty of
labor to repair damage to communication lines.21 Further, the reduced
military activity during the armistice negotiations meant the Communist
adversaries required fewer supplies.
UN air forces did their best to meet Ridgway’s expectations. With
US Navy air support, FEAF tried three different programs in 1951 to
interdict the logistics of Communist armies, yet they all failed, and for
different reasons. The first, Interdiction Plan No. 4, targeted North
Korean rail lines but was too ambitious. Bomber Command successfully
closed 27 of 39 assigned marshalling yards and took out 48 of 60 targeted
bridges, but B-29 losses were heavy, and the rail system proved too
resilient to be paralyzed effectively.
When the massive spring offensives showed the inadequacies of
that approach, FEAF shifted to Operation Strangle, focusing primarily
on the North Korean road network. US Navy, Marine, and Air Force
aircraft were assigned different sectors to bomb. They cratered roads,
dispersed tetrahedral tacks to destroy tires, and dropped delayed action
bombs to deter repair crews, with more disappointing results. The
enemy bypassed blockages, accepted casualties to complete repairs, and
exploited the lack of effective UN night bombing capability by moving
after dark. The FEAF came to regret the name of the operation, as it
raised exorbitant expectations.
In August 1951, still another campaign was initiated, the Rail
Interdiction Program, though many Air Force officers and the press
still referred to it as Strangle. This effort was better organized and more
effective. Carrier aircraft targeted east coast rail lines while Bomber
Command attacked bridges. Swarming FEAF fighter bombers cut
lines all over North Korea. Some rail lines were abandoned as enemy
repair crews could not keep up with the pace of destruction. Far East
Air Forces planners began to believe that limited Communist truck
resources might force the enemy to pull back from its positions along
the 38th parallel.22
But that was not to be, as enemy countermeasures, such as building
duplicate bridges at key crossing points and caching whole bridge
21. Eduard Mark, Aerial Interdiction: Air Power and the Land Battle in Three American Wars
(Washington, DC: Center for Air Force History, 1994), 289–319.
22. Mark, Aerial Interdiction; O’Neill, “The Other Side,” 281–85; US Pacific Fleet Commander in
Chief, Interim Third Evaluation Report, 1 May–31 December 1951 (Washington, DC: US Naval Historical
Center), 10-45–10-46; HQ Far East Air Forces (FEAF), FEAF Report on the Korean War, 25 June
1950–27 July 1953, book I, 77, file K720.04D, AFHRA; “The Aerial War during Operation Strangle,”
vol. 1, 12–17; and “Notes on Use of the Term ‘Operation Strangle’,” vol. 3, appendix 2, in History
of the Fifth Air Force, 1 July–31 December 1951, file K730.01, AFHRA.
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sections for quick repairs, again turned the tide. Intelligence reports
estimated as many as 500,000 soldiers and civilians maintained
transportation routes. Increased antiaircraft defenses appeared around
key targets, and enemy MiG jet fighters operating from Manchuria
became more aggressive. By September 1951, Soviet and Chinese MiGs
outnumbered F-86 Sabres in the theater 500 to 90. The enemy interceptors
drove back FEAF fighter-bombers, shooting down enough B-29s by
October to force Bomber Command from the daytime skies. These
actions further reduced Ridgway’s ability to maintain pressure effectively
on enemy forces and supply lines and thus to influence negotiations.23
Ultimately, Ridgway’s hopes he could use airpower to prevent
the enemy from building up supplies proved false, and he became
disillusioned with Air Force capability claims. He once told his air
commanders, “If all the enemy trucks you report as having destroyed
during the past ten days or so were actually kills, then there would not
be a truck left in all of Asia.”24
Further, the ineffectiveness of interdiction campaigns was not the
only reason Ridgway disagreed strongly with Air Force claims of its
decisive role in the Korean War. He noted ground forces accounted
for 97 percent of battle casualties, and their performance “determined
the success or failure of the United Nations effort, which in turn
determined the course of United States and United Nations policy.”25
In his Korean War memoirs, he gave the Air Force credit for its essential
support to ground operations and saving UN forces from disaster
early in the war, but he also cautioned against expecting “miracles of
interdiction” from airpower in future conflicts.26
As the months passed, Ridgway’s frustration with the armistice talks
persisted. His battles with the Joint Chiefs over the bombing of Rashin
and Pyongyang and the ineffectiveness of the interdiction campaigns
had tempered Ridgway’s initial determination to use airpower to coerce
enemy negotiators. The Communist armies twice broke off talks, citing
air attacks on the site of the talks—once due to apparently faked evidence
and once because of an actual UN bombing error—and Ridgway was
thereby reluctant to raise the stakes and risk further stalled negotiations.
Accordingly, he would not approve orders to expand target sets to
include hydroelectric dams along the Yalu River, courses of action his
successor, General Mark Clark, would pursue.

23. William F. Dean, General Dean’s Story (New York: Viking Press, 1954), 272–73; J. Lawton
Collins, War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons of Korea (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), 313;
Mark, Aerial Interdiction, 312–14; Shu Guang Zhang, Mao’s Military Romanticism: China and the Korean
War, 1950–1953 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995), 176–81; and Brigadier General Joe
Kelly to LeMay, letters, October 29, 1971 and November 7, 1951, file FEAF 1, box 65, Curtis LeMay
Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
24. M. B. Ridgway to Colonel Paul Carter, letter, December 15, 1976, folder C, 1964–1983,
post retirement A–G, Matthew B. Ridgway Papers, USAHEC.
25. Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War, repr. (New York: Da Capo, 1986), viii.
26. Mark, Aerial Interdiction; M. B. Ridgway to Colonel Paul Carter, letter, December 15, 1976;
and Ridgway, Korean War, 191, 244.
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In May 1952 Ridgway left the Far East to become Supreme Allied
Commander Europe. He retained a strong skepticism about the
utility of airpower alone that would have a significant impact on his
future actions.27
As chief of staff of the Army from 1953–55, Ridgway’s
disillusionment with the capabilities of airpower in limited war was
evident in his attitudes about New Look defense policies favoring the
Air Force and possible intervention in Indochina to assist the French.
Upon learning the Eisenhower administration was considering air
intervention alone to save the beleaguered French garrison at Dien Bien
Phu and help them defeat the Viet Minh, he expressed fears the United
States had already forgotten the “bitter lesson” from Korea “that air and
naval power alone cannot win a war and that inadequate ground forces
cannot win one either.”28 He was determined to avoid “making that
same tragic error” in Indochina.29

Killing the Vulture

Planning for Operation Vulture (Vautour) began in earnest in
mid-April 1954. On a routine liaison visit to Vietnam, FEAF commander
General Earle Partridge was informed by the French that the aerial
operation to save Dien Bien Phu had been cleared through diplomatic
channels. Partridge had received no information regarding the approval
of the operation; nonetheless, he ordered the chief of FEAF Bomber
Command, Brigadier General Joseph Caldera, to prepare a contingency
plan. Bomber Command still had its wartime contingent of B-29s for
a mass strike, but Caldera foresaw many problems with the operation
when he flew to Vietnam to confer with the French, including the
fact there were “no true B-29 targets” in the area, and bad monsoon
weather necessitated the use of radar guidance systems the French did
not possess.30
Opposition to Vulture, however, would soon obviate the need
for such planning. Ridgway led the effort against it in the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, galvanized by the fact that the chairman, Admiral Arthur
Radford, supported the mission. Radford’s high-handed tactics to
coerce Ridgway to accede to New Look policies had poisoned relations
between the two men. Ridgway considered the New Look “a misguided
policy that endangered the nation’s security.”31 He forthrightly expressed

27. Ridgway, Korean War, 200, 202, 244.
28. Ridgway, Soldier, 277.
29. Ridgway, Korean War, viii; Ridgway, Soldier, 277.
30. Ronald H. Spector, Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941-1960 (New York: Free Press,
1985), 205–6; and George C. Herring, America‘s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam 1950–1975,
2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Education, 1986), 31.
31. A. J. Bacevich, The Pentomic Era: The U.S. Army between Korea and Vietnam (Washington, DC:
National Defense University Press, 1986), 22.

TOC

In Focus: Senior Leader Dissent

Crane

15

such opinions in congressional hearings, which pleased Democratic
opposition and eventually made him persona non grata with Eisenhower.32
Ridgway was just as forthright about his position on helping the
French in March 1954 when the issue arose at a gathering for General
Paul Ely, the French chief of the armed forces staff, at Radford’s
home. Ely was in Washington to garner additional aid due to the dire
situations at Dien Bien Phu and in Indochina. When the supportive
Radford asked if the French just needed more airpower for success,
Ridgway challenged the assertion before Ely could reply. He noted in
his diary afterward, “the experience of Korea, where we had complete
domination of the air and a far more powerful air force, afforded no
basis for thinking that some additional air power was going to bring
decisive results on the ground.”33
Ridgway then mobilized the rest of the Joint Chiefs so when
Radford advocated his proposition to support the French a few days
later, they were unified in opposition to it. The chairman then asked for
the written views of each chief. Ridgway’s carefully crafted argument
about the costs and strategic risks of possible involvement in Indochina
was eventually sent to the secretary of defense. Ridgway also ordered
his director of operations, Major General James Gavin, to send a team
to the theater to gauge its conditions. They returned with a bleak report
highlighting inadequate support facilities, massive logistic difficulties
in the theater, the number of troops required for operations, and the
impact on strategic reserves.
Implicit in these calculations was the assumption that airpower
alone would not save the French and defeat the Viet Minh. Ridgway
exploited his connections in France from his time as the Supreme Allied
Commander Europe to monitor additional French requests for support,
using the inside information to keep the other chiefs aligned with
him, especially Air Force Chief of Staff General Nathan Twining.
Eventually Ridgway prepared a briefing for the National Security
Council and asked to deliver it with President Eisenhower in attendance.
When Ely returned to make a final plea for support after the fall of Dien
Bien Phu in May, Ridgway still did not trust Radford. Consequently, he
convinced the other chiefs to agree that no member of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff could meet with Ely alone.34
Ridgway’s arguments from the June 1954 National Security Council
briefing, which could be summed up as “ten divisions and ten years”
32. Bacevich, Pentomic Era, 41; and A. J. Bacevich, “The Paradox of Professionalism:
Eisenhower, Ridgway, and the Challenge to Civilian Control, 1953–1955,” Journal of Military History
61 (April 1997): 303–33.
33. Matthew B. Ridgway, memorandum, “Conversation at Home of Admiral Radford,
March 22, 1954,” Matthew B. Ridgway Papers, USAHEC.
34. Arthur Radford, memoranda for the secretary of defense, March 31 and April 22, 1954;
Matthew B. Ridgway, memoranda for JCS, April 2 and 6, 1954; James M. Gavin, “Military
Consequences of Various Courses of Action with Respect to Application of U.S. Military Forces
in Indochina”; Matthew B. Ridgway, memoranda for record, April 28 and May 17, 1954; and
Matthew B. Ridgway Chief of Staff of the US Army to Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 7, 1954, “Projected
Conversations Here with General Ely, French Army,” Matthew B. Ridgway Papers, USAHEC.
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to win in Indochina, even without Chinese intervention, appeared
in an article in US News & World Report that same month. The article
argued more soldiers would be necessary to fight in Indochina than in
Korea, and defense budgets would skyrocket while draft requirements
quadrupled. The lack of reliable allies and bases would complicate
“almost insurmountable” logistic problems, while jungle warfare would
nullify any American advantages in “mechanized, mobile equipment.”35
Ridgway’s comments were probably leaked by members of Eisenhower’s
staff, to use the arguments of another respected military commander to
support the president’s decision not to intervene.
Ridgway was not the only leader in Washington strongly opposed
to unilateral aid to the French. Key congressmen in early April 1954
also showed little confidence in the air option, warning, “once the flag
is committed, the use of land forces would surely follow.”36 They also
demanded Great Britain and other Allies participate in a collective
intervention. Democratic Senator Richard B. Russell of Georgia led the
congressional opposition to Operation Vulture. Ridgway viewed him
as an ally in his efforts to stay out of Indochina, as Russell certainly
remembered the acrimonious debates about inflated expectations
of airpower when he chaired the May 1951 joint hearings following
Truman’s firing of MacArthur.37
The death knell for Operation Vulture was the refusal of Great
Britain to be drawn into “Radford’s war against China.”38 American and
French talks on intervention continued after the fall of Dien Bien Phu
in early May, but no serious plans resulted. Historians such as George
Herring and Richard Immerman believe Eisenhower was more willing
to intervene than he admitted later in his memoirs.39 Others, such as
Melanie Billings-Yun, think Eisenhower never wanted to intervene
militarily but could not afford to take that position openly without
weakening France’s motivation to win the war and without bringing
into question America’s commitment to the security of Southeast Asia.40
If Billings-Yun is right, lessons of the Korean air war were fresh
enough in 1954 to help inspire a vocal opposition that reinforced the
president’s inclination to avoid direct military involvement in Indochina.
If Herring and Immerman are correct, then that opposition may have
35. “What Ridgway Told Ike—War in Indo-China Would Be Tougher Than Korea,” US News
& World Report, June 25, 1954, 30–32.
36. George C. Herring and Richard H. Immerman, “Eisenhower, Dulles, and Dienbienphu:
‘The Day We Didn’t Go to War’ Revisited,” Journal of American History 71, no. 2 (September
1984): 353.
37. United States Senate, “Constitutional Crisis Averted,” Historical Highlights, May 3,
1951, United States Senate (website), https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute
/Constitutional_Crisis_Averted.htm; and Conrad C. Crane, American Airpower Strategy in Korea 1950–
1953 (Topeka: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 74–75, 179–80.
38. Herring and Immerman, “Eisenhower, Dulles, and Dienbienphu,” 360.
39. Herring and Immerman, “Eisenhower, Dulles, and Dienbienphu,” 346–63; and Dwight D.
Eisenhower, Mandate for Change 1953–1956 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1963).
40. Melanie Billings-Yun, Decision against War: Eisenhower and Dien Bien Phu, 1954 (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1988).
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changed his mind by demonstrating just how perilous and divisive even
a limited aerial intervention would be. Ridgway wrote of his role:
When the day comes for me to face my Maker and account for my actions,
the thing I would be most humbly proud of was the fact that I fought
against, and perhaps contributed to preventing, the carrying out of some
harebrained tactical schemes which would have cost the lives of thousands
of men. To that list of tragic incidents that fortunately never happened I
would add the Indo-China intervention.41

Leadership Legacies

A decade later when problems in Indochina again tempted American
involvement, Ridgway was no longer in a position of responsibility or
influence. His independence and outspoken ways as Army chief of staff
led to his early retirement in 1955, his fate an echo of Marshall’s warnings
about strong dissent. Ridgway’s only available option was to warn
belatedly in articles and a book about unclear political objectives and
caution about the limitations of airpower and difficulties of operations
in Indochina.42
It is ironic that the retired Army general who had the ears of
Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson was instead Taylor,
Ridgway’s successor and an enthusiastic advocate of intervention in
Vietnam. As Army chief of staff, Taylor also opposed Eisenhower’s
New Look policies, but he was not as openly combative. Instead he let
Gavin lead the opposition and had a clandestine group of colonels in
the G-3 write articles and leak information to undermine the president’s
security initiatives. Eventually the officers were discovered, and Taylor
was told to relieve them. He did, but he also gave them plum follow-on
assignments, appreciating the fact they had taken the fall for him. Due
to these firings and his more muted dissent, he was able to maintain his
position in both Kennedy’s and Johnson’s inner circles when important
decisions were being made about Vietnam in the 1960s.43
In retrospect, US involvement in Vietnam may have proved more
efficacious in 1954, when Communist forces were not as organized or
well supplied and China was still reeling from the Korean War. But the
United States was not prepared for a major conflict there. All Ridgway’s
arguments against intervention in 1954 remained valid 10 years later, but
he was no longer in a position to make such a pitch to national leaders.
One of the other cautions about persistent and career-risking dissent on
important issues is that the effort can turn into “falling on your sword,”
and you can only do that once.
Yet there are times when such risks should be taken, especially in
the face of significant risks to American lives and resources. In January
41. Ridgway, Soldier, 278.
42. Matthew B. Ridgway, “Pull-out, All-out, or Stand Fast in Vietnam?” Look, April 5, 1966,
81–84; Ridgway, Korean War, 244.
43. David T. Fautua, “The Inconsonant Culture: Ridgway, Taylor, and the Proper Role in
Civil-Military Relations” (paper, Conference of Army Historians, June 19, 1996); Bacevich, Pentomic
Era, 42–46.
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2004, Michael O’Hanlon strongly condemned Army leaders for carrying
out a plan to invade Iraq they knew was deeply flawed. He argued they
knew the post-conflict preparations were lacking and were obligated
to find some way to fix Operation Iraqi Freedom or refuse to execute
it.44 Even Ridgway would not have advocated that course of action,
but perhaps General Eric Shinseki, who voiced his concerns about
occupation forces in an infamous February 2003 Senate Armed Services
Committee hearing, could have benefitted from adopting some aspects
of Ridgway’s 1954 playbook.
As with any historical analogy, there are many key differences. Post
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986,
the Army chief of staff position has not been as powerful as it was in
1954, and in 2003, then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld kept a
tight rein on information flow in the Pentagon. But perhaps Shinseki
could have mobilized the other chiefs in support of his position and
prepared a strong memorandum about his concerns for the historical
record. He also might have considered Senator Carl Levin—chair of the
committee—who asked the hard questions during the February hearing,
as an ally in his efforts to adjust force levels.
There might have been career implications, but Shinseki had already
been all but fired and his successor designated. The Army chief, however,
instead chose to follow the “traditional model,” and after the Senate
hearing kept the rest of his concerns private even after scathing public
rebuttals from the secretary of defense and his key subordinates.45 We
will never know whether more persistent and open dissent could have
made a difference or not. It may have forced adjustments to the invasion
plan, or such dissent may have soured civil-military relations further.
Too much dissent certainly has the potential to make the deliverer
appear to be obstructionist or not a team player. Even Ridgway
advocated strong resistance in only extreme cases. But there are times
when a military leader’s responsibility to the nation and their profession
to give best military advice and preserve precious lives and economic
resources outweigh operational or political considerations. Such
occasions are rare, but the consequences of weak acquiescence in these
situations could be catastrophic. The careful allocation of dissent is yet
another burden strategic-level leaders must bear as they rise in the ranks
of national decision making.

44. Michael E. O’Hanlon, “Iraq without a Plan,” Policy Review, December 1, 2004, https://www
.hoover.org/research/iraq-without-plan.
45. Binkley, “Revolt of the Generals.”
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COIN Doctrine Is Wrong
M. Chris Mason
ABSTRACT: Counterinsurgency does not increase the legitimacy
of, or support for, central governments engaged in internal conflicts.
Recent research shows quantifiable degrees of government
legitimacy, national identity, and population security are necessary
precursors and accurate predictors of a government’s ability to
outlast a civil uprising. Because the first two predictors—government
legitimacy and national identity—can be measured and do not
increase during a conflict, the probability of government failure in
most cases can be accurately predicted when the conflict starts.

A

lthough fighting against internal rebellions is as old as conflict
itself, the term “counterinsurgency” (COIN) to describe such
conflict originated only recently, first appearing in the English
language in 1962. The Kennedy administration introduced the word as
part of a new doctrine of limited war intended to contain communist
expansion.1 The basic premise of COIN holds that civil actions can be
taken to increase support for a central government and thereby decrease
support for an internal rebellion. The Oxford English Dictionary defines
counterinsurgency in straightforward terms: “military or political action
taken against the activities of guerrillas or revolutionaries.”2 The US
Department of State expands upon this, defining counterinsurgency as
“comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to simultaneously defeat
and contain insurgency and address its root causes.”3 According to the U.S.
Government Counterinsurgency Guide, a counterinsurgency campaign should
integrate and synchronize political, security, economic, and informational
components that reinforce governmental legitimacy and effectiveness while reducing
insurgent influence over the population. COIN strategies should be designed
to simultaneously protect the population from insurgent violence; strengthen
the legitimacy and capacity of government institutions to govern responsibly and
marginalize insurgents politically, socially, and economically.4

As journalist and contemporary historian Fred Kaplan phrases it,
“the premise of counterinsurgency is that insurgents arise out of sociopolitical conditions and, therefore, the point of a counterinsurgency
campaign, or the goal of it, is not just to kill and capture insurgents, but
to change the living conditions to help the government provide basic
1. Merriam-Webster, s.v. “counterinsurgency (n.),” https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary
/counterinsurgency.
2. Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “counterinsurgency (n.),” https://www.oed.com/. Italics added.
3. US Department of State (DoS), Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PMA), U.S. Government
Counterinsurgency Guide (Washington, DC: PMA, 2009), 12, https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents
/organization/119629.pdf. Italics added.
4. DoS, Counterinsurgency Guide, 12. Italics added.
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services to the people, so that support for the insurgency dries up.”5 As
recently as 2013, RAND Corporation published a study entitled Paths to
Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies in which the authors purported to
lay out the best practices to “help host-nation governments reform . . .
and increase their legitimacy.”6 In short, the basic principle underlying
counterinsurgency doctrine is that civil actions can be taken to increase
support for an embattled government and increase its legitimacy.
This premise seems logical and obvious: If a government makes its
people safer and improves their lives, their support for the government
will increase. Although rational, this assumption is untested, and as
Columbia University professor Rita McGrath notes, the danger in
suppositions of this type is to “take the untested assumptions that
underlie the . . . plan and treat them as facts.” 7
In this case, the untested assumption upon which COIN doctrine
rests—that actions can be taken to increase support for a government
during an internal conflict—is wrong. A study conducted at the US
Army War College from 2015 to 2020 found no empirical evidence that
counterinsurgency means and methods increased either popular support
for a government or the public perception of its legitimacy in any
internal conflict since the end of World War II. Governments have been
successful in defeating rebellions, and governments that used many of
the methods and actions prescribed by counterinsurgency doctrine have
successfully suppressed internal conflicts. But these victories have led to
the erroneous claim that success is a result of “doing counterinsurgency
right.”8 This is a classic example of the logic fallacy known to the ancient
Romans as post hoc ergo propter hoc: “after this, therefore because of this.”9
But sequence is not causation.

Quelling Internal Rebellions

In the vast academic literature of internal conflict, the recognition
that counterinsurgency doctrine is wrong is not new. For example,
Gian Gentile observed anecdotally that counterinsurgency did not
work in Vietnam, Iraq, or Afghanistan. Without fully recognizing
the reasons why this was the case, he nonetheless argued vociferously
against COIN doctrine.10 The research study behind this article
5. A. C. Valdez, “A Decade at War: Afghanistan, Iraq and Counterinsurgency,” America Abroad
Media, podcast, aired March and September 2013, https://www.americaabroadmedia.org/radio
/decade-war-afghanistan-iraq-and-counterinsurgency.
6. Christopher Paul et al., Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND Corporation, 2013), xxxv, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR291z1.html.
7. Rita Gunther McGrath, “The Dangers of Untested Assumptions,” MIT Sloan Management
Review, October 26, 2009, https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/the-dangers-of-unchecked-assumptions/.
8. For example, see Michael O’Hanlon, interview by Fareed Zakaria on Global Public Square,
“What Will Obama’s Afghanistan Policy Be?” transcript, January 25, 2009, http://transcripts.cnn.
com/TRANSCRIPTS/0901/25/fzgps.01.html; and Michael Crowley, “Obama versus Osama,”
CBS News, December 8, 2008, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/obama-versus-osama/.
9. John Woods and Douglas Walton, “Post Hoc, Ergo Propter Hoc,” Review of Metaphysics 30,
no. 4 (June 1977), https://www.jstor.org/stable/20126985.
10. Colonel Gian Gentile, Wrong Turn: America’s Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency (New York:
New Press, 2013).
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identifies and enumerates the political science underlying the failure of
counterinsurgency and, using quantifiable metrics, concludes precisely
why governments succeed or fail against internal rebellions.
For the past five years, the Study of Internal Conflict at the Strategic
Studies Institute of the US Army War College has systematically
researched and analyzed the 53 internal conflicts since 1945 in which
an internal rebellion sought either control of the government or the
creation of an independent breakaway country, and in which at least
1,000 persons died in a 12-month period. The study used the Oxford
University Armed Conflict and Correlates of War Project databases to
identify all relevant internal conflicts.11 Because there are many kinds of
civil conflict (for example, wars between ethnic groups in remote areas
that are not fought for control of the government), internal conflicts in
the Correlates of War database to which the government was not a party
were excluded from the study.
The study sought to identify all political-military factors that
correlate with government defeat in at least 90 percent of all cases. Some
factors were interrelated, as will be seen, and were often nested together.
As in calculating probable medical outcomes across multiple morbidity
factors, the presence of multiple negative political-military factors in one
conflict decreased the likelihood of government survival to close to nil.
The study results show conclusively that governments fail against
internal rebellions for five fundamental structural reasons, and the
outcomes of internal conflicts are heavily dependent on these five
preexisting political-military conditions. Each of the five factors was
found in government failure in at least 94 percent of all 53 conflicts, and
only two of the five are susceptible to military action. Further, two of the
five factors are simple binary variables, while the remaining three factors
are mathematically quantifiable to a useful degree of accuracy, creating
thresholds that correlate to government defeat with a remarkable degree
of consistency and accuracy.
Furthermore, the empirical data prove only two of the five factors
can be altered in any meaningful way after the onset of hostilities. In
essence, whether a government may be successful in suppressing an
internal rebellion depends predominantly on whether these five factors
are present at the start of the conflict. Thus, collectively, they constitute
a predictive model of probable outcomes with a reliability that startled
researchers. Cases of successful counterinsurgency often cited by
proponents of COIN doctrine were found to be simply cases where
all five political-military factors were already in favor of the existing
government at the outset of the conflict.
The research shows the basic assumption behind “clear, hold,
and build” (in Afghanistan), “pacification” (in Vietnam), or “nation
building” (in Iraq), indeed behind all counterinsurgency, is wrong. No
11. The Correlates of War Project, data sets, https://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets;
and Oxford University Armed Conflict Database, https://libguides.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/c
.php?g=422808&p=2887072.
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evidence supports the contention that these lines of effort increased
government legitimacy—one of the five factors—and a number of
studies found such efforts did not. For example, an independent
before-and-after study conducted during the war in Afghanistan
showed a mathematically 0 percent increase in either support for the
local government or the government in Kabul after the completion of
hundreds of civil affairs projects.12 A similar study produced the same
results during the Iraq War.13 In his study of the massive US Civil
Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) effort
in Vietnam, British historian Andrew Gawthorpe also concluded the
effort to increase support for and the legitimacy of the South Vietnamese
government did not work.
Nation building had failed. . . . CORDS failed despite its attempt in the latter
years of the war to emulate the successes of the Vietnamese Communist
movement through the village system. Through the village system . . . .
CORDS had abandoned the attempt to build rural support on the basis
of an imagined community of the South Vietnamese nation, and instead
had shifted to the idea of communalism which the communists had used
so successfully. . . . But it was precisely the political contents of CORD’s
programs, and its attempts to forge a network of pro-GVN village
communities that failed. The GVN never managed to become . . . legitimate
enough to demand the sacrifices needed to win the struggle against the
Communist movement. As outsiders both in understanding and in influence,
American nation builders could hardly do so either. . . . Nation building
was an unavoidable condition of victory. . . . It was also almost certainly
preordained to be impossible.14

In many cases, as a result of poorly understood local village
economies, aid projects were found to have increased local conflict.15 A
study focused on the Kapit-Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan-Comprehensive
and Integrated Delivery of Social Services program in the Philippines,
for example, found the “program exacerbated violent conflict in
eligible municipalities.”16

Civil War or Insurgency?

Before proceeding further, a note on etymology is needed to
explain why the study used the terminology “internal conflict,” or
“internal rebellion,” instead of insurgency or civil war. Conflict naming
conventions are fraught with political considerations and are often driven
12. Jennifer Brick, The Political Economy of Customary Village Organizations in Rural Afghanistan
(report prepared for the annual meeting of the Central Eurasian Studies Society, Washington, DC,
September 2008), https://www.bu.edu/aias/brick.pdf.
13. Barnett Koven, “Development Assistance and the Diffusion of Insurgent Violence” (PhD
diss., George Washington University, May 21, 2017).
14. Andrew J. Gawthorpe, To Build as Well as Destroy: American Nation Building in South Vietnam
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018), 185–90.
15. Nathan Nunn and Nancy Qian, “US Food Aid and Civil Conflict,” American Economic Review
104, no. 6 (June 2014): 1630–66, https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.104.6.1630.
16. Benjamin Crost, Joseph Felter, and Patrick Johnston, “Aid under Fire: Development
Projects and Civil Conflict,” American Economic Review 104, no. 6 (June 2014): 1833–56, https://www
.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.104.6.1833.
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by participant perspectives and politics.17 The dictionary definitions of
civil war and insurgency are basically the same: two groups of citizens
of the same country fighting each other for political power.18 There is
nothing in the dictionary definition of either term regarding the size of
the conflict, its duration, or other characteristics. The difference in the
applications of these terms is thus primarily political.
Governments fighting against internal rebellions generally avoid
using the term “civil war” since it reflects badly on the government
and possibly legitimizes the opposition. Instead, these governments
prefer terms like “rebellion” and “insurgency,” and they may even use
words intended to delegitimize the rebelling group as a whole, such as
“bandits” and “malcontents.”19 Following this pattern, when foreign
powers intervene in internal conflicts on the side of governments, they
too, usually use the term “insurgency” to refer to the fighting. Thus,
when the United States intervened in Vietnam and Afghanistan in
support of those governments, the conflicts were consistently referred
to as insurgencies and rarely, if ever, as civil wars.
In contrast, in cases where the United States opposes the
government in power, such as the ongoing conflict in Syria, the fighting
is typically referred to in official statements and policy documents as a
civil war. Conversely Russia, which has intervened heavily on behalf
of the al-Assad government of Syria, refers to the conflict there as an
insurgency and never uses the term civil war.20
A hermeneutical reading of US government-produced documents
that define insurgency, such as Joint Publication 3-24, Counterinsurgency
Operations, the aforementioned US Government Counterinsurgency Guide,
and the CIA’s Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency, shows the definitions
inherently privilege the existing governments with terms like
“constituted government” and “established government” and identify
rebel political activities as “illegal,” so the use of the term “insurgency”
effectively means the speaker has taken the side of the government.21 Of
note, the United Nations tellingly avoids both terms, preferring neutral
language such as conflict and violence. The characterization of an
internal conflict as an insurgency or a civil war is usually driven by which
side of the conflict the speaker is on; hence the term is best avoided.22
17. Edward Wong, “A Matter of Definition: What Makes a Civil War, and Who Declares
It So?” New York Times, November 26, 2006, https://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/26/world
/middleeast/26war.html.
18. Merriam-Webster, s.v. “civil war (n.),” https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary
/civil%20war; and Cambridge Dictionary, s.v. “insurgency (n.),” https://dictionary.cambridge.org
/us/dictionary/english/insurgency.
19. Michael V. Bhatia, “Fighting Words: Naming Terrorists, Bandits, Rebels and Other Violent
Actors,” Third World Quarterly 26, no. 1 (2005): 5–22, https://www.jstor.org/stable/3993760?
refreqid=excelsior%3A259cbe2857da1aae6100f9a2d5d06073&seq=1.
20. Madeline Conway, “Timeline: U.S. Approach to the Syrian Civil War,” Politico, April 7, 2017,
https://www.politico.com/story/2017/04/timeline-united-states-response-syria-civil-war-237011;
and Wong, “A Matter of Definition.”
21. US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency, rev. ed.
(Washington, DC: CIA, 2012), 28–29.
22. Wong, “A Matter of Definition.”
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Five Determinant Factors of Internal Conflict

In addition to the criteria of legitimacy of governance identified
above, the other determinant factors identified or confirmed by the
study as corresponding to government defeat in at least 94 percent of all
53 conflicts are: national identity (the percentage of the population that
locates its personal identity at the level of the nation), the percentage
of the population adequately safeguarded by internal security services,
and two binary variables already broadly known in the literature of
internal conflict—external sanctuary for rebels and the preexistence of
sustainable security forces. The latter two criteria require little additional
amplification except to note the study research bears out these two
recognized factors without exceptions.
The study was able to quantify the levels of national identity and
population control necessary for a government to prevail as 85 percent—
the same as for government legitimacy. The parameter of national
identity, in the accepted political science sense, was defined as at least
85 percent of the population locating their personal identities at the level
of the nation.23 In cases where less than 85 percent of the population
claimed a unified national identity, 96 percent of governments facing
internal rebellion as defined above suffered defeat. The national identity
factor usually coincided or nested with that of legitimacy of governance,
especially in cases where the majority ethnic, linguistic, or religious
national group comprised more than 85 percent of the population and
also predominated in the country’s government.
The factor of population security was defined as the government
securing and isolating at least 85 percent of the people from meaningful
contact with or violence from guerilla elements. It is usually impossible
to prevent a single guerilla or a small group of guerillas, either openly
or in disguise, from infiltrating a populated area and from avoiding
detection by security forces for a brief period—for example, to prevent
every suicide bomber from getting through security measures. Security
is rarely airtight, but successful governments create firewalls between at
least 85 percent of the civilian population and guerillas; such barriers
prevent meaningful political contact, such as proselytizing, leafleting,
and public addresses, as well as virtually all targeted violence against
government leaders and supporters.
Governments that failed to secure 85 percent of their populations
lost in 94 percent of the 53 case studies. The 85 percent threshold
recurred throughout the research and was almost a magic number in
government survival. The criticality of population security to defeating
internal rebellions is well established. Mao Zedong, for example,
recognized the threshold in 1937 in his treatise, On Guerrilla Warfare:
“Historical experience suggests that there is very little hope of destroying
a revolutionary guerrilla movement after it has survived the first phase
and has acquired the sympathetic support of a significant segment of
23. Omar Dahbour, “National Identity: An Argument for the Strict Definition,” Public Affairs
Quarterly 16, no. 1 (January 2002): 17–37, https://www.jstor.org/stable/40441311?seq=1.
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the population. The size of this ‘significant segment’ will vary; a decisive
figure might range from 15 to 25 per cent.”24 The data derived from the Study
of Internal Conflict more precisely pinpoint this number at a minimum
of 15 percent.
The first of the two binary variables, the existence of militarily
significant external sanctuary available to rebel forces, was defined for the
study as the persistent ability of insurgents to cross a neighboring border
in numbers that would impact the outcome of a conflict and to obtain
sanctuary there from government forces. Defining militarily significant
numbers seemed at first to be problematic for the study designers. In
actuality, however, the existence or lack of external sanctuary was clearcut in virtually all of the 53 conflicts—there were few marginal calls to
be made in assessing whether rebels had cross-border sanctuary. Rebel
movements on islands, for example, could not have external sanctuary
in any significant numbers. Conversely, most international borders are
very difficult to secure completely, even for developed countries with
almost unlimited resources (for example, the US borders with Canada
and Mexico).
In all 53 conflicts, governments were unable to defeat rebel
movements that maintained external sanctuaries. The sole ambiguous
case in this regard was the second stage of the Greek Civil War from
1946 to 1949, in which the leftist National Popular Liberation Army,
or Ethnikós Laïkós Apeleftherotikós Strátos (ELAS), initially had sanctuary
and external support from bordering Albania and Yugoslavia, and to a
lesser extent, from Bulgaria. But the UN General Assembly began to
criticize severely the three communist countries for their role in the
war, and in 1949 Yugoslavia broke with Russia and closed its frontier
with Greece. The loss of sanctuary in Yugoslavia was a severe blow to
ELAS as was greatly diminished help from and refuge in Bulgaria and
Albania—Stalin backpedaled from his proxy support through Bulgaria
while the United States surged aid to the Greek government. While
ELAS made many tactical blunders, this early case study in the postwar
record remains an asterisk in the factor of external sanctuaries.25
The second binary variable factor was defined for the study as
the preexistence of sustainable, reasonably competent government
security forces at the onset of internal violence. The study found no
government since 1945 facing an armed rebel movement that did not
have existing security forces survived the conflict. In other words, the
lack of an established army at the beginning of an internal conflict was
fatal for the government in every case. But because virtually all countries
24. US Marine Corps (USMC), Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare, Fleet Marine Force Reference
Publication 12-18, transl. Samuel B. Griffith (Washington, DC: Headquarters, USMC, April 5,
1989), 27, https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Publications/FMFRP%2012-18%20%20Mao%20
Tse-tung%20on%20Guerrilla%20Warfare.pdf. Italics added.
25. See “Greek Civil War,” HistoryNet, website, https://www.historynet.com/greek-civil-war
.htm; Amikam Nachmani, International Intervention in the Greek Civil War: The United Nations Special
Committee on the Balkans, 1947–1952 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1990); and Andre Gerolymatos, Red
Acropolis, Black Terror: The Greek Civil War and the Origins of the Soviet-American Rivalry, 1943–1949
(New York: Basic Books, 2004).
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since 1945 have had standing armies under the control of their central
governments, this factor did not often come into play and therefore had
a relatively minor impact on the research findings. Nonetheless, there
are significant exceptions, including the US phase of the Afghan conflict
from 2001–21 and the anti-government rebellion in Iraq after 2003.
Table 1. Conflict parameters
Metric

Fail Rate

National Identity

Factor

<85%

96%

Government Legitimacy

<85%

94%

Population Security

<85%

94%

Existing Security Forces

No

100%

External Sanctuary

Yes

100%

South Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, Colombia, and Malaya

Brief executive summaries of case studies where counterinsurgency
doctrine was applied are useful for illustrating how these five basic parameters
are situated within and applied to historical conflicts. The counterinsurgency
efforts in Vietnam and Afghanistan stand out among America’s wars for the
tragedy and futility surrounding them. Considerable time has been spent
identifying lessons learned from both wars, and these lessons learned were
the genesis of the Study of Internal Conflict Research Program in 2015.
At a fundamental strategic level, the two conflicts are structurally similar.
In both cases, the United States effectively created and supported a government
in a country that was not a nation in the political science usage of the word.
In both cases, the United States attempted to create a democracy as the basis
for the government’s legitimacy where no previous tradition of democracy
existed.26 In both wars, anti-government forces received existential support
from a nuclear-armed neighbor and had cross-border external sanctuaries
in two neighboring countries (Laos and Cambodia in the Vietnam War,
Pakistan and Iran in the Afghanistan War), which the United States and the
central governments of South Vietnam and Afghanistan respectively could
do little to disrupt.
In both conflicts the central governments, which were largely created and
supported by the United States (with some degree of additional international
support), were not broadly seen as legitimate by a majority of the population
(again in the political science usage of the term).27 Moreover, opponents of
the regimes in both cases were able to mobilize narratives that established
a greater claim to legitimacy from other sources, in the Weberian sense.28
In Vietnam and Afghanistan, the United States built a comprehensive,
26. Dahbour, “National Identity.”
27. See Princeton Encyclopedia of Self-Determination, s.v. “legitimacy,” Princeton University, https://
pesd.princeton.edu/node/516.
28. Max Weber, “IV. Politics as a Vocation: ‘Politik als Beruf,’ Gesammelte Politische Schriften,”
in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, trans. and ed. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 77–128, http://www.columbia.edu/itc/journalism/stille
/Politics%20Fall%202007/Readings%20--%20Weeks%201-5/Weber%20-%20Politics%20as%20
a%20Vocation.htm.
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top-down model of governance (central government to provincial government
to district government), while the opponents of the regimes worked from
the bottom up to control the village populations in the rural areas, where
approximately 80 percent of the people of both countries lived.
In both Vietnam and Afghanistan, US war planners made a conscious
choice to rely primarily on police or local paramilitary forces to protect villagers
against guerilla infiltration and violence—forces that were demonstrably
unequal to those tasks in both conflicts—while conventional military forces
were used to conduct large “cordon and sweep operations” intended to
drive guerilla forces from an area and confiscate or destroy weapons and
materiel useful to the enemy.29 Leaders of local governing bodies, established
at the district levels in South Vietnam and Afghanistan, were often chosen
by the central governments in Saigon and Kabul on the basis of graft
pyramid schemes or palace politics and were frequently unacceptable to local
populations as a result—a counterproductive effort that made the rebel’s
local political work easier.30
In both Vietnam and Afghanistan, there was a trifurcation of lines
of effort. As the main conventional Army defaulted to conventional
operations, the smaller civil affairs components conducted pacification and
reconstruction programs, which were often at odds with frequently corrupt
central government planning efforts. At the same time, special operators
increasingly sought to eliminate high-value targets with CIA oversight
through the Phoenix Program in Vietnam and similar high-value-target
operations in Afghanistan. In both conflicts, these targeted kill-or-capture
missions were not coordinated with the conventional forces and were often
conducted on the basis of flawed intelligence, sometimes neutralizing the
intended target, but often arriving too late or arresting or killing the wrong
man. These operations upset villagers, upending the patient work of the civil
affairs components, and played into enemy propaganda.
Tragically in both conflicts, the overuse and sometimes indiscriminate
application of the US advantages in fire support resulted in extensive civilian
casualties. An estimated 220,000 South Vietnamese civilians were killed by
forces fighting for the South Vietnamese government from 1962 to 1975,
and at least 135,000 civilians have been killed and wounded in Afghanistan
since 2001, where claims about responsibility often conflict.31 Such civilian
casualties alienated the rural population not just from the United States
but from the central government it was known to be supporting.
29. See for example, David Pearson, “Low-Intensity Operations in Northern Ireland,” in
Soldiers in Cities: Military Operations on Urban Terrain, ed. Michael C. Desch (Carlisle, PA: Strategic
Studies Institute, 2001), 106.
30. Gawthorpe, “To Build as Well as Destroy.”
31. Charles Hirschman, Samuel Preston, and Vu Manh Loi, “Vietnamese Casualties during the
American War: A New Estimate,” Population and Development Review 21, no. 4 (December 1995): 783–
812, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2137774?seq=1; Neta C. Crawford, Update on the Human Costs
of War for Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2001 to mid-2016 (Boston: Watson Institute, Brown University,
August 2016); “Afghanistan: Civilian Casualties Exceed 10,000 for Sixth Straight Year,” UN News,
February 22, 2020, https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/02/1057921; and UN Assistance Mission
in Afghanistan (UNAMA), Afghanistan: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Annual Report 2020
(Kabul, Afghanistan: UNAMA, February 2021), 11, https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default
/files/afghanistan_protection_of_civilians_report_2020_revs3.pdf.
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There are many other operational parallels between the wars,
such as the marginalizing of the advisory mission until far too late in
the conflicts, infantry tactics that instilled systemic overreliance on
US-provided air support among the South Vietnamese and Afghan
armies, and the inability to develop a functional language capability
to obviate the persistent failure of communications via interpreters.
In another parallel, the United States and the host governments,
while attempting to build stable armies in Vietnam (the Army of the
Republic of Vietnam) and Afghanistan (the Afghan National Army),
were largely unable to overcome debilitating problems with desertions
(attrition rates in Afghanistan never dropped below 30 percent per
year), enemy infiltration of the ranks (resulting in widespread lack of
information security), pervasive drug use, and getting recruits into the
training pipeline.32

South Vietnam
While the basic building blocks of a separate South Vietnamese
national identity—a common ethnicity, culture, and language shared
by more than 85 percent of the population—arguably existed in the
mid-1950s, the government of Ngo Dinh Diem squandered the social
capital, which did exist for creating a South Vietnamese nation, by
exacerbating the religious fault line between the Catholic minority
government and the country’s Buddhist majority, effectively creating a
body of resistance to the government that remained a key factor in South
Vietnamese politics throughout its brief existence.33 Diem also alienated
the nonethnic-Vietnamese peoples living in the south, such as the Nung,
Hmong, Chan, and Hoa, further eroding his legitimacy. Rather than
trying to build consensus and a broad nationalist movement, Diem
chose to focus on repressing his political rivals in the south and waging
war against competing anticommunist sects such as the Cao Dai and the
Hoa Hao at the expense of national cohesion.34
Thus, none of the governments of South Vietnam had 85 percent
legitimacy, and South Vietnam could not be considered a nation (less
than 85 percent of the population self-identified specifically as South
Vietnamese as opposed to simply Vietnamese). While the communist
movement in the South, which became known colloquially as the Viet
Cong, was initially weak, by 1958 the South Vietnamese government
could no longer claim full population security of and control over
85 percent of the population of the south.
Moreover, this figure continued to erode throughout the course of
the conflict until by 1972, the Viet Cong controlled or influenced the
majority of the rural population of the country south of the demilitarized
32. M. Chris Mason, The Strategic Lessons Unlearned from Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan: Why the
Afghan National Security Forces Will Not Hold, and the Implications for the U.S. Army in Afghanistan (Carlisle,
PA: US Army War College Press, 2015), https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/2340.pdf.
33. Jessica M. Chapman, Cauldron of Resistance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and 1950s Southern
Vietnam (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013).
34. Chapman, Cauldron of Resistance.
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zone. Enemy forces could and did make massive use of external
sanctuaries and supply corridors in bordering Laos and Cambodia,
which the United States and South Vietnam were not able to interdict
effectively. Of the five factors defined by the study, only the preexistence
of a sustainable and reasonably competent army applied. South Vietnam
did possess the basic elements of a capable military force with some very
good fighting elements, particularly its ranger and paratrooper battalions.
But these capabilities were largely crippled by central government
corruption and political appointments to military leadership positions
that prioritized loyalty to Saigon over military competence.
Table 2. Conflict parameters: South Vietnam
Factor

Metric

National Identity

No

Government Legitimacy

No

Population Security

No

Existing Security Forces

Yes

External Sanctuary

Yes

Afghanistan
Not only is Afghanistan not a nation (less than 85 percent of the
population places their personal identities at the level of an Afghan
nation), it is one of the most segmented and fragmented countries on
the earth.35 For example, more than 40 first languages are spoken in
Afghanistan, 17 in Nuristan Province alone—more languages than
are spoken in all of Western Europe. These languages are largely
determinant of identity, as civil conflict has raged in Afghanistan since
the 1970s between the Pashto-speaking plurality of the population and
shifting coalitions of the other ethnic and linguistic groups.36 Adding
to the fragmentation is the hostility between the Sunni Muslim majority
and the Shia minority, which is predominantly but not exclusively of the
Hazāra ethnic group.
The status of the two binary factors necessary for government
success—the existence of a sustainable and reasonably competent army
in 2002, when the Taliban were driven from power and began to build
a rebel movement, and the existence of cross-border sanctuary to a
militarily significant degree—is well known.
The mathematical odds against success were rendered
insurmountable by the imposition of popular democracy—a form of
government which had never been practiced in Afghanistan—that is
not widely accepted as legitimate governance in the Weberian sense.
Less than 30 percent of the voting-eligible Afghan population voted
35. Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 1990); and Metin Gurcan, What Went Wrong in Afghanistan? Understanding CounterInsurgency Efforts in Tribalized Rural and Muslim Environments (Solihull, UK: Helion & Company, 2016).
36. Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “No Sign until the Burst of Fire: Understanding
the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier,” International Security 32, no. 4 (Spring 2008): 41–77; and Bernard
Comrie, ed., The Major Languages of Western Europe, 1st ed. (Abingdon, NY: Routledge, 2015), v–vi.
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for Hamid Karzai, and less than 5 percent voted for Ashraf Ghani in
2019. The return of the Afghan king Mohammed Zahir Shah from exile
in 2001 as a ceremonial monarch and a figure of national unity, similar
to the role played by the royal families in Great Britain and Japan, could
have conferred popular legitimacy on a parliamentary government. The
return of King Zahir Shah, however, was rejected by the George W.
Bush administration, and the Afghan monarchy was eliminated against
the wishes of three quarters of the official delegates to the Emergency
Loya Jirga in what amounted to a CIA coup d’état.37
Traditional legitimacy in the form of a Pashtun king has always been
the predominant source of legitimacy of governance in Afghanistan.38
The absence of the legitimacy and stability provided by this monarchy
in Afghan society created a vacuum, and the Pashtun Taliban movement
essentially filled this legitimacy vacuum with a religious source of
legitimacy understood by the population. Although the Taliban initially
enjoyed little support among the Afghan people as a result of its failures
in governance, draconian social policies from 1996 to 2001, and harsh
Deobandi interpretations of Islamic law not native to Afghanistan, their
support has increased. Today the Ghani government maintains full
control of less than 54 percent of the Afghan population.39
Table 3. Conflict parameters: Afghanistan
Factor

Metric

National Identity

No

Government Legitimacy

No

Population Security

No

Existing Security Forces

No

External Sanctuary

Yes

Iraq
Many of the same problems were faced in the nation-building effort
in Iraq after 2003. As defined by most political scientists, Iraq was—and
is—not a nation.40 Following World War I, in the wake of the Sykes-Picot
Agreement, the boundary lines drawn across the sand by Gertrude Bell
37. Mason, Strategic Lessons Unlearned, 143; Pamela Hess “Afghan Council Postponed, King
Steps Aside,” United Press International, June 10, 2002, www.upi.com/Business_News/Security
-Industry/2002/06/10/Afghan-council-postponed-king-steps-aside/UPI-62001023745673/; and
Camelia Entekhabi-Fard, “Accusations of American Meddling Mar Afghan Council,” Eurasianet,
June 12, 2002, https://eurasianet.org/accusations-of-american-meddling-mar-afghan-council; and
author interviews with two eyewitness participants.
38. Roy, Islam and Resistance; and Carlo J. V. Caro, “Afghan Kings and the Failure of U.S.
Military Intervention,” RealClearDefense, February 12, 2020, https://www.realcleardefense.com
/articles/2020/02/12/afghan_kings_and_the_failure_of_us_military_intervention_115034.html.
39. Bill Roggio, “Analysis: US Military Downplays District Control as Taliban Gains
Ground in Afghanistan,” Long War Journal, January 31, 2019, https://www.longwarjournal.org
/archives/2019/01/analysis-us-military-downplays-district-control-as-taliban-gains-ground-in
-afghanistan.php.
40. Dahbour, “National Identity.”
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in 1922 to create Iraq’s current boundaries made no political sense.41 By
the beginning of the twenty-first century, only Saddam Hussein’s brutal
police state held the country together. Following the US invasion, the
government installed by the United States was not seen as legitimate by
85 percent of the Iraqi population, and it was never able to provide full
security to at least 85 percent of the total population. Thus, none of the
three 85 percent parameters of government success against insurgency
existed after 2003. Because the standing Iraqi army was disbanded
before the start of the internal rebellion and some rebels were able to find
sanctuary and support to some degree across international borders, none
of the five political-military factors established by the research study
as necessary for government success in quelling an internal rebellion
existed in Iraq in 2003.
Table 4. Conflict parameters: Iraq
Factor

Metric

National Identity

No

Government Legitimacy

No

Population Security

No

Existing Security Forces

No

External Sanctuary

Yes

Colombia

The Marxist insurgency in Colombia, known at first as “La Violencia,”
began in the 1920s and was waged by a number of rebel groups, most
notably since 1960 the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación
Nacional ) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia). This internal conflict, suppressed
in 2016, makes a fascinating case study within the context of the five
parameters of the research project. Colombia can be defined as a nation,
as at least 85 percent of the population self-identifies as Colombian.
Colombia is multiethnic, but its people share a language, religion, and
culture that are almost universal throughout the country.
Colombia’s governments in the twentieth century were seldom
broadly popular but were accepted as legitimate in the sense that
the government’s laws were recognized and its right to govern was
accepted by at least 85 percent of the population.42 Colombia’s rebels
could not gain cross-border sanctuary in militarily significant numbers;
Colombia’s border regions with Venezuela and Ecuador are remote and
uninhabitable jungles, a deadly “green desert” in which daily survival
41. James Buchan, “Miss Bell’s Lines in the Sand,” Guardian, March 11, 2003, https://www
.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/12/iraq.jamesbuchan; and Robin Wright, “How the Curse of
Sykes-Picot Still Haunts the Middle East,” New Yorker, April 30, 2016, https://www.newyorker.com
/news/news-desk/how-the-curse-of-sykes-picot-still-haunts-the-middle-east.
42. See for example Marco Palacios, Between Legitimacy and Violence: A History of Colombia 1875–
2002 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006); Abbey Steele, Democracy and Displacement in
Colombia’s Civil War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2017); and Summer Newton, ed., Assessing
Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies: Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Colombia
(1964–2009) (Fort Bragg, NC: US Army Special Operations Command, undated), https://www
.soc.mil/ARIS/books/pdf/ARIS_Colombia-BOOK.pdf.
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even for experts is a struggle. At the outbreak of La Violencia, Colombia’s
standing army was sustained by the government, and the army was
reasonably competent as defined by the study.
But one of the five factors—population security—was initially
missing from the equation, allowing a succession of rebel movements
to survive at a level that stressed Colombian society at times. Beginning
in the 1920s, government forces could not isolate the guerillas from at
least 85 percent of Colombia’s population because at least 70 percent of
the country’s population at the onset of La Violencia was rural. During
the twentieth century and into the twenty-first century, Colombia
underwent a dramatic demographic shift—by 2018, just under 80
percent of the population was urban. Because cities are much easier to
secure, Colombian security forces were eventually able to reach the magic
number of more than 85 percent population security and control.43 The
steady construction of all-season roads linking Colombia’s rural regions
to its cities also made the movement of security forces easier and faster,
as did the advent of helicopters for military transport.
In short, all five political-military conditions existed by 2016 to
starve the last of the guerilla forces, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias
de Colombia movement, of sufficient recruits and sources of popular
support, and the survivors agreed to a cease-fire.
Table 5. Conflict parameters: Colombia
Factor

Metric

National Identity

Yes

Government Legitimacy

Yes

Population Security

No → Yes

Existing Security Forces

Yes

External Sanctuary

No

Malaya
The Malayan Emergency is another notable case study that confirms
the parameters identified in the research project. This 1950s conflict,
in what was then the British colony of Malaya, is often cited as proof
that counterinsurgency works if “done right.” In fact, it does not. In
the context of the identified political-military parameters of government
success, all five elements necessary to defeat an internal rebellion were in
place at the start of the conflict.
First, Malaya was a nation as defined by political science: at least
85 percent of the population identified itself as Malay—of the Malay
ethnic group—which comprised and still comprises approximately
90 percent of the country’s population.44 The Malay speak a common
language understood throughout the country and share a common
culture. Significantly, during the 1950s conflict and subsequent outbreaks
43. Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE), Población ajustada por
cobertura - Censo Nacional de Población y Vivienda 2018 (Bogotá, Colombia: DANE, 2018).
44. Dahbour, “National Identity.”
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of violence in Malaya since then, virtually all the rebels were ethnic
Chinese, who comprise just 10 percent of the country’s population. Not
all ethnically Chinese citizens were rebels, but essentially all rebels were
ethnically Chinese.
Furthermore, the Chinese minority, who faced economic
discrimination and a permanent underclass status within the country,
lived in an apartheid society in which they were clustered almost entirely
in segregated villages and towns and did not usually venture into Malay
settlements. Because the physiognomy of the two ethnic groups is quite
distinct, this separation was relatively easy to enforce. As a result, the
government secured more than 85 percent of the population—the
90 percent of the population which was Malay—and excluded anyone
who might have been a guerilla from Malay areas. The ethnic Chinese
rebels were easily spotted and detained in most of the country, and
they could find little or no support or sympathy among the majority
Malay population.
The British faced no problems with a host-country government,
unlike the United States in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq. For example,
they could make any rules or laws they pleased, and they did not have
to beg an intransigent president to make needed reforms. In addition,
the British publicized they would return the country to the ethnic Malay
majority as soon as the rebellion was quelled. This move incentivized
the Malay people to work even harder to suppress a minority group they
already disliked intensely and enabled the government to claim sufficient
legitimacy to conduct the counter-rebellion with the support of at least
85 percent of the people.
The ethnic Chinese rebels were unable to gain meaningful external
support or cross-border sanctuary, and British Malaya had welldisciplined and competent military and police forces sustained by the
British government in London. Thus all five essential political-military
factors permitting government success were in place at the start of the
conflict and remained there until the conflict ended, which took many
years to accomplish, even with every advantage favoring the British.
Table 6: Conflict parameters: Malaya
Factor

Metric

National Identity

Yes

Government Legitimacy

Yes

Population Security

Yes

Existing Security Forces

Yes

External Sanctuary

No

The eventual victory in Malaya had nothing to do with military
skills or tactics peculiar to counterinsurgency or with specialized
cultural knowledge the British possessed beyond the ability to discern
the difference between the Malay and Chinese citizens of the colony.
Instead, this victory had everything to do with national identity,
population protection, legitimacy of governance, and the lack of
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cross-border sanctuary for rebel soldiers in any significant numbers, all
of which existed before the conflict started.

Conclusion

The most critical lessons drawn from Vietnam, Afghanistan, and
other internal conflicts are: 1) in no case since 1945 has either a sense of
national identity or the legitimacy of the central government increased
during the conflict period, and 2) the levels of national identity, legitimacy
of governance, and population security necessary to suppress an internal
rebellion are all 85 percent or more. In the 53 conflicts meeting the
study criteria for intensity and rebel goals and in which any of these
parameters were not met, government mortality was close to 100
percent. Moreover, no instances were found in the 53 conflicts where
counterinsurgency efforts to increase the legitimacy of or support for an
existing government had such an effect. Because no increase in national
identity or legitimacy of governance was found during the course of
the conflict in any of the 53 case studies, their levels at the onset of conflict
are determinant of outcomes. In other words, these factors predict the
probability of government failure with a remarkable degree of accuracy.
In October 2001, when asked by a reporter if the United States could
avoid Afghanistan becoming another quagmire like Vietnam, then
President George W. Bush replied, “We learned some very important
lessons in Vietnam.”45 Over the intervening 20 years, the political
goals of the campaign, the military conduct of the conflict, and the
implementation of the nation-building efforts of the war in Afghanistan
have shown the United States did not learn the most important lessons.
With the US Army now pivoting again from small wars to planning for
near-peer conflict as it did after Vietnam, the true lessons of the wars in
Vietnam and Afghanistan, and about counterinsurgency in general, are
in danger of being lost once more.46

45. Nayanima Basu, “When Bush, Top US Officials Compared Afghan War to Vietnam
War—a War America Lost,” Print, December 11, 2019, https://theprint.in/world/when-bush
-top-us-officials-compared-afghan-war-to-vietnam-war-a-war-america-lost/333657/.
46. Michael T. Klare, “The US Military Is Preparing for a New War: After Years of a Fruitless War
on Terror, the Pentagon Is Turning Its Focus to China and Russia,” Nation, June 5, 2019, https://www
.thenation.com/article/us-military-is-preparing-for-new-wars-china-russia/.
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ABSTRACT: The rapid decline of the Peruvian left-wing insurgent
organization Sendero Luminoso was not only the result of the
arrest of its leader. An analysis of the precipitous weakening of the
organization using two social movement theories finds other factors
were involved in the demise of the organization as well. These
factors—participatory politics, support for the military among
the rural population, and alienation of the population by Sendero
Luminoso—provide insights to effective counterinsurgency tactics.

L

eading scholarship on the decline of the Peruvian left-wing
insurgent movement Sendero Luminoso (SL) attributes the
group’s eventual weakening to the loss of its charismatic leader.1
While the arrest of the group’s leader may be one reason for its dramatic
virtual defeat, this article engages two social movement theories—statecentric and framing—to argue decapitation alone cannot account for
SL’s decline. Three factors in particular account for the weakening of
Sendero Luminoso: 1) the participatory nature of Peruvian politics
provided citizens with left-wing ideologies the ability to exercise political
power without resorting to violence; 2) the military was moderately
successful at building credibility with and separating peasants from SL;
and 3) SL alienated potential supporters. These circumstances combined
to ensure the group’s effectiveness and influence would rapidly wane
with the arrest of its charismatic leader. Throughout this article, SL will
be conceptualized as a social movement—a group engaged in collective
action to achieve a particular goal. Sendero Luminoso, however, will
also alternately be referred to as an insurgency—a particular type of
social movement engaged in “subversion and violence to seize, nullify,
or challenge political control of a region,” and a terrorist group—an
organization that “instill[s] fear and coerce[s] individuals, governments
or societies” to achieve its goals.2

1. Robert B. Kent, “Geographical Dimensions of the Shining Path Insurgency in Peru,”
Geographical Review 83, no. 4 (Oct. 1993): 441–54; Sandra Woy-Hazleton and William A. Hazleton,
“Sendero Luminoso and the Future of Peruvian Democracy,” Third World Quarterly 12, no. 2 (April
1990): 21–35, https://doi.org/10.1080/01436599008420232; and Michael L. Burgoyne, “The Allure
of Quick Victory: Lessons from Peru’s Fight against Sendero Luminoso,” Military Review XC, no. 5
(September–October 2010): 68–73.
2. Department of Defense (DoD), DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, s.v.
“insurgency,” (Washington, DC: DoD, January 2021), https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents
/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf; and DOD Dictionary, s.v. “terrorism.”
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Background

In 1970, a charismatic philosophy professor named Abimael
Guzmán founded SL at San Cristóbal of Huamanga National University
in the city of Ayacucho. The name Sendero Luminoso, which translates
to shining path, is a reference to the writings of José Carlos Mariátegui.
Mariátegui proposed replacing Peru’s feudal land ownership system
with a socialist agrarian system that would not subordinate indigenous
sharecroppers to a minority of mestizo landowners.3 Mariátegui referred
to the path from sharecropping to socialism as the Shining Path, which
Guzmán used as the name for his insurgency. The group referred to its
philosophy as “Gonzalo Thought” in honor of Guzmán’s nom de guerre,
Comrade Gonzalo, and in addition to Mariátegui, it drew inspiration
from the writings of Karl Marx and Mao Zedong. Gonzalo Thought
advocated for imposing a communist dictatorship in a Maoist-style
campaign originating in Peru’s countryside.
On May 17, 1980, residents of Chuschi, Peru, went to vote after the
transition from a military to a civilian regime and found SL had burned
ballot boxes.4 Following this initial act of rebellion and while President
Fernando Belaúnde Terry’s administration still underestimated its
strength, SL quickly gained territory, employed indiscriminate violence,
and assassinated public officials and members of moderate left-wing
political parties. In 1982, Belaúnde deployed the army and marines to
set up emergency zones. Under his and the subsequent administrations
of Alan García and Alberto Fujimori, the military and police acted
with little restraint. Most violence occurred before Guzmán’s arrest and
SL’s rapid atrophy in 1992 and resulted in over 69,000 deaths caused by
both sides.5

Leadership Decapitation

Some scholars contend the decline of SL came about because the
group could not function without its charismatic leader, finding positive
links between leadership decapitation and the mortality of terrorist
organizations including Sendero Luminoso.6 Other scholars argue the
unpredictability of leadership succession in war makes it difficult to
identify leadership decapitation as the reason for a group’s weakening, or
they propose the removal of a group’s leadership is outright ineffective

3. José Carlos Mariátegui, Seven Interpretive Essays on Peruvian Reality, rev. ed., trans. Marjory
Urquidi (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1971), 22–61.
4. Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Truth Commission: Peru 01, July 13, 2001 to August 28,
2003, https://www.usip.org/publications/2001/07/truth-commission-peru-01.
5. Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Peru 01.
6. Audrey Kurth Cronin, How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist
Campaigns (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 14–34; Bryan C. Price, “Targeting Top
Terrorists: How Leadership Decapitation Contributes to Counterterrorism,” International Security
36, no. 4 (Spring 2012): 9–46; and Patrick B. Johnston, “Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the
Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns,” International Security 36, no.
4 (Spring 2012): 47–79, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00076.
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against terrorist organizations with bureaucratic structures and high
levels of popular support.7
An important limitation to the statistical analysis that is implied but
never mentioned in the literature is that any causal link between leader
decapitation and the survival of terrorist organizations only applies to
the aggregate level. Given the possible range of ideologies, organizational
structures, and resources available to terrorist organizations across
geographies and time, it is impossible to say if a single case of leadership
decapitation, such as the arrest of Guzmán, fits the aggregate-level
findings. Moreover, while leadership decapitation may increase the
likelihood terrorist groups will cease to exist, such an increase is no
guarantee this will happen.
Even in studies that found leadership decapitation increased the
likelihood a terrorist organization would be eliminated, other factors
almost certainly influenced the amount by which the likelihood of
such an outcome increased. Some scholarship determined leadership
decapitation was effective against SL, but these studies also suggest if
terrorist organizations can weather the period of turmoil immediately
following the loss of key leaders, they can regroup and continue to be
viable. “Sendero has failed to revive itself as an ideological organization,
although a blossoming connection to cocaine trafficking has some
Peruvian officials worried the group could become a resurgent threat.”8
Similarly, a survival analysis model shows the mortality of terrorist
organizations that suffer leadership decapitation decreases over time as
the organization continues to exist.9
At the time of Guzmán’s capture, SL had been in existence 22 years
and had been fighting for 12 of those years, making it more likely to
survive than a younger insurgency. Since at least 2002, SL has been
increasing its cocaine trafficking and attacks on the military, which
suggests SL survived Guzmán’s capture and successfully reorganized.10
Although there is an undeniable link between the survival of terrorist
groups and leadership decapitation, this link alone is insufficient to
account for SL’s decline. Among others, the example of the Taliban in
Afghanistan and its continued survival after significant leadership losses
calls into question the notion leadership decapitation alone guarantees a
terrorist organization’s downfall, including that of Sendero Luminoso.

Social Movement Theories

While political scientists have examined variations in the types
and causes of insurgent violence, this article examines SL as a social
7. Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1996), 55–87; and Jenna Jordan, “Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark: Why Terrorist
Groups Survive Decapitation Strikes,” International Security 38, no. 4 (Spring 2014): 7–38, https://
doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00157.
8. Cronin, How Terrorism Ends, 20.
9. Price, “Targeting Top Terrorists,” 43.
10. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Peru: Shining Path–Slowly Regrouping (Washington, DC:
National Intelligence Council, August 3, 2003).
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movement—a group of people engaged in collective action through
formal organization to achieve a goal.11 Although the Shining Path
is often referred to as a terrorist or insurgent group, terrorism and
insurgency, as defined above, align with the definition of a social
movement. Two theories of social movement explain revolutions—social
movements that replace existing power structures as SL tried to do—in
terms of the political participation of opposition groups and the ability
of movements to craft narratives that resonate with potential recruits.
The state-centric view posits revolutions should fail in systems
that allow citizen participation in politics and succeed in personalistic
regimes that do not afford citizens political power.12 But these polities
do not have to be democracies: some scholars find revolution to be
unlikely in semi-authoritarian regimes that maintain some ability for
opposition groups to participate and address grievances within the
political system.13 Whereas the only option to exercise political power
in a personalistic regime is through violence, an open political system
enables potential guerrillas to exercise political power within the existing
system.14 Moreover, the behavior of such regimes can enable revolutions:
the regime in question can marginalize the very elites whose support it
needs to remain in power, or by intentionally weakening the military to
avoid a coup, the regime can diminish military capabilities to the point
its armed forces are unable to quell a rebellion.15
A weakness of the state-centric view is that it does not afford agency
to individuals. In contrast, framing theorists emphasize the importance
of how leaders of social movements can deliver their messages, through
words and actions, to garner support.16 They argue revolutionary
movements cannot gain materiel support or sow discontent without
using effective messaging to attract this support or change opinions.17
Framing theory holds individuals have an attitude toward an object—a
policy or action—that constitutes the sum of their beliefs about that
object. Different individuals may have different criteria that shape their
beliefs, and those criteria constitute a frame. If a social movement can
craft its message in a way that changes peoples’ frames, it can change
11. Jason Lyall, “Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks?: Evidence
from Chechnya,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, no. 3 (June 2009): 331–62, https://doi.
org/10.1177/0022002708330881; Laia Balcells, “Rivalry and Revenge: Violence against Civilians
in Conventional Civil Wars,” International Studies Quarterly 54, no. 2 (June 2010): 291–313, https://
doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2010.00588.x; Reed M Wood, “Rebel Capability and Strategic
Violence against Civilians,” Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 5 (September 2010): 601–14, https://doi
.org/10.1177/0022343310376473; and Paul Collier, “Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their
Implications for Policy,” (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2000), 26.
12. Jeff Goodwin, No Other Way out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945–1991 (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 25.
13. Jeff Goodwin and Theda Skocpol, “Explaining Revolutions in the Contemporary Third
World,” Politics & Society 17, no. 4 (December 1989): 495.
14. Goodwin and Skocpol, “Explaining Revolutions,” 493.
15. Jack A. Goldstone, “Understanding the Revolutions of 2011: Weakness and Resilience in
Middle Eastern Autocracies,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 3 (May/June 2011): 10.
16. David A. Snow, “Framing and Social Movements,” in The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social
and Political Movements, ed. David A. Snow et al. (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 2.
17. Snow, “Framing and Social Movements,” 3.
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their attitudes and, in turn, their willingness to support or join the
movement. According to this perspective, in order to be successful,
a movement must craft a message that inspires people to view that
movement positively.18
In addition to theoretical arguments, more recent work on the role
of messaging in social movements has taken advantage of the availability
of quantitative data to provide more concrete evidence of the link
between framing and the success or failure of social movements. In
a study of insurgent group networks and their attitudes toward their
targets, researchers, using a news database, found evidence that rhetoric
emanating from leaders of insurgent groups was associated with the
political entities these groups were fighting against.19 Using data from
Twitter, another study showed how misinformation from right-wing
news sites changed peoples’ opinions ahead of the 2016 presidential
election.20 A third, survey-based study found some rebel movements
positively influenced observers’ attitudes about them by using a gendered
frame to highlight females’ contributions to the movement’s goals.21

Sendero Luminoso as a Social Movement

Both social movement theories—state-centric and framing—help
explain the decline of SL. The state-centric perspective explains how
systemic factors—democratization and the availability of peaceful
alternatives within the political system and improving civil-military
relations—pulled people away from Sendero Luminoso. The framing
model shows how an individual-level factor—lack of popular support—
pushed potential guerrillas away from SL. These circumstances
combined to ensure Sendero Luminoso's organization would be a
glasshouse easily broken and requiring years to reassemble.

Democratization and Peaceful Alternatives
From 1968 to 1980, Peruvians who embraced left-wing ideologies had
options to exercise political power within an increasingly democratic
system instead of joining SL. During this period, Peru was ruled by a
military junta that gradually built open political institutions, “peasant
federations, and rural cooperatives.”22 These initiatives cultivated
a well-organized polity committed to social reform, incorporating
18. Dennis Chong and James N. Druckman, “Framing Theory,” Annual Review of Political Science
10, no. 1 (June 2007): 104, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.072805.103054.
19. Michael Gabbay and Ashley Thirkill-Mackelprang, “A Quantitative Analysis of Insurgent
Frames, Claims, and Networks in Iraq,” (American Political Science Association (APSA) 2011 Annual
Meeting Paper, APSA, 2011): 37, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1900770.
20. Yochai Benkler et al., “Study: Breitbart-Led Right-Wing Media Ecosystem Altered Broader
Media Agenda,” Columbia Journalism Review, March 3, 2017, 14.
21. Devorah Manekin and Reed M. Wood, “Framing the Narrative: Female Fighters, External
Audience Attitudes, and Transnational Support for Armed Rebellions,” Journal of Conflict Resolution
64, no. 9 (2020): 1638–65.
22. Susan C. Bourque and Kay B. Warren, “Democracy without Peace: The Cultural Politics
of Terror in Peru,” Latin American Research Review 24, no. 1 (1989): 7–34; and James Ron, “Ideology
in Context: Explaining Sendero Luminoso’s Tactical Escalation,” Journal of Peace Research 38, no. 5
(September 2001): 579.
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left-wing groups into the political system, most of which merged into
the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) and United Left
(IU).23 Democratic reform reached a crescendo with the transition to
civilian rule in 1980.
After the transition to democracy, Peruvian politics became
increasingly open to Marxist-leaning opposition groups, and the success
of the APRA and IU illuminated a less violent and more desirable
alternative to Sendero Luminoso. During Belaúnde’s administration,
parties of all stripes mobilized and ran for public office. Congress was
comprised primarily of IU and APRA politicians, who won a combined
67 percent of the popular vote in national parliamentary elections in
1985 and had similar outcomes at the municipal level.24 “Unlike the
Sandinistas or the FMLN, a Sendero victory was rarely viewed by
commentators on the left or the right as an improvement over the
existing Peruvian regime, deeply flawed as it was.”25
While this history paints an optimistic picture of Peruvian politics,
skeptics may point to unpopular structural readjustments to the
economy, human rights violations caused by the military, and low public
approval ratings.26 It is also true that after taking office in 1990, Fujimori
censored the press, allowed the military to detain citizens arbitrarily,
and created secret courts to try insurgents. In 1992, he sent the military
into the streets of Lima, dissolved congressional and judicial powers,
and ruled by presidential decree. While these actions dealt a severe blow
to democratization, they received considerable public approval and did
not force citizens to resort to insurgency to exercise political power. For
example, one 1992 poll showed 73 percent of respondents supported
Fujimori’s actions, and two months later, that approval rating had
increased to 83 percent.27 Less than a year after the coup, Fujimori called
a constitutional referendum and restored legislative and judicial powers.

Improving Civil-Military Relations
Improving civil-military relations also helped pull would-be
guerrillas into peaceful political organizations. At the end of the 1980s,
the Belaúnde and Fujimori administrations pursued a more populationcentric counterinsurgency strategy, codified in the Peruvian army
manual Unconventional Countersubversion Warfare, ME 14-7. The manual
directed the military to organize civilians into rondas (patrols) to fight
the insurgents and to refrain from using indiscriminate violence. The

23. Bourque and Warren, “Democracy without Peace,” 16.
24. Ron, “Ideology in Context,” 584.
25. Ron, “Ideology in Context,” 571.
26. Gordon H. McCormick, The Shining Path and the Future of Peru (Santa Monica CA: RAND
Corporation, 1990).
27. María Teresa Quiroz, “Medios de comunicación y opinión política de los jóvenes en la
ciudad de Lima, (coyuntura del 5 de abril de 1992),” Contratexto, no. 7 (January 2, 1994): 133, https://
revistas.ulima.edu.pe/index.php/contratexto/article/view/1943/1945.
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manual also required the military to pay fair prices for items it acquired
from civilians and respect their “fundamental rights.”28
Some high-level commanders implemented the population-centric
approach and saw considerable success. After assuming command of
the Upper Huallaga Valley, Brigadier General Alberto Arciniega Huby
quickly realized indiscriminate violence “did not lead to favorable results”
and ordered antidrug police not to “engage in repressive operations
against coca growers.”29 Huby gained support with coca growers by
telling them he realized selling coca was their only way to eke out a
living and “they were not considered delinquents but participants in the
informal sector.”30 Though likely exaggerated, Huby recounts after that
meeting, the coca growers fought alongside the army in 60 battles and
killed 1,000 SL members.31
The city of Ayacucho also experienced some success in improving
civil-military relations. In 1990, US officials visited Ayacucho and
concluded the number of deaths and disappearances by the military
and police had decreased.32 Ayacucho’s district attorney and the special
prosecutor for human rights spoke of increased cooperation from the
army in prosecuting human rights violations, and others, including the
local Catholic bishop, spoke of General Petronio Fernandez-Davila
Carnero’s efforts to improve civil-military relations.33 Similarly, during
a SL strike in Ayacucho City, the police abstained from repression
because they believed such behavior would elicit SL retaliation
against civilians.34
Aside from reducing indiscriminate violence, the military began to
work closely with the communities it protected. The military established,
trained, and equipped rondas in indigenous communities and began
distributing shotguns to them in 1991. The following year, Fujimori
codified the rights of these citizens to bear arms into the constitution.
This action had a symbolic effect because Peruvian law had prohibited
indigenous people from owning firearms since the colonial period.35

Lack of Popular Support
Sendero Luminoso alienated potential supporters in words and
actions. It used slogans such as, “if we do not understand Maoism as the
28. Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, “Tomo II,” 287–89, https://www.usip.org/sites
/default/files/file/resources/collections/commissions/Peru01-Report/Peru01-Report_Vol2.pdf.
29. Alberto Arciniega Huby, “Civil-Military Relations and a Democratic Peru,” trans. Patricia
Radu and Michael Radu, Orbis 38, no. 1 (Winter 1994): 115.
30. Huby, “Civil-Military Relations,” 116.
31. Huby, “Civil-Military Relations,” 116.
32. US Embassy Lima, In the Eye of the Storm: An Ayacucho Trip Report, Part I (Lima, Peru: US
Embassy Lima, December 20, 1990), 4, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB64
/peru25.pdf.
33. US Embassy Lima, Ambassador’s Human Rights Calls in Ayacucho (Lima, Peru: US Embassy
Lima, December 11, 1990), 8–9, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB64/peru23.pdf.
34. US Embassy Lima, In the Eye, 5.
35. Orin Starn, “Villagers at Arms: War and Counterrevolution in the Central-South Andes.”
in Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru 1980–1995, ed. Steve J. Stern (Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 1998), 224–258, https://doi.org/10.1215/9780822398059-010.
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new, third and higher stage of Marxism, it is impossible to understand
anything.” Instead of linking its cause with the marginalization of
indigenous people by the state or highlighting the rural-urban divide,
Gonzalo Thought reduced the plight of rural indigenous communities to
class warfare.36 Initially, SL received reluctant support from indigenous
peasants marginalized by exploitative sharecropping arrangements and
racism because the organization provided education and redistributed
land from wealthy plantation owners.37
But the movement lost the allegiance of the indigenous population
by forcibly replacing indigenous leaders with its own leaders, forcing
farmers not to grow crops, banning indigenous social and religious
practices, and enslaving some indigenous people.38 In areas controlled by
Sendero Luminoso, residents faced brutal punishments for infractions
such as adultery, drunkenness, and complaining about the movement.39
Some communities formed rondas, but SL violently retaliated. In the village
of Lucanamarca, SL insurgents hacked up approximately 70 peasants
with machetes and hatchets and attacked other left-wing groups.40
Though indigenous communities bore the brunt of SL violence, the
group did not attack these communities out of racial or ethnic hatred
but instead attacked them to achieve the goal of installing a communist
dictatorship. A key pillar in Gonzalo Thought was the notion that
“human rights are contradictory to the rights of the people.” Using brutal
tactics against innocent civilians was therefore necessary and justified.41
Accordingly, SL assassinated an official from the US embassy, stoned a
ronda commander to death in Lucanamarca, and killed dogs and hung
them from telephone poles in Lima.42
Moreover, Guzmán denounced President García, the IU mayor of
Lima, and the Soviet Union, and SL assassinated leaders in other leftwing organizations.43 Between 1983 and 1992, the group assassinated
268 union leaders, politicians, and community organizers that could
36. James F. Rochlin, Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia, Mexico (Boulder,
CO: Lynne Rienner, 2020) 31–36.
37. Lewis Taylor, Shining Path: Guerrilla War in Peru’s Northern Highlands, 1980–1997 (Liverpool,
UK: Liverpool University Press, 2006).
38. Lewis Taylor, “Counter-Insurgency Strategy, the PCP-Sendero Luminoso and the Civil War
in Peru, 1980–1996,” Bulletin of Latin American Research 17, no. 1 (January 1998): 35–58; and “Peru
Rescues 39 ‘Slave Workers’ from Shining Path Farm,” BBC News, July 28, 2015.
39. Carlos Ivan Degregori, “A Dwarf Star,” North American Conference on Latin America Report on
the Americas 24, no. 4 (December 1990): 14–17, https://doi.org/10.1080/10714839.1990.11723187.
40. Edward Schumacher, “Insurgency in Peru: The Unarmed Are Dying,” New York Times,
June 8, 1983, https://www.nytimes.com/1983/06/08/world/insurgency-in-peru-the-unarmed-are
-dying.html.
41. Author translation; original: Partida Comunista de Perú, “Sobre Las Dos Colinas:
Documento de Estudio Para El Balance de La III Campaña,” 1991, http://www.cedema.org/ver.
php?id=699.
42. Degregori, “A Dwarf Star,” 11.
43. Author translation; original: Partido Comunista de Peru—Sendero Luminoso, “Línea de
Construcción de los Tres Instrumentos de la Revolución,” 1988, http://www.solrojo.org/pcp_doc
/pcp_lpg.ci.htm; and José Luis Rénique, “Apogee and Crisis of a ‘Third Path’: Mariateguismo,
‘People’s War,’ and Counterinsurgency in Puno, 1987–1994,” in Shining and Other Paths: War and Society
in Peru, 1980–1995, ed. Steve J. Stern (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), 318, https://doi
.org/10.1215/9780822398059-010.
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have been supporters.44 Members also assassinated journalists from
Lima that could have helped SL gain support.45 Ultimately, without
a political system to repress people to the point they would support
Sendero Luminoso and without an effective strategy to gain new
supporters, the capture of Guzmán dealt a serious, though not deadly,
blow to the movement.

Recommendations

Drawing on the analysis above, this section proposes three
recommendations essential to successful counterinsurgency: building
and strengthening civil society organizations, improving civil-military
relations, and driving a wedge between insurgents and potential recruits.
These recommendations are intended to deprive insurgents of their
ability to generate popular support and thus differ from traditional
counterterrorist operations undertaken to prevent the successful
employment of terrorist tactics.

Civil Society Organizations
The participatory nature of the political system and the presence of
civil society organizations gives citizens the ability to exercise political
power without resorting to violence. In situations where a robust civil
society exists during an insurgency, counterinsurgents should work with
civil society leaders to strengthen these organization and their appeal
to potential guerrillas and to moderates within the rebel movement
itself. If a functional civil society is nonexistent during an insurgency,
counterinsurgents must identify influential people to build civil society
organizations that can function as alternatives to taking up arms against
the state.
Although counterinsurgents are generally military or police forces,
diplomatic and development organizations such as the Department of
State, the United States Agency for International Development, and the
National Endowment for Democracy, or their international equivalents,
are better suited to execute and coordinate counterinsurgent efforts
working in concert with military and police operations.46 Indeed,
building and strengthening civil society organizations without military
operations will not resolve an insurgency and may facilitate insurgent
assassinations by making more identifiable targets. (Just such a scenario
resulted in the SL killings of APRA and IU leaders.) But as was the case
in the ethnic conflict in Serbia (1991–99), separatists clashes in Northern
Ireland (1968–98), the anticommunist struggle in Nicaragua (1981–90),
and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front insurgency in the Philippines

44. Ron, “Ideology in Context,” 583.
45. Bourque and Warren, “Democracy without Peace,” 21.
46. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Interorganizational Cooperation, Joint Publication 3-08
(Washington, DC: JCS, October 16, 2017), https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine
/pubs/jp3_08pa.pdf ?ver=2018-02-08-091414-467.
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(1977–2014), civil society organizations can have a pacifying effect that
complements military and police operations.47

Civil-Military Relations
The military’s shift to population-centric counterinsurgency,
restraint against wanton violence, and the creation of rondas helped
boost its credibility and legitimacy in the emergency zones it controlled.
With greater credibility and legitimacy, the military was able to win
over peasants and more selectively target SL insurgents. Improving
civil-military relations by refraining from indiscriminate violence and
building relationships with civilians isolates civilians from insurgents
and makes targeting insurgents easier. For example, Dotan Haim found
civilian aid in the Philippines was more effective at countering insurgent
influence and reducing violence in villages where civilians perceived the
army as being a more credible institution than in villages where the army
had less credibility.48
Practically, counterinsurgents will often be a mix of local security
forces and foreign military forces that provide training and logistical
support to the local force, as is the case in Afghanistan and Iraq. In
such cases, foreign counterinsurgents should train local forces to build
positive relationships with civilians and condition support for these
forces on refraining from indiscriminately targeting civilians. When only
one country’s security forces act as counterinsurgents, they should gain
credibility by liaising with civilians, protecting the civilian population
from insurgent violence, and minimizing civilian casualties.

Insurgents and Potential Recruits
Counterinsurgents should also deprive insurgents of potential
support. Sendero Luminoso was unable to garner popular support
because its rigid ideology and brutal tactics alienated the population
from which it needed support.49 When rebels use brutal tactics against
civilians, counterinsurgents should capitalize on the opportunity to
portray the rebels in a negative light.
Counterinsurgents can also exploit differences in ethnicity, religion,
social strata, or economic class between insurgents and their support
base. Recent research demonstrates the least inclusive armies have been
the least effective because they sow distrust and infighting; there is no
reason to think this would not also be the case with rebel movements.50
To create and highlight divisions between rebels and potential
supporters, public affairs, psychological operations, public diplomacy,
47. Catherine Barnes, Agents for Change: Civil Society Roles in Preventing War & Building Peace,
Issue Paper 2 (European Centre for Conflict Prevention/International Secretariat of the Global
Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, September 2006), https://www.gppac.net
/files/2018-11/Agents%20for%20Change.pdf.
48. Dotan A. Haim, “Civilian Social Networks and Credible Counterinsurgency” (working
paper, University of California San Diego, 2019).
49. Ron, “Ideology in Context,” 586.
50. Jason Lyall, Divided Armies: Inequalities & Battlefield Performance in War (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2020).
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and information operations experts must work together to identify
differences between insurgents and their support base and develop a
coherent messaging campaign to highlight those differences.

Conclusion

One of the most popular explanations for the decline of Sendero
Luminoso is that the group was ineffective without its charismatic
leader. But leadership decapitation theory does not fully account for
this decline because the evidence for leadership decapitation generalizes
across space and time. Such broad generalization ignores the political
and social contexts that lead to the decline of individual groups such as
the Shining Path. Accordingly, leadership decapitation does not explain
why SL could not survive without Guzmán, only that it could not survive
without him. Social movement theory instead provides a more thorough
explanation for the group’s sudden demise.
State-centric theory maintains revolutionary movements are
unlikely to prevail in political systems where citizens can exercise
political power without resorting to insurgency, and framing theory
emphasizes the importance of the messaging rebels use to gain support.
Peru offered citizens who embraced left-wing ideologies the ability to
exercise political power. The country had been democratizing since
1968, there were political parties with Marxist orientations, and starting
in 1990, the military worked to improve civil-military relations. Sendero
Luminoso itself failed to attract the support of citizens because of
the rhetoric and brutality it employed against other leftist groups and
against indigenous communities. To be successful in future conflicts,
counterinsurgents must build and strengthen civil society organizations,
improve civil-military relations, and drive a wedge between insurgents
and their popular support.

TOC

TOC

Allies and Partners

Europe: A Strategy for a Regional
and Middle Power
Jean-Yves Haine and Cynthia Salloum
©2021 Jean-Yves Haine and Cynthia Salloum

ABSTRACT: As the European Union deals with yet another crisis—
the COVID-19 pandemic—it must adopt a grand strategy based
on unity, policy, and proportionality: cohesion over inaction, policy
over process, and regional imperatives over global ambitions.
An analysis of past strategy documents and a study of current
international trends stress the need for a Union capable of shaping
its own environment rather than reacting to it. The pandemic should
accelerate Europe’s journey toward power maturity and responsibility.

B

y nature and temperament, the European Union (EU) is
not well suited for grand strategy. Norms and rules are its
vocabulary, not power and interests. Yet the evolution of the
international system toward a loose, multipolar configuration compels
Europeans to assume more responsibilities, notably in security and
defense. In this endeavor, the EU should build internal legitimacy,
seek proportionality between ends and means, retain some modesty in
ambition, and prioritize its neighborhood before advancing its interests
among distanced great powers.
As a cluster of supranational institutions, the EU is indeed a very
special entity: a monetary union, partial thus suboptimal; a classic
alliance, at least in the Treaty of Lisbon; and a permanent forum for
managing a substantial portion of the daily lives of 450 million people.
The Union is designed for rule-based consensus, cooperative behaviors,
and prudential decisions. Collectively the EU remains a strategic dwarf.
Will the coronavirus pandemic represent one crisis too many, or,
on the contrary, will it trigger successful reform efforts toward a more
integrated and efficient Union? Between a terminal stage of irrelevance
and a federal union, the most likely scenario, as is often the case with the
EU, will probably be another kick of the can further down the middle
road—enough to keep the Union alive, not too weakened but not too
ambitious either.
According to polls, Europeans are more aware of the need for a
stronger EU, yet they remain highly doubtful of its capacity to deliver.1
Thirty years after the end of the Cold War, the essential challenge
remains roughly similar: moving from a recognition of weakness to
1. Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard, “Europe’s Pandemic Politics: How the Virus
Has Changed the Public’s Worldview,” Policy Brief, European Council on Foreign Relations,
June 24, 2020, https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/europes_pandemic_politics_how_the
_virus_has_changed_the_publics_worldview.

TOC

48

Parameters 51(2) Summer 2021

a position of strength. Notable improvements—painful for some—
have been made in economic and monetary governance. Progress has
been slower, however, in the security and defense sectors in which the
historical division of labor—some nations adopt hard power while the
EU as a whole relishes soft power—has remained largely untouched.

Preexisting Conditions

The EU was built on three models: solidarity, democracy, and
economic governance. All three models have been in crisis for most of
the last decade. Europe’s 2015 migrant crisis nearly broke the European
modus operandi of solidarity. Europe’s democratic foundation has been
threatened by the rise of populist political movements, and in some
cases, by increasingly autocratic governments discarding independent
judiciaries or refusing to safeguard respect for minority rights. The past
few years have shown economic growth to be distributed unequally
among Europeans, not only within societies characterized by increasing
social inequalities, but also among Eurozone member states, with a
widening chasm between the south and the north.
Through recurrent drama, hurried improvisation, and all-too-rare
leadership, the EU has overcome these crises. In the process, however,
three corresponding liberal beliefs have been shattered: economic
integration will lead to a political union; economic governance will
ensure Europe’s prosperity; and a union of democratic countries will
be the best guarantee against the return of violence and conflicts to
the Continent.
These liberal principles were born and implemented under the
American security umbrella of the 1950s. The EU did not make peace;
the American peace—both the Marshall Plan and the American security
guarantee—made the EU possible. In Brussels, technocrats often get
that part of history wrong. American hegemony suited many European
countries, even after the end of the Cold War. The involvement of the
United States allowed a primarily civilian Europe to continue apace. The
US presence also gave Europe the ability to postpone difficult strategic
choices and suspend international responsibilities.
But this rather limited engagement with hard security issues carried
significant costs for the credibility and moral standing of the Union: its
inaction in Srebrenica, Rwanda, and Darfur contributed to humanitarian
disasters that tainted a record of self-claimed righteousness and integrity
in foreign affairs.2 The EU seemed to reach for an impossible ideal of
absolute purity in world politics, a “divine goodness in history that it is
impossible to symbolize in any other way than by complete powerlessness
or rather by a consistent refusal to use power in the rivalries of history.”3
2. James Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1997); Gérard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1997); and Hugo Slim, “Dithering over Darfur? A Preliminary
Review of the International Response,” International Affairs 80, no. 5 (October 2004): 811–28.
3. Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man: A Christian Interpretation, Volume I: Human
Nature (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1943), 72.
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This attitude—a mixture of idealist moral stance and realist restraint—
proved an untenable international position.
Problems are deeper than a lack of ambition and capabilities. The
European Union suffers from two contradictions in its approach to
power. First, the Union has neglected power politics because it has
been militarily weak, but equally, it has been militarily weak because it
abandoned power politics. In the first decade of the twenty-first century,
EU leaders started to understand their priorities needed to change:
Brussels, historically hard on its soft power and rather soft on its hard
power, needed to become softer on its soft power and harder on its
hard power.
Still, the soft power of expanding rules and norms was not
always perceived as particularly benign by the affected countries. The
normative power was in essence much more imperial than suspected,
however “post-modern, lite or sane” it claimed to be.4 Furthermore, this
soft power often hid the lack of a real EU foreign policy—a definition
of preferences that would enhance its interests. Last, when it came to
the use of force, the Union had limited itself to a narrow set of liberal
missions, from peacekeeping to state building.
Even in these endeavors, the EU regularly confused ends and
means—an operation was successful because it existed. The Union also
repeatedly refused to take the necessary risks—a zero-casualty caveat
seemed to be attached implicitly to concepts of operations. Finally,
leadership often failed to understand the strategic stakes at hand—
by sticking to neutrality and impartiality, it made its humanitarian
interventions largely ineffective.5 European soldiers are often used as
Red Cross personnel, sometimes as instructors, and on occasion as gardien
de la paix (police officers), but nearly never as embodiments of coercion.
To kill and to die for the European flag is still largely a political taboo.
The second contradiction is related to power distribution at the
international level. Since its creation, the Union has persisted through
two stages of international polarity and into a third—a relatively stable
bipolar order, a unipolar world, and now an emerging multipolar system.
Vis-à-vis Washington, the first configuration meant a protectorate
where the cause was common, the second stage involved balancing or
supporting the unilateral decisions of the United States, and the third
stage implies emancipation in the face of diverging interests. This change,
which emerged during US President Barack Obama’s second term, is
the most fundamental reason why Europe had to stop outsourcing its
security and embrace a Gaullist posture.6
4. Robert Cooper, The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century (London:
Atlantic Books, 2003); Michael Ignatieff, Empire Lite: Nation-Building in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan
(New York: Vintage Books, 2004); and David Boucher, “ ‘Sane’ and ‘Insane’ Imperialism: British
Idealism, New Liberalism and Liberal Imperialism,” History of European Ideas 44, no. 8 (2018):
1189–1204.
5. Jean-Yves Haine, “The European Crisis of Liberal Internationalism,” International Journal 64,
no. 2 (June 2009): 453–79.
6. Jean-Yves Haine, “A New Gaullist Moment? European Bandwagoning and International
Polarity,” International Affairs 91, no. 5 (September 2015): 991–1008.
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Yet Europeans, by and large, remain reluctant to shift toward
strategic autonomy. “This general inclination to leave the strategic
problems to others is probably the consequence of having lived with
American leadership for so long and so well.” 7 But a more cynical reason
can also be seen: autonomy entails responsibilities that demand choices
and risks and thus portend less solidarity. The American hegemon was
also a “pacifier,” a comfortable framework in which internal competitions
could be subdued, relative gains did not really matter, and the imbalance
among partners was harmless.8 Without the Washington hegemon,
the power of Germany—or lack thereof—becomes essential but also
controversial. In sum, by 2020 the EU presented serious preexisting
conditions; it was process oriented, fragmented, and inward looking.

Resilience
Health care remains a national prerogative; in their combat
against the virus, states inevitably sidelined the European institutions.
Throughout the crises, Brussels was neither able to coordinate national
lockdown calendars, nor was it able to keep borders open and prevent
single-market violations. The EU witnessed an increasingly nefarious
lack of cohesion, especially when Italy, devastated by the first wave of
the pandemic, asked for help and received nearly none. Resentment set
in, nationalism rose, neighbors became suspicious, and borders closed.
At the same time, the poor management of the pandemic by other great
powers including China and the United States did, by contrast, reinforce
several common European characteristics: public health service, scientific
expertise, political transparency and accountability, the democratic
decision-making process, and international aid and assistance.9
For Europeans, the negative economic impact from the pandemic
is likely to be unprecedented. With a simultaneous supply and demand
shock, according to the International Monetary Fund, the gross
domestic product of the Eurozone will be almost 10 percent lower
in 2021 than in 2019.10 The effects within Europe are not equally
distributed. European countries with economies dependent upon
manufacturing and tourism are disproportionately affected by lockdown
measures and travel restrictions. Moreover, these countries often have
weaker fiscal reserves to compensate for unemployment and boost
economic activities. This asymmetry of effects will lead to further longterm economic divergence between southern and northern Europe.
7. Christoph Bertram, “Europe’s Best Interest: Staying Close to Number One,” International
Politics and Society 6, no. 1 (January 2003): 65. Original in German.
8. Josef Joffe, “Europe’s American Pacifier,” Foreign Policy 54 (Spring 1984): 64–82, https://
www.jstor.org/stable/1148355?seq=1.
9. Richard Youngs, “How the Coronavirus Tests European Democracy,” Carnegie
Europe, June 23, 2020, https://carnegieeurope.eu/2020/06/23/how-coronavirus-tests-european
-democracy-pub-82109.
10. World Economic Outlook Update, June 2020: A Crisis Like No Other, an Uncertain Recovery
(Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2020), https://www.imf.org/en/Publications
/WEO/Issues/2020/06/24/WEOUpdateJune2020.
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Important decisions were taken in 2020, however. First, as early as
March 2020, the European Central Bank agreed to fund the 750 billion
euro Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme—a quantitative easing
operation of government bond purchases. Although it kept market
worries about debt sustainability in check, this program encountered
the wrath of the German constitutional court, which demanded a
“proportionality assessment” to ensure it did not illegally finance
governments or expose taxpayers to potential losses.11
Second, on July 21, 2020, member states agreed on a recovery
fund composed of 390 billion euros in grants and 360 billion euros in
loans to help countries affected by the pandemic. This aid that Brussels
would borrow on the market added to the 1.074 trillion euro seven-year
budget (the Multi-annual Financial Framework). The July agreement
was the result of painstaking negotiations—not quite a “Hamiltonian
moment” but a significant step toward a transfer EU. The scheme
is not a permanent system of fully mutualized debt, but Olaf Scholz,
the German finance minister and vice chancellor, was quick to use
the American analogy.12 There was a clear recognition the survival of
Europe was at stake. As French President Emmanuel Macron argued,
Europe “faced a moment of truth,” warning without solidarity, Europe
“as a ‘political project’ would collapse.”13 German Chancellor Angela
Merkel decided to act quickly and decisively. As she has acknowledged:
“Europe needs us, just as we need Europe. . . . The EU won’t survive
without more forceful German leadership.”14
Third, it was also decided the European Commission would manage
a collective procurement program for future vaccines to make sure all
Europeans, beyond their nationalities, would be covered.
These decisions had positive effects. They decreased populist and
nationalist movements throughout Europe.15 The massive economic aid
program alleviated economic divisions between northern and southern
Europe and political tensions between eastern and western Europe.
Brussels ceased to be the usual scapegoat for everything that goes wrong
internally. Yet drawbacks emerged. The collective approach in vaccine
procurement emphasized solidarity and equality, but mistakes were
made and the rollout throughout Europe was delayed. A blame game
11. “Seeing Red: Germany’s Highest Court Takes Issue with the European Central Bank,”
Economist, May 7, 2020, https://www.economist.com/europe/2020/05/07/germanys-highest
-court-takes-issue-with-the-european-central-bank.
12. Guy Chazan, “The Minds behind Germany’s Shifting Fiscal Stance: Jörg Kukies and Olaf
Scholz Key in Reshaping Berlin’s Hawkish Attitude towards Europe,” Financial Times, June 9, 2020,
https://www.ft.com/content/2503ce9c-cde9-4301-bba0-8301f7deaf3b.
13. Victor Mallet and Roula Khalaf, “Macron Warns of EU Unravelling Unless It
Embraces Financial Solidarity,” Financial Times, April 16, 2020, https://www.ft.com/content
/d19dc7a6-c33b-4931-9a7e-4a74674da29a.
14. Matthew Karnitschnig, “What Merkel Wants,” Politico, June 25, 2020, https://www.politico
.eu/article/what-angela-merkel-germany-wants-eu-influence.
15. Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Carisa Nietsche, “The Coronavirus Is Exposing Populists’
Hollow Politics: As the Crisis Worsens, Even More Extreme Groups May Prosper,” Foreign
Policy, April 16, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/16/coronavirus-populism-extremism
-europe-league-italy/.
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inevitably arose between states, the Commission, and pharmaceutical
groups. The recovery fund has market credibility because it is
supported by Germany. Berlin will likely have a preponderant voice
in its management, and this position may trigger unease, especially in
France. A Europe without German leadership runs the risk of division;
a German Europe runs the risk of resentment.
Between Brussels’ missteps and German dominance, the
equilibrium is thus fragile. Yet economic solidarity remains a prerequisite
for cohesion at the foundation of European security. Crises necessarily
change priorities, affect interests, and call past decisions into question.
It is too soon to tell if this will be the case with defense budgets in the
face of the COVID-19 crisis, but the scenario is likely.
The European Defense Fund, launched on January 1, 2021, was
established to strengthen the defense industrial base and develop
innovation. Initially it was given a 13 billion euro budgetary envelope
(2021–27), but this amount was reduced to 8 billion euros in the
Commission’s latest proposal.16 As for the long list of projects decided
under the Permanent Structured Cooperation scheme established
in December 2017, it is highly unlikely all will survive unscathed.
As the new director of the European Defence Agency, Jiří Šedivý,
acknowledged, “we can expect an additional strain on resources, it is
already looming.”17 Yet despite the unprecedented impact from the
pandemic and potential weakening of the EU security foundations, the
political and economic underpinnings of the Union have the potential
to remain relatively resilient.

Global Distancing

In a matter of months, the coronavirus has affected every great
power, revealing obvious vulnerabilities: a chaotic American presidency,
China’s one-party, opaque decision making, and Russia’s one-leader
discretionary policies. The international community seems to be back to
“competitive decadence,” where great powers compete with one another
in their attempts to solve mounting internal problems.18 In this context,
the international society of states has become more fragmented and
less responsive; international cooperation, from humanitarian concerns
to collective security issues, is more difficult. Our multipolar world is
more heterogeneous and distant. The most likely configuration that will
emerge is a world disorder—not necessarily more violent, but essentially
power regulated rather than rules based.
16. Raluca Csernatoni, “EU Security and Defense Challenges: Toward a European Defense
Winter?,” Carnegie Europe, June 11, 2020, https://carnegieeurope.eu/2020/06/11/eu-security
-and-defense-challenges-toward-european-defense-winter-pub-82032; and European Commission,
“Commission Welcomes the Political Agreement on the European Defence Fund,” European
Commission, December 10, 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP
_20_2319.
17. Robin Emmott, “On Budget Eve, EU Defence Money at Risk from Coronavirus,” Reuters,
May 12, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-eu-defence/on-budget-eve
-eu-defence-money-at-risk-from-coronavirus-idUSKBN22O1BU.
18. Pierre Hassner, “Cold War to Hot Peace,” New York Times, October 16, 1973.
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In such a world, where will Europe stand? First, the United States has
moved from friend to stranger, if not outright competitor. The pandemic
has deteriorated the already poor relations between Washington and
Brussels. US President Donald Trump, the first American president
to be overtly hostile to the EU, framed the relationship as a zero-sum
game. “Trump saw Europeans as adversaries, not America’s closest
allies, and often told advisers different versions of the idea that ‘the EU
is worse than China, only smaller.’ ”19 Certainly rifts have happened
before, from the Suez to Iraq. With the Biden presidency, a more
constructive agenda will be possible, yet the last several years have left
many Europeans with mixed feelings toward the United States, and
significant differences remain.
Recent history suggests the United States is increasingly moving
away from the Atlantic and the European theater to focus more on the
Indo-Pacific theater. The categorical nature of transatlantic relations
has been subsumed by multipolarity. A common perception of friend
and foe is at the basis of a functioning alliance; with today’s rapidly
changing threats and situational relationships, a broad Alliance such as
NATO cannot maintain consensus in every contingency. US President
Joe Biden reaffirmed “the faith” in Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, yet
strategic foci and threat perceptions among Allies vary.20
Second, China has moved from stranger to rival. The pandemic has
reinforced several negative characteristics including China’s unreliability,
lack of transparency, and disinformation efforts. In addition to the crisis,
the increasing authoritarianism of China’s leader President Xi Jinping,
further restrictions of basic freedoms, and the poor prospect of any
liberalization have pushed Europe toward a more cautious approach
vis-à-vis Beijing.
The crisis has also underlined the asymmetry in EU-China economic
relations, including the Union’s vulnerability in some crucial sectors.
Europe is not in a position to decouple, yet many European governments
are actively promoting supply chain diversification for a wide range of
products to other producers like Vietnam and India.21 But few European
governments, first among them Germany, are willing to engage in an
economic battle with Beijing. Under German leadership and amid
strong criticism from human rights groups and unambiguous opposition
from Washington, the EU signed the Comprehensive Agreement on
Investment with China in December 2020. Merkel believed it was “right
19. Susan B. Glasser, “John Bolton’s Epic Score-Settling,” New Yorker, June 18, 2020.
20. David E. Sanger, “Biden Declares ‘America Is Back’ on International Stage,” New York
Times, February 23, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/live/2021/02/19/world/g7-meeting-munich
-security-conference.
21. Archana Chaudhary, “EU to Focus on Diversifying Crucial Supply Chains, Says Borrell,”
Bloomberg, July 14, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-07-14/eu-to-focus-on
-diversifying-crucial-supply-chains-says-borrell.
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and important to strive for good strategic relations with China.”22 By
strategic, she essentially meant a growing trade relationship.
Moreover, with worldwide deflation, Chinese economic growth will
suffer. The temptation, already clear, is for the Chinese Communist
Party to compensate domestic weakness with a more assertive
affirmation of Chinese power. Thus far, the EU seems divided on
how to react. After a new security law was imposed on Hong Kong,
Europeans condemned the move but were unable to agree on any
punitive measures.23
Under domestic pressure and growing evidence of massive human
rights violations against the Uighurs in the Xinjiang region, the EU
decided in March 2021, for the first time since 1989, to impose targeted
sanctions on four Chinese officials involved in operating internment
camps in Xinjiang. In the EU 2019 Strategic Outlook, China was defined
“as a negotiating partner, an economic competitor, and a systemic
rival.”24 With an increasingly assertive China and after the departure
of Merkel this year, partnership might become more challenging.
Economic competition and political rivalry will thus continue, albeit in
a more distanced form.
Third, Russia remains an enemy but a weaker one. Russia has been
affected by two major crises simultaneously—the pandemic and the
collapse of oil prices. Russian President Vladimir Putin gambled with
Saudi Arabia and lost. Both crises will have a significant impact on
Russian state resources. In 2019, income from oil and gas accounted
for nearly 40 percent of Russia’s federal budget revenues. The Central
Bank of Russia estimated a 6 percent fall in gross domestic product
in 2020, and fiscal measures to support people and businesses affected
by the pandemic add up to just 40 billion US dollars or 2.8 percent of
gross domestic product. By comparison, Germany had a 130 billion euro
rescue package for its economy.25
Yet Putin is unlikely to moderate his foreign policy approach—any
analogy with the mid-1980s is misguided.26 With economic difficulties,
the country can be expected to take a nationalist and conservative
turn that will include increased repression against domestic political
opponents and scapegoating of foreign intruders. Russia’s main lesson
from the pandemic may well be confirmation of the superiority of
self-reliance in a globalized world. Moscow will continue to interfere
in US and European politics—it is cheap and carries few risks—and
22. Hans von der Burchard, “Merkel Pushes EU-China Investment Deal over the Finish
Line Despite Criticism,” Politico, December 29 2020, https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-china
-investment-deal-angela-merkel-pushes-finish-line-despite-criticism/.
23. Ian Bond, “The EU Must Be Prepared to Be Critical of China. It Can Start with Hong
Kong’s Security Law,” Euronews, June 24, 2020.
24. European Commission, EU-China: A Strategic Outlook, March 12, 2019.
25. See Henry Foy, “Russia: Pandemic Tests Putin’s Grip on Power,” Financial Times, May 4,
2020, https://www.ft.com/content/d4d61de4-8aea-11ea-9dcb-fe6871f4145a.
26. Eugene Rumer, “The Coronavirus Won’t Make Putin Play Nice,” Quick Take (blog), Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, April 14, 2020, https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/04/14
/coronavirus-won-t-make-putin-play-nice-pub-81555.
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the value gap with Brussels will increase. The current sanctions regime
is likely to remain in place for the foreseeable future and with it the
absence of meaningful dialogue. The 2021 imprisonment of Russian
opposition leader Alexey Navalny and the mass arrest of protesters have
only increased moral revulsion among many Europeans. The prospect
of a reset button appears as remote as ever.27
Global distancing within the international system leaves the EU in
an unprecedented position—mostly alone. Sidelined by its traditional
US ally, contending with an assertive China, and confronting a hostile
Russia, the Union’s responsibility is a strategic reality. The EU must
learn the language of power politics and the new vocabulary that comes
with it—force and coercion, balance of power, and zone of influence.
In a loose, multipolar system, every major power has to think for itself.
Understandably, the United States is shifting its focus toward the
Indo-Pacific region and is worrying about the rise of China. The EU
has to confront instability in its eastern and southern neighborhoods,
and overall interests common to Europe and the United States are
decreasing in number. In short, Europe remains a middle power in size.
With a population larger than the United States and with the second
largest nominal gross domestic product, and despite the considerable
defense capabilities of some of its members (one a nuclear power), it is
still unable to compete militarily as a world power. Moreover, the EU
has become a middle power in position: the EU finds itself increasingly
torn between Beijing and Washington. From a sociological and historical
point of view, the Union’s situation has evolved—it is further apart from
Washington. This shift does not imply a rapprochement with Beijing, yet
the EU’s autonomy and concomitant responsibility has increased.

A Grand Strategy

Any grand strategy is fraught with difficulties. Complexity makes
prediction impossible, contingencies make it useless. For Europeans,
there is the added dimension of bringing together a group of countries
with vastly different power dynamics, strategic cultures, and security
traditions. Some countries may be tempted to consider that any grand
strategy exercise is doomed to fail because Europeans do not share a
sense of community that would allow for such an instrument to be
relevant and meaningful. Yet at its core, a grand strategy translates an
understanding of what we are and where we act and reveals intentions
regarding what we have and what we want. Around this core, unity, policy,
and proportionality form the necessary basis of an EU grand strategy.

Unity
Unity is the first prerequisite. A grand strategy is a declaration of
intentions, and in the case of the EU, the initial audience is domestic. The
27. Carl Bildt, “Why the West’s Attempts to Reset Relations with Russia Have Failed Again
and Again,” Washington Post, February 18, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021
/02/18/carl-bildt-russia-reset-putin/.

TOC

56

Parameters 51(2) Summer 2021

first attempt at a grand strategy occurred after the 2003 Iraq crisis, and
the assumption was a Europe divided was powerless.28 In 2009, Europe
was too fragmented to contemplate an update. In 2016, after the terrorist
attacks, the immigration crises, and the Brexit vote that took place a
week before its publication, a new document emphasized resilience in
capacities and in politics, underlining the need for a concerted EU role.29
For Europeans today, however, unity is more difficult than ever.
First, as mentioned before, the US umbrella ceased to protect the
EU against its own discord. Second, at 28 members, the club is too
large to make timely and effective decisions and actions in foreign and
security policy. Attempts to build a limited core group or vote with a
qualified majority have been a fiasco; consensus building seems the only
way to move forward.30 Third, and most importantly, Europe has to
position itself around issues and in areas that are largely unfamiliar. Too
often the result has been Europe’s absence or its refuge behind empty
formulas or paycheck diplomacy.
But unity cannot be only a matter of a top-to-down process run
by a foreign policy elite. Unity must include a European forum where
issues can be debated and decisions accounted for. Too often, foreign
policy is decided behind closed doors in a world of classified documents
and internal memos. The EU needs to hold hearings and establish
parliamentary oversight, including at the national level—a necessary step
toward legitimacy. Transparency is not only a democratic imperative,
it is a strategic necessity, adding a crucial but missing dimension to
the Union’s arsenal—public opinion, a formidable force multiplier.
After the pandemic, temptations of inward-looking, protectionist, and
isolationist measures will increase. Keeping the EU’s ambition intact
begins with promoting the saliency of international politics in all-toooften parochial European debates.

Policy
The second component of a grand strategy is policy—a daunting
task for the EU. At the most fundamental level, the institution has to
replace process with policy. For too long, the enlargement framework
was the only lens through which the Union perceived its neighborhood—
membership for those who would join, association for those who could
not. The enlargement framework was perceived as benign, but as the
fiasco in Ukraine demonstrated, it was not. Moscow saw the expansion
of rules as the essence of an imperial policy and decided to draw the line.
28. Alyson J. K. Bailes, The European Security Strategy: An Evolutionary History, Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Policy Paper No. 10 (Stockholm: SIPRI, February 2005).
29. Nathalie Tocci, “From the European Security Strategy to the EU Global Strategy:
Explaining the Journey,” International Politics 54, no. 4 (July 2017): 487–502; and Wolfgang Wagner
and Rosanne Anholt, “Resilience as the EU Global Strategy’s New Leitmotif: Pragmatic, Problematic
or Promising?,” Contemporary Security Policy 37, no. 3 (2016): 414–30.
30. Leonard Schuette, “Should the EU Make Foreign Policy Decisions by Majority Voting?,”
Centre for European Reform, May 2019.
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For the EU, expansion was not geopolitical but technocratic. Of course,
that Europe was mistaken does not justify the Russian reaction.31
The first lesson is about framing issues and thinking strategically. A
key merit of the 2003 document was its attempt to define threats, even
in very generic terms. What is needed, however, is a more demanding
and challenging definition of interests and identification of friends
and enemies. Europeans may be averse to thinking this way, but it
is a prerequisite for genuine strategic behavior. As Raymond Aron,
following Carl Schmitt, described it, the identification of friends and
foes is “the first task of political responsibility that cannot be avoided, it
is the supreme political act.”32
Designing strategies to face hostile acts, either by deterrence,
coercion, or negotiation, is the second step. In the rare instance when
the EU has identified an enemy, it has done so from a normative point
of view and put its identity as a liberal entity before its strategic interest,
thus making dialogue impossible. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is a
war criminal, yet he is also a critical participant in peace talks. Putin may
indeed be a brutal autocratic leader, but Russian cooperation is needed
to tame Iranian nuclear ambitions. In a multipolar world where gray
zones will replace clear lines of identification, the task may be difficult
but must not be avoided. Postponing this debate constitutes abandoning
strategic purposes.
The third step involves the EU prioritizing itself. On several
important issues—trade, climate change, and nuclear proliferation—
American and European interests do not align. On security issues,
Europeans have rarely acted for themselves. In Ukraine, the Minsk II
peace process, albeit fragile, is a European solution to a European
problem where the absence of the United States was a condition for
progress. With Iran, Europeans are working to salvage an agreement
they deemed in their interests while Washington is still hesitant on
lifting sanctions and opening talks.33
Overall, the EU maintains a strange but not surprisingly myopic
view of world affairs, based on an excessive focus on the hegemon—the
United States—despite an expected incongruence between US global
interests and Europe’s regional security. In European capitals, there is a
tendency to hide behind the storm and hope for quieter times. The past
cannot be the prologue; in the increasing antagonism between China
and America, the EU will have to choose sides according to its interests.
31. See John J. Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions
That Provoked Putin,” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 5 (September/October 2014): 77–89; and Stefan
Auer, “Carl Schmitt in the Kremlin: the Ukraine Crisis and the Return of Geopolitics,” International
Affairs 91, no. 5 (September 2015): 953–68.
32. Raymond Aron, Penser la Guerre, Clausewitz, 2: L’Age Planétaire (Paris: Gallimard, 1976), 119.
33. Colum Lynch, “Europeans Fear Iran Nuclear Window Closing,” Foreign Policy, March 26,
2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/26/europe-us-biden-iran-nuclear-deal-lift-sanctions/.
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Europe so far has displayed no intention to unite with Washington
against Beijing.34

Proportionality
Considerations of proportionality—the delicate balance between
ends and means—follow considerations of unity and policy. Not
surprisingly, for the last 20 years the EU has focused on the latter rather
than the former, and since the process has been capability driven and
not strategy led, inadequacies, disconnect, and mismatch have abounded.
The founding act of the Common Security and Defence Policy in 1999
was an agreement to rearm Europe for autonomous action, which at the
time was translated as a military objective of 60,000 troops. This target
was rapidly abandoned in favor of small, deployable battle groups of
around 2,500 troops.35
Military budgets were drastically decreased after the 2009 financial
crisis, and the pandemic crisis may again further reduce overall defense
funding. This lack of funding narrowed potential military operations to
a limited band of the security spectrum—low-intensity peacekeeping
missions. Needless to say, planning for potential military operations
should be approached in the opposite manner. What is the EU ready to
do and where?
As stated in the 2016 document, the EU views security as global;
it has interests, stakes, and options everywhere. This perspective is
the result of normative thinking—universal values—and security
traditions—France is a permanent member of the UN Security Council.
The strategic reality, however, is different: the scope of Europe’s ambition
should be regional. In a multipolar world, regional responsibilities are
essential. Ignoring these responsibilities invites foreign interventions
and contests.
The EU has refused to act in Syria, but Moscow did. In Libya, the
EU disagreed and Turkey has moved in. France decided to intervene in
Mali, then in the entire Sahel at great cost. Several other European air
forces are operating in Iraq and Syria against Daesh. Does Mali belong
to a European perimeter? If so, why not Libya? Or Tunisia? What about
Turkey? Is Georgia part of the European zone of influence? Without
proper focus and care, the Balkans will certainly be subject to increasing
Russian or Chinese pressure. What are the risks and responsibilities of
the exclusion or inclusion of Tbilisi? What kind of middle ground is
achievable and with whom? These conversations need to be initiated
at the EU level before national decisions are made. The strategic
imperative in a loose multipolar system is to protect a zone of interests,
defining lines, even redlines. Europe is an idea; it also needs to become
a geographic, and thus strategic, entity.
34. Philippe Le Corre, “Europe’s Tightrope Diplomacy on China,” Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, March 24, 2021, https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/03/24/
europe-s-tightrope-diplomacy-on-china-pub-84159.
35. See Sven Biscop, “Battalions to Brigades: The Future of European Defence,” Survival 62,
no. 5 (2020): 105–18, https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2020.1819654.
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Once the scope of interests has been defined—flexibility is wiser
than dogmatism—then the level of capabilities can be determined. For
the EU, two fundamentally different contingencies must be addressed:
protection and projection. The first contingency requires high-tech
and heavy weaponry, sophisticated air defenses, and substantial and
combined joint forces. The second contingency requires light and
deployable units, strategic airlift, and a lead nation. Europe today
is unprepared for either one. The first contingency is left to NATO,
namely the US military; the second contingency is shouldered mainly by
France and the United Kingdom.
The EU’s current lack of readiness is as alarming as its lack of a
meaningful strategic culture. While significant investments were
decided before the pandemic, it remains to be seen whether they will be
maintained. Modernization is one step, lethality is another step. Kinetic
weapons, with trained personnel and maintenance and training budgets,
must be the principal investment. Primarily, the EU needs to understand
the strategic landscape and change its mindset from a liberal community
intent upon forgetting past wars to a strategic actor prepared to deter or
wage future conflicts.
A call for arms is not a call for war. Proportionality is about
creating and using the means appropriate to the chosen end. Precisely
because Europe is weak, restraint and moderation must be its guide.
The EU must take responsibility for its backyard—the Balkans and
the Mediterranean shore—and create its own environment rather than
react to an environment not of its choosing. In his second inaugural
address, US President Woodrow Wilson announced Americans were
“provincials no longer.”36 Europe, out of retirement as the result of the
rise of a multipolar world and the end of US hegemony, needs to be
precisely that: provincial.
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ABSTRACT: Growing Sino-Russian coordination necessitates
greater security cooperation between US Allies in Europe and
East Asia. US Allies in both regions face remarkably similar
threats requiring similar operational concepts, capabilities, and
technologies. Further, these Allies must hedge against the specter
of US abandonment. An exploration of the links between the two
geographically distant US Alliance networks illustrates the Allies’
perspectives on US extended deterrence and highlights opportunities
to devise better policies for cooperation.

O

ver the last decade, strategic links between East Asia and
Europe have grown rapidly. Consequently, the analysis
and management of US Alliances require an interregional
perspective that explicitly assesses the connections between the security
and geopolitical dynamics in both regions. As they have in the past,
US Alliances must play a central role in today’s era of renewed greatpower competition.1 After all, one of the advantages the United States
enjoys vis-à-vis either China or Russia is its possession of a strongly
institutionalized alliance system. If the United States and its Allies remain
complacent, however, China and Russia could coordinate to divide US
attention and resources and drive wedges within and between existing
US Alliances.
Leveraging synergies between US Alliances in both regions would
benefit the United States in the context of its competition with Russia
and China. But this is not a debate confined to Washington. America’s
European and East Asian Allies must proactively engage in interregional
dialogues to remain cohesive in the face of greater Sino-Russian
coordination and to counter skepticism in the United States about the
value of Alliances.

The Stage
On July 23, 2019, Russia and China jointly flew warplanes near
island clusters called Dokdo in South Korea and Takeshima in Japan
respectively, driving a wedge between two US Allies that dispute the
1. Elbridge A. Colby and A. Wess Mitchell, “The Age of Great-Power Competition: How the
Trump Administration Refashioned American Strategy,” Foreign Affairs 99, no. 1 (January/February
2020): 118–30.
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sovereignty over these islands.2 And security coordination between
Moscow and Beijing is not limited to East Asia: in July 2017, China’s
People’s Liberation Army Navy and the Russian Navy participated in a
joint exercise in the Baltic Sea.3 According to a Chinese military expert,
China and Russia “need to lean on each other for support to deal with
hostilities from different fronts.”4 In January 2019, then US Director of
National Intelligence Dan Coats told Congress, “China and Russia are
more aligned than at any point since the mid-1950s, and the relationship
is likely to strengthen in the coming year as some of their interests and
threat perceptions converge.”5
Moreover, the Biden-Harris administration’s references to a global
struggle between democracy and authoritarianism implicitly assume
an alignment between Russia and China and thus lower expectations
Washington will try to create fissures between the two nations.6 Indeed,
the Biden White House’s Interim National Security Strategic Guidance alludes
to the fact that Russia and China represent a threat to US Allies and
interests in the critical regions of Europe and the Indo-Pacific.7 The
prospect of deeper security coordination between those two powers
in Europe, the Indo-Pacific, and elsewhere threatens to complicate
America’s global strategic picture.
In contrast, US Allies in Europe and Asia continue to display
rather tenuous security ties, despite repeated promises of further
cooperation. For decades, these distant groupings of US Allies have
enjoyed a quasi-alliance with each other, a term used by some scholars
to designate the relationship between those states who share alliance
ties with a common third party but not with each other.8 Despite such
long-standing quasi-alliance ties, US Allies in Europe and East Asia
have had a limited security interaction with each other due to resource
scarcity, geographical distance, and the need to prioritize threats in
their respective regions.9 Yet US European and East Asian Allies now
2. Brad Lendon, “Why Russia and China Are Wading into a Centuries’ Old Dispute over a Tiny
Island Cluster,” CNN, updated July 27, 2019, https://edition.cnn.com/2019/07/26/asia/south
-korea-russia-japan-china-warplanes-analysis-intl-hnk/index.html.
3. Richard Weitz, “Assessing the Sino-Russian Baltic Sea Drill,” China Brief 17, no. 12,
Jamestown Foundation, September 20, 2017, https://jamestown.org/program/assessing-the
-sino-russian-baltic-sea-drill/.
4. Ni Lexiong quoted in Tommy Yang, “Strategy Behind China Joining Russia ‘on NATO
Doorsteps’ in Baltic Sea,” Sputnik News, July 21, 2017, https://sputniknews.com/politics
/201707211055763714-china-drills-russia-baltic-sea/.
5. Daniel R. Coats, Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence
Community (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2019), 4,
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR---SSCI.pdf.
6. Joseph R. Biden Jr., “America’s Place in the World” (remarks, US Department of State
Headquarters, Washington, DC, February 4, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room
/speeches-remarks/2021/02/04/remarks-by-president-biden-on-americas-place-in-the-world/.
7. Joseph R. Biden Jr., Interim National Security Strategic Guidance (Washington, DC: White
House, March 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf.
8. Victor D. Cha, Alignment despite Antagonism: The US-Korea-Japan Security Triangle (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 1999).
9. Stephan Frühling, “ ‘Key to the Defense of the Free World’: The Past, Present and Future
Relevance of NATO for US Allies in the Asia-Pacific,” Journal of Transatlantic Studies 17, no. 2
(March 2019): 238–54.
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have good reasons to develop more robust security relationships with
each other. At least three sets of interrelated developments underscore
this point.
The first development, already mentioned, relates to improving
security cooperation between China and Russia.10 Greater coordination
in security policies can allow these two powers to maintain a cohesive
front, outflank the United States, and undermine the security of
America’s European and East Asian Allies. Notably, through arms
transfers and greater military coordination, Russia and China have
strengthened each other’s capabilities, while mutually learning from best
technological and operational practices.
Moreover, Russia and China appear to be engaging in coordinated
probing in Europe and East Asia, executing incremental, self-restrained
actions designed to test the reactions of the United States and its Allies
and better gauge the boundaries of their freedom of action while staying
below the threshold of traditional military activity.11 Coordinated
Sino-Russian actions against US interests and Allies in Europe and
East Asia could force Washington into a long and resource-draining
two-flank competition and compel it to make difficult choices. Such
coordinated activities could lead to tensions between the United States
and its Allies regarding which threats to prioritize, but could also lead to
tensions between US Allies in the two regions as they compete for US
resources and attention.
The second development pertains to the similarity of the regional
threats US Allies in Europe and East Asia face. Through their advances in
precision strike and missile modernization programs, Russia and China
seek to undermine the local military balance in northeastern Europe and
in the Western Pacific. Relatedly, as they strengthen their local military
positions relative to that of the United States and foster the perception
they may enjoy local military superiority in certain parts of Europe or
the Western Pacific, Moscow and Beijing can more confidently engage
in nontraditional forms of probing. Conceptually, US Allies in Europe
and East Asia face a similar problem, namely, how to counter the threat
posed by Russian and Chinese military modernization and hybrid or
gray-zone activities. To address such similar threats, US Allies must
draw on similar operational concepts, capabilities, and technologies,
which will reveal opportunities for collaboration.
The third development concerns persistent uncertainty about US
security commitments to either region. This problem became particularly
pressing in the face of US President Donald Trump’s “America First”
vision and mixed signals about the value of Alliances.12 Even under
the Biden-Harris administration, recovering the damaged trust in
10. Alexander Korolev, “How Closely Aligned Are China and Russia? Measuring Strategic
Cooperation in IR,” International Politics 57 (2020): 760–89.
11. Jakub J. Grygiel and A. Wess Mitchell, The Unquiet Frontier: Rising Rivals, Vulnerable Allies, and
the Crisis of American Power (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016).
12. Mira Rapp Hooper, “Saving America’s Alliances: The United States Still Needs the System
That Put It on Top,” Foreign Affairs 99, no. 2 (March/April 2020).
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US Alliances will require the efforts of all parties to those Alliances.
Although the Biden-Harris administration has put Alliances at the
center of its foreign policy, US Allies cannot rule out the possibility of a
less Alliance-friendly president in the future.
Concerns about US security commitments also include questions
about how the United States will prioritize between Europe and
East Asia at a time when America faces two great-power challengers
simultaneously, and when the power gap it enjoyed during the socalled unipolar era appears to be diminishing.13 The specter of US
retrenchment from their regions incentivizes Allies to hedge, either
by investing in strengthening their own autonomy or diversifying their
portfolio of security partnerships.14 Greater ties with each other can be
part of that package. To be sure, such ties cannot be seen as an adequate
alternative to their existing Alliances with the United States, because no
group of countries can match US power-projection capabilities. Rather,
these ties can strengthen the bargaining position of Allies in both
regions vis-à-vis the United States and can hedge against uncertainty
surrounding the future of US foreign policy.

Similarities

US Allies in Europe and East Asia are part of an extended deterrence
success story. Although adversaries have conducted large-scale military
attacks against countries with close security ties to the United States—
South Korea in 1950, Taiwan in 1954, and Pakistan in the Indo-Pakistani
Wars—there appears to be no such attack against a US Ally protected by
an applicable defense obligation of the United States.15
The two regions also present important similarities in terms of
their threat environments. One common feature relates to the threat
posed by theater-range missiles and the proliferation of anti-access/
area-denial capabilities. This concern becomes particularly pressing
following the demise of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF)
Treaty: progress in fielding theater-range missiles and anti-access/
area-denial capabilities is enabling Russia and China to behave more
aggressively. In this context, US Allies in Europe and East Asia face
a similar conceptual problem—how to counter an impending missile
challenge through enhanced missile defense capabilities, which includes

13. Linde Desmaele and Luis Simón, “East Asia First, Europe Second: Picking Regions in
US Grand Strategy,” War on the Rocks, August 7, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/08/east
-asia-first-europe-second-picking-regions-in-u-s-grand-strategy/.
14. Sven Biscop, “Letting Europe Go Its Own Way: The Case for Strategic Autonomy,” Foreign
Affairs, July 6, 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-07-06/letting-europe-go-its
-own-way; and Yogesh Joshi, India-Japan-Australia Minilateral: The Promise and Perils of Balancing
Locally, Observer Research Foundation (ORF) Occasional Paper 114 (New Dehli, India: ORF, May
2017), 1–22.
15. Tongfi Kim, “U.S. Trans-Pacific and Trans-Atlantic Alliances: A Comparison,” Georgetown
Journal of International Affairs, January 6, 2019, https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2019/01/06/trans
-pacific-and-trans-atlantic-alliances.
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weighing the pros and cons of deploying theater-range missiles to deter
Russian and Chinese aggression.16
And even if they may not go so far as launching a direct attack on
US Allies, Russia’s or China’s missile and military buildup could give
them the confidence to engage more aggressively in hybrid or gray-zone
forms of warfare.17 Precisely because US extended deterrence has been
so successful in preventing armed conflicts, China and Russia now
engage in hybrid or gray-zone tactics, which are aggressive but aimed to
avoid triggering military retaliation. Russia’s “Little Green Men” have
infiltrated Ukraine since 2014, while China’s “Little Blue Men” have
advanced Chinese interests in the South and East China Seas.18 As US
Alliances were originally designed with large-scale armed aggression in
mind, such hybrid or gray-zone tactics leave uncertainty about how these
Alliances can cope with them.19 The link between traditional military
threats and nontraditional ones is therefore concerning for US Allies in
both regions.
The challenges China and Russia pose to US Allies in East Asia and
Europe is further compounded by growing Sino-Russian cooperation.
Such cooperation has grown steadily in the post–Cold War era, and
the two former adversaries now appear to be aligned strategically.20 In
particular, periodic joint exercises, staff exchanges, and arms sales point
to an increasingly institutionalized military cooperation. Russian arms
sales and technology have played an important part in the development
of Chinese anti-access/area-denial capabilities. More broadly, Russia and
China appear to be learning from each other’s best practices in hybrid
forms of warfare.21
As a function of this strategic military cooperation, simultaneous
probing by China and Russia of US Allies and interests in East Asia
and Europe could help disperse US resources and thus maximize the
chances of success for Beijing and Moscow. More broadly, Sino-Russian
diplomatic and economic cooperation may also create an effective
wedge against US Alliances. By working together, China and Russia
could reduce the negative repercussions of their actions in the East and
South China Seas or Ukraine, respectively, and also sabotage western
efforts outside East Asia and Europe, as the situation in Syria shows. To
16. See Jacob Cohn et al., Leveling the Playing Field: Reintroducing US Theater-Range Missiles in a
Post-INF World (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2019), https://
csbaonline.org/research/publications/leveling-the-playing-field-reintroducing-us-theater-range
-missiles-in-a-post-INF-world/publication/1; and Luis Simón and Alexander Lanoszka, “The
Post-INF European Missile Balance: Thinking about NATO’s Deterrence Strategy,” Texas National
Security Review 3, no. 3 (Summer 2020): 12–30.
17. Alexander Lanoszka, “Russian Hybrid Warfare and Extended Deterrence in Eastern
Europe,” International Affairs 92, no. 1 (January 2016): 175–95.
18. Christopher P. Cavas, “China’s ‘Little Blue Men’ Take Navy’s Place in Disputes,” Defense
News, November 2, 2015, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2015/11/03/chinas-little-blue
-men-take-navys-place-in-disputes/.
19. Michael M. Bosack, “Ameliorating the Alliance Dilemma in an Age of Gray-Zone Conflict:
Lessons Learned from the US-Japan Alliance,” Naval War College Review 73, no. 4 (2020): 45–66,
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=8145&context=nwc-review.
20. Korolev, “Closely Aligned.”
21. Grygiel and Mitchell, Unquiet Frontier.
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the extent the credibility of US military protection is interconnected in
different parts of the world, China and Russia could also work together
to erode Allies’ confidence in US extended deterrence.
Finally, a worsening regional threat environment brings back fears
of abandonment among US Allies in both Europe and East Asia.22 Such
fears are perhaps further compounded both by the aforementioned
America First doctrine and by the fact that the need to deal with greatpower challengers on multiple fronts may force the United States to
prioritize the other region. Indeed, Trump openly questioned the value
of US Alliances and demanded all Allies increase their financial
payments to the United States.23 In the late 2019 negotiations with
South Korea on defense cost-sharing, for example, the United States
reportedly demanded a fivefold increase, although this demand was
subsequently dropped.24
Trump also questioned the US commitment to NATO’s collective
defense and demanded NATO Allies increase defense spending.25 US
pressure on its Allies for economic concessions or increased defense
spending was by no means a new phenomenon, but these recent demands
were more serious because they were combined with a contempt for the
value of US Alliances. Even as the Biden-Harris administration seeks to
rebuild failing Alliances, Allies can no longer take such commitments
for granted.

Differences
Beyond the well-known distinction between the multilateral NATO
and bilateral Alliances in East Asia, there are important differences in
how US Allies relate to regional threats. First, US European Allies are
relatively economically self-reliant. Even though there is some degree of
dependence on Russia, such dependence is confined to the hydrocarbon
sector, which appears to be decreasing and is mutual—Russia is badly
in need of European markets, investments, and technology.26 Thus the
degree of economic interaction and interdependence European Allies
have with the United States far outweighs their dealings with Russia.
In contrast, the economies of America’s East Asian Allies are deeply
intertwined with China, which has become the economic center of
22. Victor D. Cha, “Abandonment, Entrapment, and Neoclassical Realism in Asia: The United
States, Japan, and Korea,” International Studies Quarterly 44, no. 2 (June 2000): 261–91.
23. Zack Beauchamp, “How Trump Is Killing America’s Alliances,” Vox, June 12, 2018,
https://www.vox.com/world/2018/6/12/17448866/trump-south-korea-alliance-trudeau-g7.
24. Bloomberg, “US Drops Demand for Fivefold Hike in South Korea Troop-Funding Bill,
Report Says,” Japan Times, December 26, 2019, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/12/26
/asia-pacific/us-drops-south-korea-fivefold-demand/#.XhG61FVKiUk.
25. Jeremy Shapiro, “Trump’s Meaningless NATO Spending Debate,” Order from Chaos (blog),
Brookings Institution, July 9, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018
/07/09/trumps-meaningless-nato-spending-debate/.
26. European Commission, “Russia,” European Commission, last updated May 20, 2020,
https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/russia/.
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gravity in the region.27 The interests of the East Asian Allies to preserve
good economic relations with China may at times undermine the
cohesion of America’s Alliances in East Asia.
Another interregional difference lies in the geographic characteristics
of the two theaters. Whereas US Allies in East Asia face China’s
military challenges at sea over maritime territorial disputes, European
Allies confront primarily land-based military threats from Russia.28 In
the military component of its rebalance to Asia, therefore, the Obama
administration emphasized increased investment in the Navy.29
Aside from different military requirements, the geographical
differences are likely to produce different political challenges for the
Alliances. Because maritime borders and territories tend to be far from
metropolitan areas and have few residents, disputants may have a more
difficult time justifying military conflict for their claims or, alternatively,
believe escalation is easier to control than it is on land. For the United
States, for example, it may seem absurd to fight a war against China over
uninhabited islands, even though the US government has repeatedly
confirmed the US-Japan security treaty applies to the Senkaku
Islands.30 For China, in turn, occupying the Senkaku Islands probably
appears to be less provocative and dangerous than invading densely
populated Taiwan.
Finally, unlike NATO’s relatively clear-cut competitive relations
with Russia, some US Alliances in East Asia are ostensibly targeted
against North Korea, which is dangerous and nuclear armed but not
nearly as powerful as China. In fact, the United States and its regional
Allies have seen China as a potential partner to help address the
challenge posed by North Korea’s nuclear weapons development. If
North Korea ceases to present a significant threat to Japan and to South
Korea, US Alliances with these two countries will require significant
political adjustments. Meanwhile, NATO is expected to play an
important role in counterterrorism and geopolitics in the Middle East
and North Africa. Although these new missions increase the importance
of NATO, especially to the United States, they can also create friction
among Allies, as was seen at the time of the 2003 US invasion of Iraq.

Perceived Links

Connections between US Alliances in Europe and East Asia
may not be apparent at first glance, but they do exist and can have a
27. Evan A. Feigenbaum and Robert A. Manning, “A Tale of Two Asias: In the Battle for Asia’s
Soul, Which Side Will Win—Security or Economics?,” Foreign Policy, October 31, 2012, https://
foreignpolicy.com/2012/10/31/a-tale-of-two-asias/.
28. Mira Rapp Hooper, “Uncharted Waters: Extended Deterrence and Maritime Disputes,”
Washington Quarterly 38, no. 1 (Spring 2015): 127–46.
29. Robert G. Sutter et al., Balancing Acts: The US Rebalance and Asia-Pacific Stability, Elliott School
of International Affairs and Sigur Center for Asian Studies (Washington, DC: George Washington
University, 2013).
30. Tongfi Kim, US Alliance Obligations in the Disputes in the East and South China Seas: Issues of
Applicability and Interpretations, PRIF Report, no. 141 (Frankfurt, Germany: Peace Research Institute
Frankfurt, 2016): 1–34.
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meaningful impact on the strategic calculations of US Allies in each
region—and even on the United States itself. When new developments
create uncertainty about US policy, with potential implications for the
United States’ reputation as an Ally or the allocation of US military
resources, the Allies pay close attention to situations in distant regions.
Moreover, as the United States prepares for global competition
with China, Washington has been paving the road for interregional
cooperation between US Allies. For example, a recent expert group
report to the NATO secretary general argues China is “best understood
as a full-spectrum systemic rival, rather than a purely economic player
or an only Asia-focused security actor,” and asserts “NATO must devote
much more time, political resources and action to the security challenges
posed by China.”31
Two somewhat contradictory interregional connections are
particularly important for US Alliances. First, US Allies in both
regions are affected by the reputation of the United States as a military
protector.32 Insofar as reputation is a global commodity, all US Allies
have reasons to support the reputation of the United States—the
credibility of US extended deterrence helps guarantee their own security.
Yet US military resources, including policymakers’ attention, are limited,
resulting in an inevitable trade-off between what the United States can
commit to in East Asia and in Europe.
Thus, just as the Obama administration’s rebalance to Asia or
the Trump administration’s emphasis on competition with China
provoked uneasiness among European Allies about the sustainability
of Washington’s commitment to Europe, America’s reengagement
with Europe after Russia’s annexation of Crimea led to questions
in Asia about the future of the alleged rebalance. In this regard, the
complementary and competitive relations between the two regions are
an important background to any interregional collaboration among
the Allies.
Beyond these important but abstract connections, what can the
United States and its Allies gain from greater interregional cooperation?
Arguably the most important contributions America’s European and
East Asian Allies can provide to each other’s security are indirect.
In a context defined by resource scarcity and a worsening threat
environment in Europe and East Asia, the United States would prefer its
Allies concentrate their defense resources and efforts in their respective
regions. In this vein, US experts and policymakers often argue the most
efficient way to use the resources and capabilities of America’s European
Allies is to deter Russia and provide security in their own continent—and
31. NATO Reflection Group, NATO 2030: United for a New Era (Brussels: NATO,
November 25, 2020), 27–28, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/12
/pdf/201201-Reflection-Group-Final-Report-Uni.pdf.
32. Hal Brands, Eric S. Edelman, and Thomas G. Mahnken, Credibility Matters: Strengthening
American Deterrence in an Age of Geopolitical Turmoil (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments, 2018), https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/credibility-matters
-strengthening-american-deterrence-in-an-age-of-geopolit/publication/1.
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its immediate neighborhood—thus relieving Washington of its burden
there as it prioritizes Asia and the Indo-Pacific region.33 The same logic
applies in relation to America’s East Asian Allies, whom the United States
would rather have focus on deterring China in the Western Pacific.34
America’s European Allies would also derive important indirect
benefits if East Asian Allies were to step up their defense and security
efforts, and vice versa. From a European perspective, perhaps the most
useful contribution East Asian Allies can make is to increase their own
military capabilities while also reducing tensions with China. Likewise,
East Asian Allies would very much appreciate a greater European
defense effort, which could free up US resources badly needed in East
Asia.35 East Asian Allies would also welcome a de-escalation between
the West and Russia—perceived to be a relevant stakeholder in Asian
security.36 From their viewpoint, the more conflictual the relationship
between the United States and Russia is, the more of a spoiler attitude
Moscow may adopt in East Asia, for example, by closing ranks with
China on North Korea and other issues.
Even though America’s European and East Asian Allies focus their
efforts on their respective regions, the fact they face similar militarystrategic problems offers opportunities for a structured security
dialogue. Missile defense is one such area. Both sets of allies face the
problem of proliferation of theater-range missiles and the challenges
of addressing this threat through a combination of US support,
the development of indigenous missile defense capabilities, and the
development and deployment of theater-range missiles.37 Another
opportunity relates to countering hybrid warfare and related problems
such as cybersecurity or disinformation.38
Through a more structured dialogue, America’s European and
East Asian Allies could learn best practices from each other in missile
defense or hybrid threat countermeasures—including questions relating
to divisions of labor with the United States—and even cooperate in
research and technology. In this vein, the NATO 2030: United for a
New Era report argues the Alliance should “deepen cooperation with
Indo-Pacific partners, including by strengthening information-sharing
and creating regularised dialogues on technological cooperation and
pooling of R&D in select fields.”39
To be sure, America’s European and East Asian Allies can directly
contribute to each other’s security in a number of ways. Through the
33. Interviews with multiple US defense officials in Washington, DC, and Brussels, Belgium,
September 2018–April 2019; and Barry Pavel and Jeffrey Lightfoot, “The Transatlantic Bargain
after ‘the Pivot’,” Issue Brief, Atlantic Council, March 22, 2012, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org
/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/the-transatlantic-bargain-after-the-pivot/.
34. Interview with US defense official, February 23, 2018.
35. Interviews with multiple Japanese and Australian officials, November 2019–March 2020.
36. Interview with Japanese defense official in Tokyo, January 15, 2020.
37. Jacob Cohn et al., Leveling the Playing Field.
38. Interviews with multiple Japanese, Australian, South Korean, and NATO officials,
September 2018–March 2020.
39. NATO 2030, 15.
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European Union’s arms embargo against China, the steady flow of highquality European weapons systems to East Asia, and engagement in
defense cooperation with key US Allies and partners in the region such
as Japan, Australia, and Vietnam, European Allies are contributing to
the security of East Asian Allies, and the advancement of US strategic
objectives in that region.40
Another important direct contribution to security relates to
diplomatic support in the face of political disputes. Having support
from Allies beyond the scope of any given region adds legitimacy to
US foreign policy, reinforcing its aspiration to frame the US position as
grounded in global rules and norms. In this regard, the support from
Japan and other East Asian Allies in denouncing Russia’s annexation
of Crimea or that of European Allies in denouncing Chinese actions
in the South China Sea represents an important legitimacy boost.41
Arguably, the most practical assistance East Asian Allies can expect
from European Allies is diplomatic and political support. For instance,
European diplomatic support is important for Japan on issues such as
North Korea’s nuclear weapons development and territorial disputes
with China.42 Diplomatic and political support from European Allies
makes it easier for East Asian Allies to frame certain problems (for
example, territorial disputes with China or North Korea’s nuclear
program) as threats to the rules-based international order, rather than
merely a by-product of power politics.
Last but not least, since China is expanding its influence, mostly
through geo-economic tools and the creation of an economic hierarchy
in Asia, it is also important for East Asian Allies to receive European
assistance in countering China’s economic influence attempts. Until
recently, China’s power-projection capabilities were limited, and Beijing’s
leverage over other states derived mostly from its economic clout rather
than its ability to either threaten or protect other states. As the debate
over membership in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank or the
debate over Huawei’s role in 5G networks illustrates, China can resort to
divide-and-rule tactics vis-à-vis US Allies in both regions.

Conclusion

America’s European and East Asian Allies are far away from
each other, but their links with the United States generate important
geopolitical crossovers between regions. These nexuses become
increasingly apparent as the threat by Russia and China to US regional
Allies intensifies simultaneously. Against that backdrop, a number of
relevant questions emerge. How can European and East Asian Allies
strengthen deterrence in their respective regions? And what can they
learn from each other’s experiences in that regard? What are the
40. Luis Simón, “Europe, the Rise of Asia and the Future of the Transatlantic Relationship,”
International Affairs 91, no. 5 (September 2015): 969–89.
41. Interviews with multiple Japanese, Australian, South Korean, EU, and NATO officials,
September 2018–March 2020.
42. Interviews with multiple Japanese officials, September 2018–March 2020.
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similarities, differences, and possible connections between US Alliances
in Europe and East Asia? What are the perceptions of credibility of US
extended deterrence that abound in Europe and northeast Asia?
This article has addressed these questions by identifying some of the
similarities, differences, and possible synergies between US Alliances
in Europe and East Asia. While interregional dialogues thus far have
focused on transnational challenges, a focus on deterrence against
great-power challengers is warranted. Certainly as their respective
regional security environments worsen, European and East Asian
Allies are becoming increasingly focused on their immediate vicinities.
This perspective limits the scope for direct engagement beyond each
country’s region. Yet all countries face similar challenges, ranging from
missile proliferation and hybrid forms of warfare from Russia, China, or
(to a lesser extent) North Korea to mounting concerns about America’s
commitment to their security.
Greater coordination can help US Allies learn from each other’s
experiences and best practices in dealing with regional challengers and
better managing their relations with the United States, particularly in
the face of increasing strategic coordination between China and Russia.
Additionally, diplomatic support and greater economic engagement
can be mutually beneficial in terms of strengthening resilience against
regional challengers, mitigating excessive dependence on the United
States, and hedging against the possibility of US retrenchment in the
future. In particular, since China’s geo-economic challenge is global
in scope US Allies worldwide can benefit from supporting each other
against Chinese predatory behavior. Thus, security dialogues between
European and East Asian Allies should involve top leaders who can link
the global, interregional, economic, and security aspects of cooperation.
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ABSTRACT: While unmanned aerial systems can serve as a
force multiplier for militants, these systems do not embody a
transformation in modern insurgent warfare or enable militants
to engage regularly in strategic coercion. Instead, drone use is
consistent with a militant group’s relative capabilities and broader
strategic objectives. Consequently, these groups are likely to employ
drones primarily for theater and tactical military purposes.

D

rones provide militants with affordable and novel means
of bringing force to bear against opponents as the cost and
complexity of this technology decreases and range, lethality,
and swarming ability increases. A simple cost-benefit analysis suggests
many militant groups should be attracted to making drones a central part
of their armory. This framework, however, overlooks important strategic
and political considerations, the sum of which strongly suggest most
militant groups have determined drone-based airpower does not enable
them to engage successfully in strategic coercion in civil war. Instead,
drones serve as tactical adjuncts to the existing military strategies of
militant groups and are used primarily to support ground operations and
to interfere with the military operations of opponents.

Background

Over the past decade, state and nonstate actors alike have
substantially increased their production and militarized use of
unmanned aircraft systems (UAS)—drones.1 The refinement and
proliferation of affordable UAS technology has prompted more militant
groups to incorporate drones into their military and political operations.
For instance, militants have introduced drones to armed conflicts in
Ukraine, Nigeria, Indonesia, Syria, Iraq, and Libya. Expressing concern
about this trend, a May 2019 United Nations report advised, “greater
efforts are needed to address the potential risks posed by terrorist use of
UAS.”2 US defense and political leaders have echoed this call.3
Mitigating the risks posed by such drone use is complicated by the
lack of agreement among experts and practitioners regarding the nature
1. Secretary General, International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), Unmanned Aircraft
Systems (UAS), Cir 328 AN/190 (Montreal: ICAO, 2011), x, https://www.icao.int/Meetings/UAS
/Documents/Circular%20328_en.pdf.
2. United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate
(CTED), Greater Efforts Needed to Address the Potential Risks Posed by Terrorist Use of Unmanned Aircraft
Systems, CTED Trends Alert (New York: CTED, May 2019), 1, https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/wp
-content/uploads/2019/05/CTED-UAS-Trends-Alert-Final_17_May_2019.pdf.
3. Michelle Tan, “Army Chief: Soldiers Must Be Ready to Fight in ‘Megacities’,” Defense
News, October 5, 2016, https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/ausa/2016/10/05
/army-chief-soldiers-must-be-ready-to-fight-in-megacities/.
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of the threat posed by militant drone programs. Some assessments
raise alarm. “Imagine swarms of undersea, surface, and aerial drones
hunting submarines hidden in the vastness of the ocean. Or imagine
hundreds of airborne drones darting through New York City, seeking
out targets and dosing them with nerve agent.”4 In 2017, then chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph F. Dunford Jr. remarked
to a Senate committee that drones were “at the top of [the US defense
community’s] list for current emerging threats.”5 Others, however, have
expressed less concern.6
How and to what extent do militants advance their strategic
objectives with drones? Drawing on Robert Pape’s categories of
coercive airpower, this article presents a framework for assessing
militant drone operations and their effects in armed conflicts.7 The
analysis focuses primarily on drone operations conducted by Islamic
State, Hezbollah, and Houthi militants as these groups are especially
prominent among the few nonstate organizations known to have used
drones to kill opponents.8

Appeal of Drone Technologies
Two types of drones are available to militants. The first type
resembles an airframe that can carry a human crew—a fixed-wing, longerrange aircraft that can remain aloft for hours. These drones are equipped
with satellite uplinks for long-distance communication, sophisticated
surveillance systems, and sizeable payloads for guided missiles. Only a
few militant groups, most prominently Hezbollah and the Houthis, have
employed drones with some or all of these characteristics. The second
type resembles a hobbyist drone—small, portable, and limited in range
and payload. This type of drone has been used more widely by militant
groups such as Islamic State.
Yet technological and political developments are rapidly blurring
this distinction and may allow many militant groups to obtain drones
capable of strategic effects. Commercial outlets are producing larger
4. Zachary Kallenborn and Philipp C. Bleek, “Drones of Mass Destruction: Drone Swarms and
the Future of Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Weapons,” War on the Rocks, February 14, 2019,
https://warontherocks.com/2019/02/drones-of-mass-destruction-drone-swarms-and-the-future
-of-nuclear-chemical-and-biological-weapons/.
5. Ash Rossiter, “Drone Usage by Militant Groups: Exploring Variation in Adoption,” Defense &
Security Analysis 34, no. 2 (2018): 113–26, https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2018.1478183.
6. Dhia Muhsin, “Houthi Use of Drones Delivers Potent Message in Yemen War,” International
Institute of Strategic Studies (blog), August 27, 2019, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2019/08
/houthi-uav-strategy-in-yemen.
7. Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1997), 46.
8. Emil Archambault and Yannick Veilleux-Lepage, “Drone Imagery in Islamic State
Propaganda: Flying Like a State,” International Affairs 96, no. 4 (July 2020): 955–73, https://doi
.org/10.1093/ia/iiaa014; and Don Rassler, Remotely Piloted Innovation: Terrorism, Drones and Supportive
Technology (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, October 2016), https://ctc
.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Drones-Report.pdf.
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drone systems with wider operative radii and heavier payloads.9 Swarm
technology continues to improve and is becoming accessible to amateur
operators and militant groups.10 This particular technology could
enhance militant groups’ use of drones for strategic ends, allowing them
to coordinate strikes among many small, inexpensive, and expendable
drones to create physical and psychological effects.11
The number of states producing and exporting drones is growing
rapidly. States as diverse as Belarus, Iran, and Indonesia produce
indigenous drone systems, and many other states import these types of
weapons.12 This proliferation could facilitate militant groups’ acquisition
of drones through a number of channels.
States that produce drones might provide them to militant
organizations to further their foreign policy objectives: Iran, for
example, has been accused of giving Hezbollah and the Houthis access
to sophisticated, long-range drone systems. Drones are widely traded on
international markets, allowing militant organizations to purchase them
legally or illicitly. Moreover, the diffusion of knowledge about drone
production allows militants to produce drones themselves or modify
unarmed drones to carry weapons.13
The urban battlespace also lends itself to drone use. Many experts,
including US defense leaders, expect the frequency of urban warfare
to increase worldwide.14 The urban terrain limits or removes many
obstacles that otherwise characterize drone operations. For example,
militants operating in an urban setting are less concerned about drones’
limited flight range.15 Drones are well-suited to the urban environment.
They are more difficult to detect and are naturally designed to avoid
physical obstacles that might inhibit a small tactical unit, vehicle-borne
improvised explosive device, or armed convoy. Some observers warn
personnel operating in urban conflicts that “the development of large
9. T. X. Hammes, “The Future of Warfare: Small, Many, Smart vs. Few & Exquisite?” War
on the Rocks, July 16, 2014, https://warontherocks.com/2014/07/the-future-of-warfare-small
-many-smart-vs-few-exquisite/.
10. Zachary Kallenborn, “The Era of the Drone Swarm Is Coming, and We Need
to Be Ready for It,” Modern War Institute, October 25, 2018, https://mwi.usma.edu
/era-drone-swarm-coming-need-ready/.
11. Robert J. Bunker, Terrorist and Insurgent Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Use, Potentials, and Military
Implications (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2015), 25.
12. Matthew Fuhrmann and Michael C. Horowitz, “Droning On: Explaining the Proliferation
of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles,” International Organization 71, no. 2 (Spring 2017): 397–418; Michael C.
Horowitz, Sarah E. Kreps, and Matthew Fuhrmann, “Separating Fact from Fiction in the Debate
over Drone Proliferation,” International Security 41, no. 2 (Fall 2016): 7–42; and Peter Bergen, Melissa
Salyk-Virk, and David Sterman, “Who Has What: Countries Developing Armed Drones,” in World
of Drones database (Washington, DC: New America, July 2020), https://www.newamerica.org
/international-security/reports/world-drones/who-has-what-countries-developing-armed-drones/.
13. Don Rassler, The Islamic State and Drones: Supply, Scale, and Future Threats (West Point, NY:
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, July 2018), 22, https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content
/uploads/2018/07/Islamic-State-and-Drones-Release-Version.pdf.
14. Tan, “Ready to Fight.”
15. Scott Stewart, “Beyond the Buzz: Assessing the Terrorist Drone Threat,” Stratfor, February 9,
2017, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/beyond-buzz-assessing-terrorist-drone-threat.
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and capable suicidal drones needs to be considered as the next probable
successor to suicide bombing.”16
These developments mean more militant groups have the capacity
to obtain more sophisticated drones. From an operational standpoint,
these systems offer a number of advantages. First, drones are easier to
operate than many advanced weapons systems such as cruise missiles or
fixed-wing aircraft. The technology underlying units from commercial
retailers—a basic airframe, computing power, and communication
capabilities—is not complex and is widely available. The larger drones
used in the September 2019 attacks on the Saudi Aramco facilities in
Khurais and Abqaiq are estimated to have cost only $15,000 or less to
build.17 This expenditure is comparable to the expense of assembling
a suicide car bomb—between $13,000 and $20,000.18 Further, these
systems obligate opposing forces to expend resources on developing
drone countermeasures, which have faced many challenges.19
Operating larger, fixed-wing drones often requires more extensive
training from experts. For example, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps and Hezbollah embedded long-term advisers in Yemen to train
Houthi members to operate such systems.20 But for militant groups
committed to projecting airpower, these drones offer an accessible
alternative compared to piloting, maintaining, and basing conventional
aircraft. The absence of an onboard crew means militants risk fewer
human resources when deploying these systems. This aspect of drones
is especially appealing to armed nonstate actors who compete against
larger and more capable government forces and must carefully husband
their current and future recruits.21
Second, drones offer militants an opportunity to engage targets
that would be too risky to attack or surveil with ground forces.22 While
militant forces may not have the capacity to launch a successful ground
16. Craig Whiteside and Vera Mironova, “Adaptation and Innovation with an Urban
Twist: Changes to Suicide Tactics in the Battle for Mosul,” Military Review (November–December
2017): 84, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives
/November-December-2017/Adaptation-and-Innovation-with-an-Urban-Twist-Changes-to
-Suicide-Tactics-in-the-Battle-for-Mosul/.
17. Ben Hubbard, Palko Karasz, and Stanley Reed, “Two Major Saudi Oil Installations Hit by
Drone Strike, and US Blames Iran,” New York Times, September 14, 2019, https://www.nytimes
.com/2019/09/14/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-refineries-drone-attack.html.
18. Dina Temple-Raston, “How Much Does a Terrorist Attack Cost? A Lot Less Than You’d
Think,” NPR, June 25, 2014, https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2014/06/25/325240653
/how-much-does-a-terrorist-attack-cost-a-lot-less-than-you-think.
19. Arthur Holland Michel, Counter-Drone Systems, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Center for the
Study of the Drone at Bard College, 2019), https://dronecenter.bard.edu/files/2019/12/CSD
-CUAS-2nd-Edition-Web.pdf.
20. Eric Schmitt, “Iran Is Smuggling Increasingly Potent Weapons into Yemen, US Admiral
Says,” New York Times, September 18, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/18/world
/middleeast/iran-houthis-fifth-fleet-admiral.html.
21. Desirée Nilsson, “Turning Weakness into Strength: Military Capabilities, Multiple Rebel
Groups and Negotiated Settlements,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 27, no. 3 (July 2010):
253–71.
22. James Igoe Walsh and Marcus Schulzke, Drones and Support for the Use of Force (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 2018).
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assault into a neighboring country, drones make surveilling or attacking
these territories feasible.23

Coercive Logic of Militant Drone Use

How and to what extent do militants use drones to advance their
strategic objectives? Speaking to interstate relations, the “advent of
airpower quite literally added a whole new dimension to the possibilities
for coercion.”24 Does the emergence of drone technologies offer a
similar watershed moment to militant actors? “Coercion” is the “art of
manipulating the costs and benefits to affect the behavior of an actor.”25
Using this definition, how might militant groups use drones to erode
their opponent’s will to fight and convince their opponent to make
concessions or suffer the costs of coercion?26
Armed actors can use airpower to coerce their opponents in
multiple ways. Pape’s discussion of airpower in interstate conflict identifies
meaningful differences in militants’ applications of drone systems.
While armed drones may be used to execute tactical, operational, or
strategic missions, this article focuses on the intended strategic results
of drone-based missions and assesses the capacity for strategic coercion
presented by militants’ use of drones. By design, strategic effects impair
the adversary’s ability to carry out war or hostilities and should neutralize
the adversary’s centers of gravity.27
Pape first distinguishes between strategic bombing and theater
air attacks.28 Actors in armed conflicts use strategic bombing to coerce
opponents in two ways—denial and punishment. In a denial strategy,
airpower targets the opponent’s capacity to develop and deploy military
forces, weakening it sufficiently to allow ground forces to seize territory.
Actors use denial strategies to “dissuade an adversary by convincing them
that any military campaign they may launch will fail militarily because
the coercer will deny the ability to complete the action successfully.”29
Toward this end, the coercer could threaten to capture territory held
by the opponent or threaten to destroy enough of the opponent’s military
power to thwart its territorial ambitions.30 Denial involves the direct and
23. Brian A. Jackson et al., Evaluating Novel Threats to the Homeland: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and
Cruise Missiles (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), 37–42.
24. Tami Davis Biddle, “Coercion Theory: A Basic Introduction for Practitioners,” Texas
National Security Review 3, no. 2 (Spring 2020): 94–109, https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream
/handle/2152/81862/TNSRVol3Issue2.pdf ?sequence=2&isAllowed=y.
25. Alexander B. Downes, “Step Aside or Face the Consequences: Explaining the Success
and Failure of Compellent Threats to Remove Foreign Leaders,” in Coercion: The Power to Hurt in
International Politics, ed. Kelly M. Greenhill and Peter Krause (New York: Oxford University Press,
2018), 96.
26. Pape, Bombing to Win, 46; and US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Doctrine for the Armed Forces of
the United States, Joint Publication 1 (Washington, DC: JCS, March 2013): I-4.
27. US Air Force, Air Force Doctrine Publication 1 (Montgomery, AL: Curtis E. LeMay Center
for Doctrine Development and Education, March 10, 2021), 6, https://www.doctrine.af.mil
/Portals/61/documents/AFDP_1/AFDP-1.pdf.
28. Pape, Bombing to Win, 46.
29. Biddle, “Coercion Theory,” 109.
30. Pape, Bombing to Win, 14.
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large-scale destruction of enemy war-fighting units and personnel with
a goal to undermine fundamentally an adversary’s capacity to fight and
to force that adversary to make strategic concessions. In a punishment
strategy, enemy civilians are deliberately targeted to lower morale,
leading them to press their government to end the conflict.
Actors use theater air attacks to coerce the enemy in two ways
as well: interdiction and close air support. An interdiction strategy
seeks to destroy “logistic networks, reinforcements, and command
headquarters behind front lines,” and its goal is to “stop the movement
and coordination of forces throughout the theater.”31 A close air
support strategy involves supporting the military actions of ground
troops by providing cover against enemy airpower, engaging in tactical
surveillance, and targeting enemy forces in support of ground forces.
The following four categories provide a framework to investigate the
coercive capacity of militant drone operations.

Denial
Militants can use armed drones to attack opposing military bases
and over-the-horizon forces without exposing their personnel to harm.
Houthi forces, for example, regularly used drones to surveil and attack
Saudi- and UAE-led coalition forces outside of Yemen. Similarly in
July 2006, Hezbollah used a military-grade drone to disable an Israeli
warship. Following the attack, group leader Sheik Hassan Nasrallah
warned Israeli officials, “you wanted an open war and we are ready for
an open war.”32
With or without drones, strategic denial is a tall order for militant
organizations, which almost always have fewer materiel capabilities
than their state-based opponents. Yet some militants do seem to use
drones for this purpose. Announcements by the Houthis demonstrate
they consider drone attacks to fit within the group’s broader “Balance
of Deterrence” initiative—an explicit reference to a core principle of
coercion theory.33 For instance, after claiming responsibility for the
September 2019 attacks on the Saudi Aramco facility, the Houthis
capitalized on the event to coerce Emirati forces. A Houthi military
spokesperson stated: “to the Emirati regime we say only one operation
[of ours] would cost you dearly. . . . Today and for the first time we
announce that we have dozens of targets within our range in the UAE,
some are in Abu Dhabi and can be attacked at any time.”34
These types of attacks, designed to deny the coalition forces, will
likely continue. In a limited but growing number of cases, militants have
used drones to deny the advancement of other militants. For example
31. Pape, Bombing to Win, 77.
32. Hamza Hendawi, “Israel: Hezbollah Drone Attacks Warship,” Washington Post, July 14, 2006.
33. Rawan Shaif, “Saudi Arabia’s Self-Fulfilling Houthi Prophecy,” Foreign Policy, October 2,
2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/02/saudi-arabias-self-fulfilling-houthi-prophecy/.
34. Aziz El Yaakoubi, Maher Chmaytelli, and Tuqa Khalid, “Yemen’s Houthis Threaten to
Attack United Arab Emirates Targets,” Reuters, September 18, 2019, https://www.reuters.com
/article/us-saudi-aramco-houthis-emirates-idUSKBN1W3282.
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in August 2017, Hezbollah used armed drones to strike Islamic State
forces in Syria close to the border with Lebanon, demonstrating the
broader application of this technology by militant groups.35 Hezbollah,
which boasts the longest-standing drone program among militant
groups, seems to focus its lethal drone operations on members of other
nonstate actor groups, namely Jabhat al-Nusra and Islamic State. Its
drone operations against Israeli government forces, by contrast, have
been largely nonkinetic.36
This distinction between drone strikes against state opponents and
against rivals suggests few militants might use armed drones in true
denial strategies against the former, such as striking strategic targets at
the opponent’s center of gravity. Compared with government forces,
most militants operate on the short end of the capability ratio; drones
do not give militants an upper hand in this regard. On the whole,
militant organizations, such as the Houthis, that possess sophisticated
drone systems have a greater baseline opportunity to achieve strategic
denial, however, they have not used their drone fleets to shift conflicts
fundamentally in their favor.
This pattern of use is unlikely to change, even with advancements
in drone-based technologies. Militants’ ability to use drones for strategic
effect, especially for purposes of denial, against state opponents is
limited by logistical and materiel factors. Strategic coercion involves
widespread and sustained attacks on an opponent’s centers of gravity.
Militant groups would need to control enough territory to house fleets
of drones and their support operations, such as intelligence collection
and analysis, repair facilities, and bases for drone operators.
Moreover, this infrastructure would need to be safe from attack—
and resources would have to be diverted to protect this infrastructure.
Only militant groups in a position to challenge the state more effectively
with other military means could consider using drones for denial. Even
capable militant groups such as Hezbollah lack elements needed to use
drones for strategic denial; in this sense, they are fundamentally different
from most states with modern military capabilities and command and
control systems.
Relative weakness leads militant groups to husband their resources
and deploy them to maximize their survival, wearing down opponents
instead of trying to win through decisive battlefield victories. This is
the fundamental political strategy of most militant groups, large or
small. This strategy would also apply to a decision about whether to
invest in large-drone capabilities—capabilities that create vulnerabilities
as previously discussed. As such, militants will unlikely try to develop
drone capabilities for the purpose of strategic denial.
35. Angus McDowall, “Hezbollah Uses Drones against Islamic State in Syria: Hezbollah-Run
Media,” Reuters, August 21, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-lebanon-syria
/hezbollah-uses-drones-against-islamic-state-in-syria-hezbollah-run-media-idUSKCN1B11H4.
36. Archambault and Veilleux-Lepage, “Drone Imagery,” 13.
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Punishment
Militants may attack soft targets as part of a punishment strategy.
Coercion by punishment intentionally raises costs or risks to civilian
populations, which subsequently pressures officials to back down or
make concessions. And militant drone operations have indeed caused
civilian casualties. Yet the Houthis’ drone attacks on soft targets in Saudi
Arabia and Yemen—intended to advance the group’s political objectives
by exposing the Yemeni government’s inability to defend its territory
and by exerting political pressure on the Saudi government to limit its
activities—have focused more on targeting critical infrastructure.37
Notably on June 14, 2019, the Houthis released a poster directed at Saudi
and Emirati civilians that cautioned, “for your safety, avoid airports and
military locations.”38 They began a sustained strike campaign against
Saudi regional airports that same week.
This example illustrates a broader point: militant organizations
thus far have shown a lack of will rather than a lack of capacity to use
drones systematically in punishment strategies. This fact is welcome but
perplexing: even smaller drones offer a seemingly surefire way to incite
fear among noncombatant populations. Indeed, many who express
concerns about the use of drones in this context draw attention to the
potential of these weapons to disrupt airport operations, attack large
groups of civilians, or assassinate political leaders.
While small armed drones cannot kill many people, they could
create widespread fear and lead to abrupt changes in public behavior. Yet
this sort of attack seems to be quite rare, even for groups that otherwise
target civilians, such as Boko Haram and Islamic State, and is consistent
with Pape’s findings about the ineffectiveness of using airpower to target
civilians in interstate conflicts.39
Why is this the case? Militant groups may have concluded other
armaments are better suited for the task. Suicide bombing, for example,
signals resolve and capacity.40 Relatedly, a number of militant groups
understand counterinsurgent air strikes kill civilians and have leveraged
this data for propaganda purposes. They may refrain from using drones
to target civilians in order to enhance this narrative. Indeed, one can
imagine such attacks might backfire: this type of drone strike might lead
the group’s enemy, a regime for example, to devote more resources to the
fight; it might also cause the civilian population in question to rally around
37. “Several Killed in Houthi Missile, Drone Attack: Yemeni Officials,” Al Jazeera,
November 7, 2019.
38. Caleb Weiss, “Analysis: Houthi Drone Strikes in Saudi Arabia and Yemen,” Long War
Journal, August 7, 2019, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2019/08/analysis-houthi-drone
-strikes-in-saudi-arabia-and-yemen.php.
39. Pape, Bombing to Win, 10.
40. Bruce Hoffmann and Gordon H. McCormick, “Terrorism, Signaling, and Suicide
Attack,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 27, no. 4 (2004): 243–81, https://doi.org/10.1080
/10576100490466498.

TOC

Strategy and Doctrine

Doctor and Walsh

81

the regime. For these reasons, militant groups that engage in terrorism
using drones are less likely to achieve their larger political objectives.41

Interdiction
Coercive militant force also may be used for interdiction purposes,
weakening enemy battlefield forces by starving them of needed
logistical support. Strikes against civilian airports, factories, and similar
targets serve the strategic purpose of threatening command centers, arms
depots, or logistical staging hubs. In some cases, these strikes undermine
critical sources of economic revenue.42 The only militant group to have
carried out such drone operations systematically is the Houthis. Since
April 2018, the group has conducted a steady stream of drone strikes
against airports, munitions warehouses, oil production facilities, and
arms depots in Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.43

Figure 1. Houthi rebel drone and missile attacks, 2018–19

Starting in April 2018, the Houthis executed 115 drone attacks
through October 2019 (figure 1).44 Of these attacks, 62 were conducted
against civilian airports or critical infrastructure, and 27 were conducted
against military bases or troops.45 The remaining 26 attacks were
reported as intercepted or as striking unknown targets. By comparison,
Houthi forces conducted 45 attacks with ballistic missiles against
military bases and/or military troops and only 20 attacks against civilian
airports or critical infrastructure.
This analysis indicates the Houthi militants use their drone arsenal
for specific coercive purposes. Houthi drone operations strike softer
41. Max Abrahms, “Why Terrorism Does Not Work,” International Security 31, no. 2 (Fall 2006):
42–78, https://www.jstor.org/stable/4137516?seq=1; and Virginia Page Fortna, “Do Terrorists
Win? Rebels’ Use of Terrorism and Civil War Outcomes,” International Organization 69, no. 3
(Summer 2015): 519–66, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization
/article/abs/do-terrorists-win-rebels-use-of-terrorism-and-civil-war-outcomes/4729B2B92690461
6190DC38DB3240C8F.
42. “Houthi Drone Attack ‘Hits Arms Depot’ at Saudi Airport in Najran,” Al Jazeera,
May 21, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/05/houthi-drone-attack-hits-arms-depot
-saudi-airport-najran-190521080525385.html.
43. Weiss, “Houthi Drone Strikes.”
44. Data from Weiss, “Houthi Drone Strikes.”
45. Weiss, “Houthi Drone Strikes.”
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targets rather than as part of a true denial strategy, while the group uses
its ballistic missiles to attack harder targets protected with air defense
systems that can more effectively intercept drones.
Overall, Houthi drone operations against soft targets disrupt
sources of logistical support for coalition military activity in Yemen.
These drone operations also demonstrate the group’s strength and
resolve while avoiding a potential rallying of the public around coalition
leadership triggered by mass civilian casualties from drone strikes.
The Houthis’ drone operations show mixed results in coercing
opponents. Drone operations against the Saudis—the group’s primary
opponent—have had limited success at the strategic level. A 2019 report
concludes, “ultimately, UAV use by [the Houthis] has not shifted the
strategic calculus of the Saudi-led coalition.”46 Indeed, while the Houthis
have recently gained ground, the Saudis have also not retreated. In terms
of successful coercion, the UAE completed the withdrawal of its forces
in Yemen in February 2020. While outright military victory against the
Houthis became less and less likely, this decision was also likely shaped
by the Houthis’ growing capacity and stated willingness to strike airports
and critical infrastructure within the Emirates.47

Close Air Support
Drones can also be used in theater air attacks to support groundforce operations, giving militants a combined arms capability. As Pape
describes it, “the purpose of close air support, which attacks frontline
fielded forces, is to thin the front, creating weak spots that the attacker’s
ground forces can exploit.”48 The best-known example of these types of
operations is Islamic State modifying unarmed drones—or engineering
their own—to carry small munitions in Iraq and Syria. Islamic State
effectively used its arsenal to disrupt coalition front lines in a number of
campaigns, including the Battle of Mosul.
Bellingcat analyst Nick Waters records 208 drone attacks conducted
by Islamic State in 2017 in Iraq and Syria (figure 2).49 In contrast to
the types of operations typical of the Houthis or Hezbollah, most
Islamic State drone strikes were tactical enhancements used in defense
of strategically valuable positions, focused on military vehicles and
troops in transit or active combat. Less than 5 percent of the group’s
2017 drone operations targeted critical infrastructure like information
centers or communication towers. All of the 2017 attacks occurred in
territories Islamic State controlled or defended in 2017, and more than
half occurred in the major battles in urban areas. While Islamic State
drone operations had relatively little strategic coercive effect, they have
often been quite operationally and tactically disruptive.
46. Muhsin, “Houthi Use of Drones.”
47. Ibrahim Jalal, “The UAE May Have Withdrawn from Yemen but Its Influence
Remains Strong,” Middle East Institute, February 25, 2020, https://www.mei.edu/publications
/uae-may-have-withdrawn-yemen-its-influence-remains-strong.
48. Pape, Bombing to Win, 78.
49. Nick Waters, Drone Proliferation Database (Dropbox, 2018).
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Figure 2. ISIS drone strikes by target type, 2017

Close ground support operations can include nonkinetic approaches
as well. Interestingly, many militant groups with access to drones
choose not to arm them at all. Indeed, a larger number of armed groups
employ drones strictly for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
purposes. For example in 2018, an official associated with the Air
Force Research Laboratory reported the Taliban had been using drones
extensively to monitor the location and movements of US troops.50
Islamic State’s West Africa Province in Nigeria has used drones to
collect tactical intelligence, plan more effective hit-and-run attacks, and
avoid surprise counterattacks. These drones are helpful for intelligence
collection against stationary targets but are less useful for supporting
attacks on small and mobile targets.51
Close air support presents one of the most fruitful areas for
expansion in militant drone programs. Homemade, commercial, and
military-grade units are all well suited for this purpose, meaning groups
without access to military-grade drones can still conduct ground
support operations effectively and on a systematic scale. In 2017, then
commander of US Special Operations Command General Raymond A.
Thomas noted, “[the] most daunting problem [of 2016] was an adaptive
enemy who, for a time, enjoyed tactical superiority in the airspace under
our conventional air superiority in the form of commercially available
drones and fuel-expedient weapons systems, and our only available
response was small arms fire.”52
Indeed, Islamic State’s recorded use of drones mirrors Pape’s
assessment of how such operations can be carried out to optimal
effect. “The most important group support targets are point targets
50. Jared Keller, “The Taliban Are Watching US Troops with Drones ‘24/7’ in Afghanistan,”
Task & Purpose, December 14, 2018, https://taskandpurpose.com/bulletpoints/taliban-drone
-surveillance-afghanistan.
51. Jacob Zenn, “The Humanitarian Dilemma around the Military’s ‘Super Camp’ Strategy in
Nigeria,” Council on Foreign Relations, Africa in Transition (blog) September 5, 2019, https://www
.cfr.org/blog/humanitarian-dilemma-around-militarys-super-camp-strategy-nigeria.
52. David B. Larter, “SOCOM Commander: Armed ISIS Drones Were 2016’s ‘Most Daunting
Problem,’ ” Defense News, May 16, 2017, https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/sofic
/2017/05/16/socom-commander-armed-isis-drones-were-2016s-most-daunting-problem/.
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requiring direct hits: tanks, armored personnel carriers, self-propelled
artillery, bunkers used for communications, logistic storage, or other
purposes, and bridges.”53 While Islamic State’s drone operations did not,
ultimately, have a strategic coercive effect, the group demonstrated in
2016 and 2017 how drones could be used on the front lines to challenge
and deny—even temporarily—the advancement of better-equipped
opposing forces.

Conclusion

Some experts argue drones provide militants with a “poor man’s
air force,” enabling them to employ airpower as a central part of their
political-military strategies.54 Yet militant groups do not have powerful
reasons to use drones systematically for strategic bombing, such as
in denial or punishment strategies. Rather, they use these systems to
optimal effect in theater air attacks—especially in interdiction or closegroup support operations. A militant group’s drone program coincides
with its limited relative capabilities and broader strategic objectives.
Due to the rapid advancement and proliferation of drone systems, many
militant groups will soon have the capacity to acquire drones that would
allow strategic bombing. Most groups, however, will have little incentive
to do so.
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ABSTRACT: Predoctrinal deliberations about the employment of
the US armed forces, captured in Joint Doctrine Notes, remain
critically understudied. Using comparative text analysis, this article
identifies changes in recent Joint Doctrine Note depictions of military
strategy. These changes risk distorting the logic of military strategy,
sacrificing means-ends integration to organizational impulse, and
raising the prospect of future shortfalls in US strategic effectiveness.

I

n December 2019, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff released
a new Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) on military strategy, JDN 2-19.
The note differs from its predecessor, JDN 1-18, in significant ways.
Perhaps most notably, 2-19 expands on conventional characterizations
of military strategy. Per JDN 2-19, strategy encompasses more than
the designated employment of the military instrument “to secure the
objectives of national policy.”1 The document specifically requires the
creation of “friendly advantages . . . at the expense of the competitor
or adversary.”2 This modification, we contend, risks removing military
strategy from its foundational logic, substituting organizational impulse
for means-end integration and jeopardizing future strategic effectiveness.
The following sections provide theoretical grounding, evidentiary
support, and practical context for our argument. First, the article examines
classical accounts of the logic of military strategy, asking whether
shifting doctrinal depictions of strategy run counter to that logic. The
article then provides a comparative textual analysis of select sections
from JDN 1-18 and JDN 2-19, lending substantiation to the claim that
the two differ from each other in meaningful ways. The article identifies
evidence of divergent portrayals of military strategy, highlighting JDN
1-18’s emphasis on means-ends integration and JDN 2-19’s embrace
of military organizational impulse. Finally, the article addresses the
implications of this variance for the future of US strategic effectiveness,
particularly in the context of re-emergent great-power competition. The
article warns JDN 2-19 may be a harbinger of regression in US military
strategic thought and urges decisionmakers to engage rather than evade the
complexities of means-ends integration.
1. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Strategy, Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 1-18 (Washington, DC:
JCS, 2018), I-7, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/jdn_jg/jdn1_18.pdf ?ver=
2018-04-25-150439-540.
2. JCS, Strategy, JDN 2-19 (Washington, DC: JCS, 2019), II-3, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36
/Documents/Doctrine/jdn_jg/jdn2_19.pdf ?ver=2019-12-20-093655-890.

TOC

86

Parameters 51(2) Summer 2021

Means-Ends Integration: Logic and Obstacles
Clausewitz defines strategy as “the use of engagements for the
object of the war.”3 This definition, along with the well-known “war
is an instrument of policy” dictum, informs most contemporary
understandings of military strategy.4 They also distinguish its chief
function: bridging military means to political ends.5 Absent this function,
“there is no rationale for how force will achieve purposes worth the price
in blood and treasure.”6 Underscoring strategy’s rational-utilitarian
logic, Richard Betts notes that
one must be able to devise a rational scheme to achieve an objective through
combat or the threat of it; implement the scheme with forces; keep the
plan working in the face of enemy reactions (which should be anticipated
in the plan); and achieve something close to the objective. Rational strategic
behavior should be value maximizing, choosing appropriate means according
to economistic calculations of cost and benefit.7

In other words, strategic effectiveness (success in bringing about
the attainment of political ends) requires consideration of the costs of
military options relative to one another, the costs of these options relative
to the benefits of specified policy aims, and such costs relative to risks
inherent to the strategic situation. Further utility-relevant deliberations
might center on the prioritization of military resources, the sequencing
of military activity, or the theory of how success will be achieved.8
Though superficially straightforward, the rational-utilitarian
reconciliation of means to ends is susceptible to “thousands of
diversions.”9 Though it may not guarantee battlefield success—the
enemy, after all, gets a vote—political-military integration is almost
certainly necessary for strategic success.10 Fog (uncertainty) and friction
(danger, physical exertion, and intelligence gaps that impede action) are
ever-present factors in war and strategy.11 Political leaders are inclined
to seek ambitious and ambiguous political ends absent an understanding
of the limits of military force; military leaders are liable to curb political
inputs that run afoul of military expertise. Strategic cultural biases,
3. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, indexed ed., trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 128.
4. Clausewitz, On War, 605–10.
5. Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999), 17; and
Richard K. Betts, “Is Strategy an Illusion?,” International Security 25, no. 2 (Fall 2000): 5–6.
6. Betts, “Is Strategy an Illusion?,” 5.
7. Betts, “Is Strategy an Illusion?,” 6.
8. Eliot A. Cohen, “What’s Obama’s Counterinsurgency Strategy for Afghanistan?,” Washington
Post, December 6, 2009, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/04
/AR2009120402602.html; and Jeffrey W. Meiser, “Ends+Ways+Means=(Bad) Strategy,” Parameters
46, no. 4 (2016): 81–91.
9. Clausewitz, On War, 178.
10. James Mattis, “Meet the Press,” NBC, video (no longer available), October 13, 2019; and
Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), 25–29.
11. Clausewitz, On War, 122.
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tense or imbalanced civil-military relations, and leaders’ cognitive
psychological pathologies interfere with strategic decision making.12
Attempts at evading or bypassing the myriad predicaments of
strategy are apt to prove untenable. The purposeful engagement with
means-ends dilemmas is both necessary and advantageous.13 This
engagement affords alternatives to brute-force attrition, enhances the
value of existing resources, acts as a force multiplier, provides options for
besting equally capable adversaries, and mitigates the costs of defeating
weaker ones.14
While most obstacles to means-ends integration fall outside the
control of the Joint Force, one exists well within its purview: the
military’s organizational penchant for pursuing certainty. This quest
for certainty may influence the adoption of standardized procedures,
the reliance on technocratic expertise, or the related preference for
offense (and annihilation). In theory, offense enables management of
an uncertain and threat-riddled security environment; defense requires
responsiveness to that environment. Offensive plans, capabilities,
posturing, and operations—the argument goes—alleviate fog and
friction.15 This perspective colors military technocratic protocols that
help depoliticize use-of-force policy debates, augment military budgets,
and enhance organizational autonomy.16
Despite their ostensible appeal, offensive plans, capabilities,
posturing, and operations do not yield cure-all effects. Friction,
for example, is largely impervious to defensive and offensive plans,
as adversary behavior ensures war rarely proceeds “according to
expectations.”17 Further, blind adherence to offense may yield an
outbreak of war consistent with the spiral model or may result in strategic
failures: the adoption of (perceived) offensive capabilities or posturing
may spark rival fears and in-kind responses, seeding unforeseen war,
as illustrated by the onset of World War I.18 Notwithstanding the
offensive arms race that triggered that war and indications that military
technologies of the time favored defense, both the Entente Powers and
the Central Powers went on to assume offense-centric strategies. France,
which implemented a distinctly offensive “single combat doctrine”
despite apparent barriers to its success, spent much of the war seeking
to overcome the plan’s costly shortfalls.19
Given the problems outlined above, what tools might serve as
effective checks against undue organizational impulse or as effective
12. Betts, “Is Strategy an Illusion?”
13. Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine, 25–29.
14. Betts, “Is Strategy an Illusion?,” 6, 8, 50.
15. Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine, 48; and Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A
History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (New York: Macmillan Co., 1973), xxii.
16. Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine, 49; and Jack Snyder, “Civil-Military Relations and the Cult
of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984,” International Security 9, no. 1 (Summer 1984): 109.
17. Betts, “Is Strategy an Illusion?,” 37.
18. Snyder, “Civil-Military Relations,” 119.
19. Stephen Van Evera, “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War,”
International Security 9, no. 1 (Summer 1984): 60.
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safeguards of means-ends integration? Scholars skeptical of military
self-regulation in strategy call for active civilian intervention in strategy
processes.20 Others offer a somewhat less cynical alternative. Military
mindfulness, encompassed in doctrine, enhances the likelihood of
overcoming organizational blind spots and achieving strategic effects.21
The following comparative analysis of the texts of Joint Doctrine
Notes 1-18 and 2-19 seeks evidence of competing predoctrinal
characterizations of strategy. More specifically, the discussion examines
2-19 for recurrent text indicators linking the organizational preference
for offense as the presumed mitigation of uncertainty. Does the language
of JDN 2-19 evince bias for organizational predisposition, and if so,
does that bias risk distorting strategy’s means-ends logic?

Ends-Ways-Means versus Organizational Impulse

Doctrine outlines standards for the management of force
employment or “fundamental principles” for the conduct of operations.22
Strategy-centric doctrine connects operational conduct to the logic
of strategy. Such doctrine does not advance a particular strategy or
set of strategies over another but provides guidance for identifying
and overcoming barriers to strategic effectiveness.23 Both JDN 1-18
and JDN 2-19 provide insights into ongoing deliberations about the
substance of US military strategy and how this strategy should be
depicted in Joint Doctrine. The comparison that follows reveals a
doctrinal shift away from strategic process thinking as it relates to the
formulation, implementation, assessment, and adaptation or innovation
of military strategy. Should the contents of JDN 2-19 be reflected in
doctrine, their inclusion could have significant ramifications for the
Joint Force’s approach to military strategy.

Strategy Formulation

Comparison. Both JDN 1-18 and JDN 2-19 introduce strategy
formulation as a task founded on rationalist means-ends logic, noting
this process requires consideration of the following questions:
1. Where do we want to go, or what are the desired ends?
2. How do we get there, or what are the ways?
3. What resources are available, or what are the means?
4. What are the risks and costs associated with the strategy?24
Beyond this point, the documents’ strategy-making guidance
diverges. Joint Doctrine Note 1-18 repeatedly calls for the development
of “ends-ways-means-risks/costs” connections that aid the strategic
20. Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine, 49, 53–54, 58–59.
21. Betts, “Is Strategy an Illusion?,” 39; and Gray, Modern Strategy.
22. Aaron P. Jackson, The Roots of Military Doctrine: Change and Continuity in Understanding the
Practice of Warfare (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2013), 6; and Posen,
Sources of Military Doctrine.
23. Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine; and Jackson, Roots of Military Doctrine.
24. JCS, JDN 1-18, I-1, I-2–I-3; and JCS, JDN 2-19, I-1.
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situation and ultimately serve political ends.25 Strategy formulation
requires the regular engagement of assorted participants: elected
officials, political appointees, career bureaucrats, and military leaders.
Curtailing their inputs jeopardizes means-ends alignment and unity
of effort. 26 Further, mechanistic routine should be avoided, as such
routine risks producing “unimaginative, pedestrian and predictable”
strategies the adversary can “easily anticipate and counter.”27
Joint Doctrine Note 2-19 asserts the configuration of strategy
cannot rest on “inadequate” ends-ways-means-risks/costs calculations.
The strategy formulation process demands military leaders articulate
ways to “impose order on the environment” and “generate friendly
advantages over the adversary.”28 Politicians are relevant to the strategymaking process insofar as they must designate “the limits of actions and
resources available.”29 Beyond that point, military leaders must translate
strategy’s conceptual narrative for “supporting military campaigns” into
operational plans. Strategy development is a “function of [operational]
creative art.”30
Analysis. Joint Doctrine Note 1-18 recognizes strategic effectiveness
benefits from the incorporation of various civilian and military
perspectives in the strategy-making process. The document suggests
rationality and ingenuity are also critical to the attainment of political
ends. The language of JDN 2-19, however, implies strategy operates in
service of operational art and design (respectively, the cognitive and
methodological frameworks for producing an operational approach)
rather than the inverse.31 Strategy formulation, 2-19 implies, leaves
little room for consideration of the ambition or ambiguities of political
ends—such considerations exist within the realm of campaign
management. This approach may result in stovepiped, if not limited,
civilian participation in strategy making. Likening strategy development
to operational design, which entails standardized planning, JDN 2-19
encapsulates technocratic biases for securing “order” and “advantage”
over ends.32

Strategy Implementation
Comparison. Joint Doctrine Note 1-18 and JDN 2-19 also differ
from each other on strategy implementation. While 1-18 accepts that
environmental conditions should inform strategy, it ranks political
ends as the most critical determinant of strategic behavior.33 The note
concedes strategic approaches, or ways—observation, accommodation,
25. JCS, JDN 1-18, vii.
26. JCS, JDN 1-18, II-8.
27. JCS, JDN 1-18, IV-4.
28. JCS, JDN 2-19, II-2.
29. JCS, JDN 2-19, II-2.
30. JCS, JDN 2-19, I-1, II-3, vi.
31. JCS, JDN 2-19, IV-1; and JCS, Joint Planning, Joint Publication (JP) 5-0 (Washington, DC:
JCS, 2017), xxi, IV-1, IV-4–IV-6.
32. Regarding standardization, see JCS, JDN 2-19, IV-1.
33. JCS, JDN 1-18, III-2–III-3.
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compromise, shaping, persuasion, enabling, inducing, assurance,
deterrence, compellence, subduing, and eradication—differ in
accordance with political objectives and strategic circumstances. Varying
conditions along the strategic competition continuum may only call for
nonkinetic shaping operations; indeed, they may require the military do
nothing but hold, wait, and observe.34
Like its predecessor document, JDN 2-19 acknowledges strategic
activity serves political ends. Yet 2-19 more specifically pegs strategy
implementation to other priority factors. A strategic approach
should expressly accommodate “variables in the environment,” “the
organization [the strategy] serves,” and the tools of operational art.35
The document limits its coverage of strategic ways to assurance, coercion
(deterrence and compellence), and forcible action. While 2-19 does not
ascribe a particular strategy type to “forcible action,” it notes such action
entails pitting “strength against strength” to “remove . . . the enemy’s
ability to hold the initiative” and “subdue the enemy.”36 Thus, forcible
action seems synonymous with the offensive.
Analysis. Joint Doctrine Note 1-18 suggests a broad and flexible
range of strategic approaches, including nonkinetic and shaping
strategies, hold utility for addressing political ends in the face of change
and uncertainty.37 In contrast, JDN 2-19 treads familiar territory,
fixing strategic behavior to organizational interests in and operational
art’s tools for assuring order over environmental variables.38 By this
logic, strategic action is largely synonymous with, and perhaps even
subservient to, operational art. Further, 2-19 implies that securing order
over the environment (particularly through kinetic operations) is apt to
call for offensive and forcible action, which the text depicts in terms that
roughly characterize strategies of annihilation and attrition.39
Whereas 1-18 treats strategy implementation as the realization of
political-military integration designs, 2-19 links strategy implementation
to organizational interests in creating and sustaining competitive
advantage. But strategic activity cannot be confined to operations alone.
Exclusive focus on operational art risks forsaking strategic effectiveness
for a business-as-usual implementation process.

Strategy Assessment
Comparison. Assessment weighs the suitability of military activity
to “the strategic situation,” the designated end, and “its subordinate
objectives” and requires estimates of one’s—and the adversary’s—aims,
34. JCS, JDN 1-18, III-2.
35. JCS, JDN 2-19, II-3, II-1, III-1, II-5.
36. JCS, JDN 2-19, IV-1, II-3–II-5.
37. JCS, JDN 1-18, III-2–III-3, viii–ix.
38. JCS, JDN 2-19, II-3.
39. Antulio J. Echevarria II, Military Strategy: A Very Short Introduction (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2017), 13–25.
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capabilities, and strategic circumstances.40 Joint Doctrine Note 1-18
advances conceptual guidance for “permeat[ing]” ends-ways-meansrisks/costs estimates across dynamic political ends and environmental
conditions.41 Assessments are not only critical gauges of a strategy’s likely
effects but serve as validity tests of underlying strategic assumptions and
the broader strategic situation.42 Absent recognition of this function,
assessments serve “tactical and operational gains, but not . . . desired
political objectives.”43
Accordingly, JDN 1-18 warns against reliance on “magic formula[s]
for calculating risk” or standardized protocols for guaranteeing estimate
accuracy. Allowing that even effective strategies require updating for
continued success, the document prioritizes prudence, urging strategists
to refine skills for “recognizing and avoiding” assessment traps.44
In contrast, JDN 2-19 adopts a notably different approach to
assessment, calling for “a formal methodology to assess . . . risk”—
specifically covered in the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual, Joint Risk Assessment.
The manual upholds risk as “the probability and consequence of an
event causing harm to something valued” and centers predominantly
on estimates of environmental risk.45 The “Joint Risk Assessment
Model,” which purports to ensure risk can be capably managed utilizing
“objective” measurements, is central to the manual.46 The model
incorporates and depends upon the specification of risk calculation and
risk classification formulas.47 Though Joint Risk Assessment situates this
model within a broader “strategic planning construct,” the manual says
relatively little about the relationship between risk and strategy, or how
risk estimates might assist to gauge a strategy’s likely or actual effects
(particularly with respect to ends).48
Analysis. Though they employ intermittently overlapping terminology,
JDN 1-18 and JDN 2-19 depict assessment in discernably different
terms.49 JDN 1-18 regards assessment as a complex and imperfect
process and urges strategists to seek broadly analytical and holistic
impressions of ends-ways-means-risks/costs estimates. The document
implies individual discretion and expertise, not necessarily technocratic
procedures and objective measures, hold considerable utility for
establishing present strategic impact or future strategic direction. JDN
2-19 ostensibly gives precedence, instead, to the assessment of risk
40. JCS, JDN 1-18, III-4; Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1971), 63–71; Michael I. Handel, Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought, third
revised and expanded edition (New York: Routledge, 2001), 236–48; and Clausewitz, On War,
585–86.
41. JCS, JDN 1-18, IV-1, ix.
42. JCS, JDN 1-18, IV-1–IV-6, II-2 (Figure II-1).
43. JCS, JDN 1-18, II-5.
44. JCS, JDN 1-18, IV-1, IV-2, IV-4.
45. JCS, JDN 2-19, VI-1; and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Joint Risk Analysis,
CJCS Manual (CJCSM) 3105.01 (Washington, DC: JCS, 2019).
46. JCS, CJCSM 3105.01, B-1, 4–5, 7.
47. JCS, CJCSM 3105.01, 4–5, 7.
48. JCS, CJCSM 3105.01, A-2.
49. JCS, JDN 1-18, IV-1; and JCS, JDN 2-19, VI-I.
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absent its relation to strategy, conveying seeming indifference to the
broader requirements of assessment or the matter of how they might
impact strategic effectiveness.
While the assessment content in JDN 2-19 does not specifically
hint at the prioritization of offense, discussions of assessment do center
on organizational concerns that drive the propensity for offense: risk
(more broadly, uncertainty) inherent to the security environment. In
short, JDN 2-19’s emphasis on (environmental) risk assessment reflects
operational predilections for mitigating uncertainty.

Strategy Innovation and Adaptation
Comparison. Changing circumstances are apt to require strategic
updating. Updating may take the form of innovation over the long-term
or grand-scale change “institutionalized across an entire organization”—a
new doctrine, organizational framework, or technology.50 Alternatively,
updating may take the form of incremental adaptation based on
knowledge gleaned in combat and carried out during the immediacy
of war. As JDN 1-18 observes, “No strategy is infallible . . . significant
changes in the strategic situation should force the strategist to adjust
the strategy’s ends, means, and/or ways.”51 Strategic updating may be
responsive to changes in the security environment, but these updates
ultimately serve “[n]ational interests and policies.”52 Joint Doctrine Note
1-18 cautions against innovating or adapting by rote. The note further
warns that organizational blinders and standard operating procedures
undercut the “objectivity, open-mindedness, insight, and/or creativity”
required for augmenting strategy in accordance with a variable strategic
situation or evolving political ends.53
Joint Doctrine Note 2-19 acknowledges the national military strategy
links force innovation and adaptation to the “requirements of law, policy,
and defense strategy.”54 But the note predominantly centers on the
organizational determinants of innovation (force design) and adaptation
(force development). Force design involves testing new concepts against
mid- to long-term “challenges in the strategic environment,” while force
development entails identifying “capability requirements” for countering
near-to mid-term challenges.55 Force design and force development
reinforce the organization’s purpose and reflect the senior leader’s vision
for its future direction. Organizational-level innovation and adaptation
encompass, naturally, organizational interests in shaping future
investments.56 Notably, however, JDN 2-19 does not include substantive
coverage of either strategic innovation or strategic adaptation.
50. Williamson Murray, Military Adaptation in War: With Fear of Change (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2011); and Theo Farrell, “Improving in War: Military Adaptation and the British
in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, 2006–2009,” Journal of Strategic Studies 33, no. 4 (2010): 567–94.
51. JCS, JDN 1-18, IV-3.
52. JCS, JDN 1-18, II-1.
53. JCS, JDN 1-18, IV-6.
54. JCS, JDN 2-19, III-1.
55. JCS, JDN 2-19, V-1–V-2, III-1.
56. JCS, JDN 2-19, III-2, V-1.
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Analysis. Joint Doctrine Note 1-18 accounts for the innovation and
adaptation of strateg y in light of changing political ends and emerging
environmental challenges, and for the possibility that updating
mechanistically can undermine the likelihood of strategic effectiveness,
potentially undercutting the “better or more permanent . . . condition.”57
In contrast, JDN 2-19 seemingly shows greater concern for the
innovation and adaptation of capabilities in alignment with organizational
purpose and the vision of senior military leaders.58 Though it briefly
acknowledges force innovation and adaptation share links to policy,
2-19 heavily implies military means are more apt to guide political ends
than the inverse. Because the note prioritizes updating capabilities to
the neglect of updating strategy, it intimates political ends are essentially
static and largely dependent on means alone.

Conclusion

Joint Doctrine Note 2-19 aligns with JDN 1-18 in several respects.
Both define strategy in means-ends terms. Both account for the
dynamism and ambiguity of political ends and the strategic environment.
And both recognize military strategy operates at several levels, involves
diverse actors, and crosses multiple time horizons. The two documents
also differ from each other in meaningful ways. Joint Doctrine Note 1-18
reveals consistent adherence to the classical strategy archetype, admits
that means-ends integration is rife with, but responsive to, obstacles,
and warns against the adoption of technocratic solutions to strategic
dilemmas. Joint Doctrine Note 2-19 exhibits clear departures from
the classical strategy model, conveys an apparent preoccupation with
environment over ends, and suggests a predisposition for technocracy.
Joint Doctrine Note 2-19 gives considerable lip service to strategy’s
means-ends integration logic. Initially, the note accedes that policy
guides strategic choice and action, and the text further distinguishes
military strategy from institutional strategy, planning, campaign plans,
and the organizational determinants of force development and design.59
Yet in subsequent chapters, JDN 2-19 focuses on those exact subjects—
institutional strategy, planning, campaign plans, and organizational
mechanisms for shaping future capabilities. These chapters broadly
overlook the political-military dimensions and discourse inherent
to strategy.
Likewise, 2-19 explicitly states the purpose of an institutional strategy
is to “[translate] higher-level policy,” yet the text simultaneously suggests
the starting point for institutional strategy is securing or maintaining
operational advantages for the institution.60 These two logics cannot
coexist without one eclipsing the other, and in effect, JDN 2-19’s
preference for organizational and operational prescriptions belie its
stated concern for means-ends integration. This approach further
57.
58.
59.
60.

JCS, JDN 1-18, III-1, IV-1, III-3–III-4.
JCS, JDN 2-19, III-1–III-2.
JCS, JDN 2-19, II-3, III-2.
JCS, JDN 2-19, III-2.
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informs and reinforces the notion that strategy rests on generating
friendly advantages. Joint Doctrine Note 2-19’s particular concern for
the attainment of edge over ends aligns with theoretical and historical
accounts of the military organizational pathology for offense.
Comprehensively, JDN 2-19 risks distorting the foundational logic
of military strategy and legitimizing the substitution of organizational
impulse for means-ends integration. Its reflection of organizational and
technocratic biases, particularly those which undergird the preference
for offense, warrant concern. Joint Doctrine Note 2-19 falls shy of
accounting for the possibility that organizational aims do not necessarily
serve national security ends. Further, this perspective hazards a
willingness to accept “edge” as an end unto itself, rather than a means to
national security ends and raises important questions for consideration.
Does JDN 2-19 imply environmental variables merit regulation but
political dynamics warrant avoidance? Does the document discount the
need for active political and military participation across the strategy
cycle? As articulated, does JDN 2-19 hazard a propensity to evade rather
than engage with the civil-military complexities of strategy?
The assumption that military strategy distinctively hinges on
the establishment and preservation of friendly advantages does not
adequately account for contemporary security realities. The notion is
both reductive and dangerous, given the possibility competitors may
perceive overt bids for edge—particularly under shifting geopolitical
realities—as offensive threats. The United States can ill afford to accept
the risks of adventurism, or assume further costs to finite national
resources, under conditions of mounting great-power rivalry.
The collapse of the American “unipolar moment” calls for
restraint in the realms of both grand strategy and military strategy.61
The reemergence of interstate strategic competition suggests the
United States cannot afford to “cow all potential challengers” and
“comfort all coalition partners.”62 Further, America should not risk
enticing adversaries to conflict. Yet strategy that hinges on the quest
for persistent military edge quite plausibly involves significant costs and
risks, including arms races, war spirals, and strategic failures.
The disjuncture between the language of JDN 2-19 and the need
for strategic prudence is a relic of the unipolar moment and is indicative
of the “strategic atrophy” that the Summary of the 2018 National Defense
Strateg y warns against.63 Decades of US strategic drift—exemplified by
the interventionism of the 1990s, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the 2011
participation in the NATO strikes on Libya, and the January 2020
drone strike on Qassem Soleimani—call for greater engagement with
61. Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs 70, no. 1 (1990): 23–33.
62. Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy,”
International Security 21, no. 3 (Winter 1996–97): 32.
63. James N. Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America:
Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018), 1.
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the political dimensions of strategy.64 The drone strike, carried out just
weeks after the publication of JDN 2-19, continues to draw scrutiny.
Questions of legality aside, the strike’s underlying objectives, and thus
the matter of its strategic effectiveness, remain largely unclear.65 The fact
that JDN 2-19’s thematic content is broadly consonant with the character
of the strike—assertion of force absent delineation of purpose—suggests
the need for a more rigorous approach to military strategy.
Future strategists will be called on to devise increasingly flexible,
adaptive, and resource-efficient options for countering great-power
competitors, confronting the persistent condition of terrorism and
addressing human security challenges such as pandemics. Joint
Doctrine Note 1-18 provides an imperfect but utilitarian roadmap for
matching military means to political ends. The document’s coverage
of tools for recognizing and surmounting strategic dilemmas, and
its inclusion of historical cases in which political-military discourse
is central to the resolution of those dilemmas, could prove critical to
future strategists.
It may be the case that JDN 1-18 encapsulates the exception to—
and not the rule of—US strategic pursuits, and that JDN 2-19, in turn,
represents a conventional preference for the American way of battle.
As military leaders determine whether to forge ahead with offensive
conceptions of strategy or relink strategy to its political underpinnings,
they should recall Joint Doctrine Notes are not definitive but instead
represent an ever-evolving discussion about the foundational tenets of
military strategy. Strategy may yet be salvaged from its detractors and
employed to purposeful effect.
Joint Doctrine Note 2-19 encompasses constructive updates to US
strategic thought. Facets of JDN 2-19—its consideration of innovation,
for example—appropriately account for substantive gaps in JDN 1-18.
Further, this evaluation of 2-19 is far from exhaustive, warranting
circumspect rather than definitive projections about the note’s
implications for future strategic effectiveness. It is entirely plausible
JDN 2-19 mirrors military leaders’ frustration with the struggle of
political officials to identify or resource adequately the aims of the US
unipolar moment, the counterterrorism decade, or the initial return to
interstate strategic competition. Faced with such conditions, it seems
reasonable doctrine might prioritize environment and edge over the
political ends.
Yet as Betts reminds us, strategists are often plagued by ambitious
or ambiguous political objectives; they are the hallmarks of strategy’s
64. Stephen M. Walt, The Hell of Good Intentions: America’s Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of U.S.
Primacy (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2018).
65. Natasha Turak, “ ‘Dangerous Escalation’ and ‘Severe Revenge’: The World Responds to
the US Killing of Iran’s Top General,” CNBC, updated January 5, 2020, https://www
.cnbc.com/2020/01/03/qasem-soleimani-death-world-responds-to-us-assassination
-of-irans-top-general.html; and Tamara Wittes, “Around the Halls: Experts React to the Killing of
Iranian Commander Qassem Soleimani,” Order from Chaos (blog), Brookings Institution, January 3,
2020, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/01/03/around-the-halls-experts
-react-to-the-killing-of-iranian-commander-qassem-soleimani/.
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illusory nature.66 These hallmarks call for the persistent and rigorous
pursuit of political-military integration. They do not provide justifiable
cause for removing strategy from its purpose.
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ABSTRACT: Shortfalls and inefficiencies in traditional planning
and campaigning have become increasingly clear in the current
hyperconnected security environment. US military planners can
mitigate these deficiencies by embracing integrated planning
and campaigning approaches including the development of new
organizational structures and processes. These improvements will
give senior leaders increased options as the US military and US
Allies and partners address complex problems with better effect and
to greater advantage.

O

ver the last two decades, rapid advances in information
technologies, the hyperconnected world these technologies
have created, and the reach and power of the narratives they
convey have driven significant changes in the global security arena.
Adversaries excel at leveraging these technologies and tools with few legal
and ethical constraints and restraints. Further, these adversaries are willing
to play the long game, betting they can outlast what they see as a tired
and strategically impatient and incoherent America. Legacy planning and
campaigning tools are largely ineffective in a competition space defined
by hyperconnectedness, the ubiquity of information, narrative warfare
including disinformation and misinformation, and the democratization
of access to the means and ways of information power.1 Moreover, the
often uncoordinated efforts of different government departments and
agencies—and among Allies and partners—only magnify the problem.
To begin addressing these challenges, the US Joint Staff in 2018
published the Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning. This publication
offers useful approaches and ideas for combating information-savvy
opponents through the development of new planning and campaigning
capabilities. It defines integrated campaigning as “Joint Force and
interorganizational partner efforts to enable the achievement and
maintenance of policy aims by integrating military activities and
aligning non-military activities of sufficient scope, scale, simultaneity,
and duration across multiple domains.”2
1. Robert S. Ehlers Jr. and Patrick Blannin, “Making Sense of the Information Environment,”
Small Wars Journal, March 3, 2020, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/making-sense
-information-environment.
2. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning (JCIC), (Washington, DC:
JCS, March 16, 2018), v, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/concepts/joint
_concept_integrated_campaign.pdf ?ver=2018-03-28-102833-257.

TOC

98

Parameters 51(2) Summer 2021

Integrated campaigning is indispensable for dealing effectively
with the new realities of conflict evident in the hyperconnected global
security environment and for gaining the initiative in prolonged
security problems.3 This article addresses the basic elements of
integrated campaigning and its utility for addressing long-duration
security challenges and information-savvy opponents. The article then
considers the value of integrated campaigning as a means for addressing
complex problems within the hyperconnected hyperconnected global
security environment and the utility of this type of campaigning to
planners. The article concludes with recommendations for structural and
organizational improvements to promote this more-effective approach
to planning and campaigning.

Planning Evolution

The attributes currently associated with military planning matured
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Prussian Great
General Staff was arguably the first highly sophisticated planning
organization focused on mobilization timetables, logistics, replacements,
and the most effective use of everything from the railroad and the
telegraph to breech-loading artillery and the machine gun.4 These new
approaches to planning grew out of changes in the character of war
driven by political, economic, and social realities.5
The Prussian planning model, adopted by other great powers
including the United States, worked well so long as the military
technological paradigm of the era—industrial warfare based on mass
conscription—remained the norm.6 The disasters of the world wars and
the development of atomic and nuclear weapons produced a paradigm
shift, but not a definitive one. NATO and the Warsaw Pact continued
to plan for major conventional war in Europe using tried and tested
planning processes, and their military forces appeared much like those
produced by earlier manifestations of the industrial warfare paradigm.7
The end of the Cold War and the Coalition victory in Operation
Desert Storm portended major changes in armed conflict. While
some called Desert Storm the last industrial war, others called it the
first information war. The war’s new computing and communications
technologies represented a clear evolution, altering the character of
that conflict in every way from the speed and precision of Coalition
3. Ehlers and Blannin, “Information Environment.”
4. Arden Bucholz, Moltke, Schlieffen, and Prussian War Planning (Oxford, UK: Berg, 1991), 1–17;
and Gunther E. Rothenberg, “Moltke, Schlieffen, and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment,” in
Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1986), 299–302.
5. Bucholz, Moltke, 1–17.
6. Mark A. Stoler, Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy
in World War II (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 258–70.
7. Jan Hoffenaar and Christopher Findlay, eds., Military Planning for European Theatre Conflict
during the Cold War: An Oral History Roundtable, Stockholm, 24–25 April 2006, Zürcher Beiträge: Zur
Sicherheitspolitik, NR. 79 (Zurich: Center for Security Studies, ETH), 46–56.
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maneuver to the lethality of its actions.8 But planning for Desert
Storm still involved a traditional, industrial-war approach: AirLand
Battle doctrine and planning processes, developed for war in Europe,
drove operations.9
With the development of the World Wide Web and rapid increases in
the speed of communications, events began outpacing the predominant
planning model. Counterinsurgencies and wars of national liberation
fought in the second half of the twentieth century had also exposed
shortcomings inherent in the model. When opponents refused to play by
prevailing rules and norms, the military advantages of the great powers
shrank or disappeared. In French Indochina, Algeria, and elsewhere,
David was often beating Goliath. These victories had more to do with
will and strategic patience than with military strength.10
Similarly, as people gained access to the Internet and began publishing
and disseminating narratives, hyperconnected, agile, message-savvy
“Davids” began emerging, drawing crowds and amassing influence and
power. The arrival of 3G and 4G transmission speeds and associated
Web-publishing tools made the late 1990s and early 2000s a watershed
period for this new kind of power. These trends are intensifying, giving
nonstate actors and states willing to break with conventional norms
major advantages in pursuing their strategic priorities. The dissemination
of 5G further intensifies this process.11
Countering these new forms of conflict reveals insufficiencies
in traditional planning processes. While constraints and restraints
hamstring American and Allied responses to technologically savvy
adversaries, the planning process itself is often the biggest culprit.
Planning tends to be episodic rather than continuous. Planning teams
are often ad hoc and temporary. Even when a good team comes together,
the assignments process almost immediately begins disassembling
it. Unfilled billets prevent formal changeover between outgoing
and incoming personnel, and in the name of security and efficiency,
communications specialists wipe the computer drives of departed staff.
These actions and the resulting loss of knowledge continuity produce
institutionalized inefficiency and ineffectiveness in planning and
lessons-learned processes.12
8. Alan D. Campen, ed., The First Information War: The Story of Communications, Computers,
and Intelligence Systems in the Persian Gulf War (Fairfax, VA: Armed Forces Communications and
Electronics Association (AFCEA) International Press, 1992), 1–22.
9. Rick Atkinson, Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War (Boston: Mariner
Books, 1994).
10. Gérard Chaliand, ed., Guerrilla Strategies: An Historical Anthology from the Long March to
Afghanistan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982).
11. David Patrikarakos, War in 140 Characters: How Social Media Is Reshaping Conflict in the
Twenty-First Century (New York: Basic Books, 2017), 3–13, 255–64.
12. Michael J. Mazaar et al., The U.S. Department of Defense’s Planning Process: Components and
Challenges (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2019), xii–xiii, 2–3, 32–40; and T. C. Greenwood
and T. X. Hammes, “War Planning for Wicked Problems,” Armed Forces Journal (2009), http://
armedforcesjournal.com/war-planning-for-wicked-problems/.
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The Centrality of Information
Contemporary conflict is particularly information dense and
transcends geographic boundaries in ways not previously possible.
As a result, multifunctional, multidomain campaigns are increasingly
complex. The central objective of what is now called information
warfare or operations in the information environment is to achieve
information advantage and decision superiority through nonlethal and
lethal operations, leading to an end state that supports strategic priorities.
But information advantage and decision superiority are temporary
conditions within a limited space. This boundedness makes coordinated
and synchronized actions, and the planning process required to develop
them, central to successful operations.13
Gaining advantage—producing the full range of effects and
objectives required to achieve end states—in today’s security challenges
requires a process integrated across all instruments of power, alliances,
and other collectivities. Often these challenges are persistent, highly
complex, and feature opponents well versed in the use of gray-zone
tactics—“intense political, economic, informational, and military
competition more fervent in nature than normal steady-state diplomacy,
yet short of conventional war”—and other information-heavy
approaches. Accordingly, only a highly adaptive, flexible, and iterative
process of integrated campaigning offers any hope of long-term success.14
The linear, sequential, and highly centralized planning and campaign
development processes of the previous century cannot deliver the level
of agility and adaptability required to maintain an advantage in current
operating environments. Applying instruments of power deftly and in
coordination with whole-of-government and alliance actors requires a
planning approach that identifies common characteristics of diverse and
seemingly unrelated problem sets and aligns policy-driven end states
with shorter-term objectives and activities. This is where integrated
campaigning can be of the greatest value.
Integrated campaigning forgoes the “false dichotomy of peace and
war” or the existence of “artificially static environments that can be
broken into discrete campaigns with fixed end-states” by recognizing
“the need for proactive, ongoing campaigning that adjusts to fluid
policy environments and changing conditions to create favorable and
sustainable outcomes.”15 This adaptability allows policymakers and
commanders to understand, shape, and influence adversaries, partners,
and neutrals throughout enduring or discrete operations.
13. Ehlers and Blannin, “Information Environment”; and Eric X. Schaner, “What Are OIE?:
Definition and Functions,” Marine Corps Gazette 104, no. 4 (April 2020): 20–22, https://mca-marines
.org/wp-content/uploads/MCG-April-2020.pdf.
14. Joseph L. Votel et al., “Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone,” Joint Force Quarterly 80,
no. 1 (1st Quarter 2016): 102, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-80/jfq
-80_101-109_Votel-et-al.pdf.
15. JCS, JCIC, iii.
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Crucially, integrated campaigning is ongoing. Supporting
organizational structures and processes must be established, including
cross-functional planning teams, formal and informal informationsharing networks, and information pass-along as members of planning
teams move to other assignments. Integrated campaigning must not be
episodic but instead constant and consistent in line with the evolving
problems it addresses.
Viewed through the lens of current planning processes, however,
campaign planning approaches across the competition continuum have
inherent contradictions. Joint Doctrine Note 1-19, Competition Continuum,
states, “campaigning through cooperation is usually an enduring activity
with no discreet start or end point.”16 How does this direction align
with traditional ends-, ways-, and means-based planning? The efficacy
of cooperation-oriented activities can only be accurately assessed once
they are tested in a competitive environment. Consequently, planning
must remain proactive, not reactive. Also, while adaptability is key to
success in competitive environments, achieving long-term strategic
aims is the primary motivation and must inform planning, execution,
and assessment.
Additionally, constraints and restraints emerge from the same
precept upon which integrated campaigning is based. Domestic and
international law apply the distinction between peace and war to
legitimize, rationalize, and regulate the use of force. The transition to
a state of war—declared or undeclared—also justifies the allocation
of resources coinciding with an increase in acceptable risk. For an
institution as large as the US Department of Defense, it is easier to treat
these matters in distinct categories rather than on a complex sliding
scale. Are the existing legal and institutional advantages of the artificial
and simplistic peace/war binary compatible with the multidimensional
complex sliding scale now characterizing competition and conflict?17
Moreover, what is the role of the military in an environment
characterized by multidimensional complexity?
Despite these potential limitations, integrated campaign planning
and its ultimate result, integrated campaigning, enable commanders
to excel in armed conflict, and ideally short of it, through the skillful
application of whole-of-government cooperation and competition
strategies. Commanders must be alert to the tension between military and
other instruments of power and strive continuously for proper balance.
Perhaps most important, integrated campaigning reduces the
difficulty of operating in the hyperconnected global security environment
by enabling information maneuver in coordination with more traditional
physical forms of maneuver. State and nonstate actors are becoming
adept at articulating the concept of information maneuver. They
16. JCS, Competition Continuum, Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 1-19 (Washington, DC: JCS,
June 3, 2019), vi, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/jdn_jg/jdn1_19.pdf; and
JCS, JCIC, 7.
17. JCS, JCIC, 31–32.
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recognize how continuous, integrated, well-timed, and well-targeted
shaping and influence actions enable combined effects at the wholeof-government and whole-of-nation levels and enable combined-arms
effects at the military level. Employing properly targeted information
in the right places and times, against the right audiences, either in
conjunction with physical force or independent of it, is crucial in the
hyperconnected hyperconnected global security environment. Our
adversaries understand this concept.
Consequently, in the face of a militarily superior United States,
other players work to achieve strategic aims through gray-zone
activities. Russia, for example, has developed a range of nonmilitary and
quasi-military capabilities and tasks not normally assigned to Western
militaries. The Russian Federation’s use of reflexive control and its
associated activities is a case in point.18 Russian operations in Georgia,
Crimea, and Ukraine have made full use of these capabilities to throw
opponents off balance and keep them on the defensive in the battle for
narrative and physical dominance.19
During a crisis, doing something is often seen as imperative. This
bias for action frequently results in the military becoming the default
responder.20 If timely action is a priority, the military can effectively be
brought to bear, as other instruments of power are rarely as responsive.
But the nonintegrated deployment of military assets rarely delivers
sound, long-term solutions to crises, making imperative a synchronized
whole-of-government approach.21 In this way, other instruments of
power can set the conditions to make military efforts either unnecessary
or more effective. Russia has moved in this direction, as has China with
its “Informationized Warfare” and “Three Warfares” approaches.22
China continues to enhance its information warfare capabilities and
build its information advantage, emphasizing operations designed to
weaken an enemy force’s command and control systems.23 The People’s
Liberation Army has boosted its multi-domain, anti-access/area-denial
18. Michael Holloway, “How Russia Weaponized Social Media in Crimea,” Real Clear
Defense, May 10, 2017, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/05/10/how_russia
_weaponized_social_media_in_crimea_111352.html; and Keir Giles, James Sherr, and Anthony
Seaboyer, Russian Reflexive Control (Kingston, Ontario: Royal Military College of Canada, October
2018), 13–23, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/328562833_Russian_Reflexive_Control.
19. Valery Gerasimov, “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight: New Challenges Demand
Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying Out Combat Operations,” reprinted in Military
Review (January–February 2016): 23–29, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military
-review/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20160228_art008.pdf.
20. Robert Gates, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: Department of Defense
[DoD], February 6, 2006), 86, https://archive.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/QDR20060203.pdf.
21. John J. Frewen, “A Bias for Action? The Military as an Element of National Power,” in New
Directions in Strategic Thinking 2.0: ANU Strategic and Defence Studies Centre’s Golden Anniversary Conference
Proceedings, ed. Russell W. Glenn (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 2018), 44.
22. Dean Cheng, Cyber Dragon: Inside China’s Information Warfare and Cyber Operations, The
Changing Face of War, edited by James Jay Carafano (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2017), 37–53.
23. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), FY04 Report to Congress on PRC Military Power,
Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act: Annual Report on the Military Power of the
People’s Republic of China (Washington, DC: OSD, 2004), https://www.globalsecurity.org/military
/library/report/2004/d20040528prc.pdf.
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capabilities.24 China is also improving its cyber capabilities, including
computer network attacks, electronic warfare, and information
blockades of its computer networks. Chinese leaders realize how
important emerging technologies are to national success. Artificial
intelligence, for example, has assumed a major role in Beijing’s ambitious
Made in China 2025 plan. This technology-based blueprint details a threephase strategy to maintain market share in 2020, develop significant
breakthroughs by 2025, and dominate the sector (along with nine other
high-tech sectors) by 2030.25
Although their playbooks differ, Russian and Chinese means
for obtaining and leveraging the initiative in conflict and gray-zone
competition derive from their understanding that using and manipulating
information more rapidly and effectively than their opponents offers
major advantages. These approaches spring from a deep contextual
understanding of the problem, its key players, and how changes in
the speed and ubiquity of information flows have altered planning
and operational requirements. Moreover, Russia and China can move
unpredictably, execute operations rapidly, and fail fast without severe
internal political ramifications, which makes them more risk tolerant.
Although Russian and Chinese activities have elicited a range of
punitive responses, their governments arguably have mitigated the
impacts by co-opting whole-of-nation capabilities as force multipliers
in an enduring and scalable manner. Acknowledging this reality is
important because the West has difficulty replicating such whole-ofnation capabilities for structural, legal, and moral reasons. Adopting an
integrated campaigning mindset, however, may facilitate development
of the whole-of-nation effects leveraged by Russia and China. Integrated
campaigning will also facilitate more effective whole-of-alliance (or
coalition) actions using all instruments of power in a coordinated,
synchronized, and interactive manner.
Understanding both the major impacts of information on the
contemporary global security environment and how our principal
opponents use that information to gain advantage in specific situations
makes it possible to understand not only why integrated campaign
planning and integrated campaigning are vital, but also how these
concepts might best be operationalized.

Operationalizing Integrated Planning and Campaigning

The Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning begins with a warning:
The United States is in a worldwide competition with emerging and
resurgent global powers, aspiring regional hegemons, and non-state actors

24. S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University,
Countering Anti-Access/Area Denial Challenges: Strategies and Capabilities, Event Report (Singapore:
RSIS, December 1, 2017), https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/ER180424
_Countering-Anti-Access.pdf.
25. People’s Republic of China (PRC) State Council, Made in China 2025 (Beijing: PRC State
Council, July 7, 2015), http://www.cittadellascienza.it/cina/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/IoT
-ONE-Made-in-China-2025.pdf.
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seeking to challenge aspects of the post-World War II international order.
For the foreseeable future, adversaries will continue to creatively combine
conventional and non-conventional methods to achieve their objectives.
Many will operate below a threshold that invokes a direct military response
from the United States while retaining the capability to escalate to more
conventional armed conflict if desired.26

To meet these challenges, the United States and its Allies and
partners must engage in Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and
multinational integrated campaigning across all instruments of
power. The Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning defines integrated
campaigning as, “Joint Force and interorganizational partner efforts to
enable the achievement and maintenance of policy aims by integrating
military activities and aligning nonmilitary activities of sufficient
scope, scale, simultaneity, and duration across multiple domains.”27
Its “foundational idea” is “to enable an expanded view of the operational
environment by proposing the notion of a competition continuum. This
competition continuum offers an alternative to the old peace/war binary
with a new model of cooperation, competition below armed conflict,
and armed conflict. These are not mutually exclusive but rather states of
relationships with other actors that can exist concurrently.”28
To develop and practice integrated planning and campaigning,
four actions are required: understanding the problem and its associated
operating environment through the lens of the competition continuum;
constructing iterative campaigns using a design process that coordinates
and deconflicts military and nonmilitary activities; employing force and
securing gains in campaigns tailored to the operational environment;
and assessing and adapting campaigns based on objectives aligned with
strategic priorities.29
These approaches signal a fundamental shift in what planning
entails. Specifically, planning must become an integrated, long-term,
continuous process operating in parallel with the integrated campaigning
it sets in motion. This effort requires planners to monitor continually
the progress made in achieving objectives and end states.
Achieving this combination is challenging. The process revolves
around the core of a clearly articulated mission and a well-defined (and
achievable) end state. The Australian Defence Force’s Information War:
ADF Manoeuvre in the Information Environment, JDN 1-20 emphasizes,
“defence against threats generated in the IE [information environment]
requires a national strategic narrative.”30 Unlike the United States,
however, the Australian government does not produce a national
security strategy to articulate a national security-oriented strategic
narrative nested within a grand strategy. There is no “over-arching
26. JCS, JCIC, 5.
27. JCS, JCIC, 5.
28. JCS, JCIC, 6.
29. JCS, JCIC, 5–6.
30. Australian Department of Defence (ADoD), Information War: ADF Manoeuvre in the
Information Environment, JDN 1-20 (Canberra: Joint Doctrine Directorate, 2020), 5.15.
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controlling national policy or architecture . . . to [facilitate] contest in
the IE.”31 Similarly problematic is the American tendency not to act in
accordance with its national security strategy.
Viewed through the lens of the hyperconnected global security
environment and its dynamics, the imperatives for effective and
achievable strategic aims, coordinated policy formulation, effective
policy execution, and strategic patience all drive requirements for major
changes in planning and operations. This new mindset will support
the rapid, effective, and persistent integration of operations across the
cognitive, physical, and informational domains to achieve integrated
campaigning objectives.
The combination of inertia brought on by decades of traditional
planning processes, legal and ethical constraints, and the relative freedom
of action of adversaries and competitors all present challenges. Together,
they make translating planning and operational improvements into
effective integrated campaigning difficult. In fact, developing mature
and capable integrated campaign planning and campaigning processes
requires a paradigm shift in the structures and processes of planning
organizations themselves.32

From Concept to Practice

Campaign plans seek to shape the operational environment and
achieve national objectives.33 These plans establish operations, activities,
and investments to achieve objectives in support of strategic priorities.
Objectives must be continuously assessed. As they are achieved (or
determined to be infeasible), decisionmakers update the plans with new
objectives and assessment measures. Integrated campaigning includes
operations across the spectrum of conflict, creating opportunities to
affect the operational environment favorably.
Campaign planning identifies means to achieve specific effects and
objectives. By extension, integrated campaign plans seek to capitalize
on the cumulative effect of multiple coordinated and synchronized
operations, effects, activities, and investments that cannot be
accomplished by a single operation. This approach facilitates integrated
campaigning with a continuous, coordinated planning process executed
in parallel with the operations it sets in motion.34
The implications of this approach, specifically for long-term
problems, are important. Setting conditions is vital to campaign
planning because it involves a range of whole-of-government and
international factors shaping the problem. Shaping and influencing target
audiences, steadily and well ahead of the problem becoming a crisis, is
31. ADoD, JDN 1-20, 5–21.
32. Marcus Thompson, “Information Warfare – A New Age?,” (speech, iWar Five Eyes
Principals’ Forum, Australian Defence Force Headquarters, Canberra, October 31–November 1,
2018).
33. DoD, Joint Planning, Joint Publication 5-0 (2017), I-1.
34. DoD, JCIC, 1–8.
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imperative. Accordingly, integrated campaign planning relies heavily on
continuous war gaming, red teaming, and assessment, all of which help
decisionmakers stay ahead of problems, anticipate major developments,
and gain initiative over time as integrated campaigning continues. The
line between planning and operations is increasingly blurry precisely
because planning and operations occur simultaneously over long periods.
Trying to gain the initiative and achieve continuing advantage involves
parallel efforts along with careful phasing and sequencing.
Unlike deliberate planning, which produces operational plans
that may or may not be executed in the future, integrated campaign
planning addresses ongoing, complex problems that require constant
engagement. A similar dynamic pertains when comparing integrated
campaign planning with crisis action planning. While the latter addresses
an immediate problem and will often be executed, such planning begins
and ends at specific points in time, while integrated campaign planning
and the integrated campaigning it supports continue for the duration of
the problem.
Iterative planning and assessment, along with frequent and realistic
war gaming and red teaming, facilitate plan development, operations,
and the continuous updates required to stay ahead of opponents. The
feedback loops and other observe-orient-decide-act aspects of this
dynamic are often intensely negative for the party falling behind.
Important changes in structures and processes associated with this
aspect of integrated campaign planning include establishing standing and
multidisciplinary planning groups with a long-term focus on security
problems and high levels of understanding regarding those problems.
These planning groups require human-machine interfaces that provide
advanced data analytics to help planners understand how the problem is
evolving, identify possible solutions, and select a viable course of action.
Condition setting, continuous assessment during parallel planning
and execution, and updating campaign plans faster and more effectively
than opponents all maximize the probability of addressing problems
successfully and short of armed conflict. Long-term shaping and
influencing to place an opponent in a position of relative disadvantage is
vital, as is the battle for the loyalty of partners, neutrals, and others in the
court of global public opinion. Alienating these groups with an approach
too reliant on the threat of physical force and too light on information
mass and maneuver will erode support and endanger relationships with
potential partners. Nonlethal approaches and actions are well worth the
effort, and continuously and methodically planning for them is at least
as important as planning for lethal actions.

Key Aspects and Recommendations

The foregoing discussion of planning for long-term complex
problems provided the general approaches, structures, and processes
necessary for effective planning and operations in the hyperconnected
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global security environment. The most important of these best practices
can be summarized as follows.
Persistence. Integrated campaign planning must be continuous. Unlike
conventional plans, integrated campaign planning changes constantly
because it occurs in parallel with the integrated campaigning it supports.
The requirements for persistence in information-centric planning
parallel the rapid flow of information itself as well as the fast-paced
shifts in behavior and initiative such information flow drives. Speed
requires a speedy antidote, or at least a persistent and timely one, and
this begins with the planning process.
Standing planning groups. Multidisciplinary standing planning groups,
comprised of the best available people by skill set and experience,
are indispensable for integrated campaign planning and integrated
campaigning. The Israeli Defense Force Spokesperson’s Unit and its realtime media center compose one case in point. While this organization is
an operations center designed to counter and provide dueling narratives
and messages, the deeper function that allows this activity is persistent
and time-sensitive planning by the right groups of people.35 The need
for standing planning groups applies to problems as urgent as Israel’s
conflicts with Hamas and as long term and gradual as those involving
China and Russia.
Organizational structure and processes. An organization’s structure
and processes must facilitate persistent, well-informed, and wellstaffed planning. While the Joint (J-code) structure accomplishes
this integration in limited ways, it is far from ideal for addressing
long-term, complex problems, especially those with high operational
tempos. The key shortcoming within the J-code structure is not the
number of J-code directorates but the paucity of truly integrated teams
dedicated to working specific problems over long time periods. This
close and persistent integration of personnel in permanent spaces—
rather than coming together occasionally on neutral ground—is key to
integrated campaigning.
Time and depth. Certain numbers of US military officers need to
be generalists—as in “general officers.” The rest of the officer corps
needs greater time and depth in specific, long-term problem sets much
like their enlisted and civilian counterparts who are generally hired
to provide deep expertise and continuity. Practical solutions to this
challenge of time and depth can be found by updating the military
personnel assignments process. While less than 1 percent of officers will
reach flag rank, the majority are developed professionally as though they
might. While this professional development opens a wider window for
the selection of flag officers, it drastically reduces the aggregate time and
depth officers have in any given problem set or area of specialty. The “up
or out” system is not very effective in the current security environment.
35. Neal Ungerleider, “Inside the Israeli Military’s Social Media Squad,” Fast Company,
November 20, 2012, https://www.fastcompany.com/3003305/inside-israeli-militarys-social-media
-squad; and Patrikarakos, War in 140 Characters, 63–90.
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Whole-of-government approach. No aspect of integrated campaigning is
less well developed. Because most problems in the global security arena
are long term, highly complex, and reliant on an all-instruments-ofpower approach, no single instrument of national power will suffice
to deal with them. Unfortunately, whole-of-government approaches are
limited in scope and are the exception rather than the norm. Cultural
and contextual differences account for much of this nonintegration, and
the current hyperpartisanship only exacerbates the problem. Standing,
cross-functional planning teams must include long-term participants
from all interested agencies and departments sitting in common spaces
and working at an all-instruments-of-power level. This comprehensive
approach is the basis of effective interagency coordination, civil-military
cooperation, Joint and multinational operations, and the effective use
of structures such as Joint interagency coordination groups and Joint
interagency task forces.
Engagements with nongovernmental experts. Because limited numbers
of real experts in a given problem set reside within the government,
planners must seek insight from business, academic, professional,
humanitarian, and other entities with relevant interests. These
relationships must be cultivated over time and at the organizational level
to build mutual understanding and cooperation.
Advanced and basic planning tools. The rapid development of advanced
data analytics and artificial intelligence technologies is changing how
humans understand and engage with complex problems. While technology
is not a substitute for human interaction and interconnections, it is
moving in that direction. Planning teams need a combination of the latest
interactive technologies along with the venerable and still indispensable
whiteboards and butcher-block paper. These legacy methods facilitate
a more creative and interactive planning process even as cutting-edge
tools enhance analytical insights.

Conclusion

Today the national interests, citizens, and territories of the United
States and its Allies and partners are threatened in every operating
domain by regional instability, failed states, increased weapons
proliferation, global terrorism, unconventional threats, and challenges
from adversaries. Working within this highly complex environment,
planners must learn to engage in integrated campaign planning,
and their operational counterparts in integrated campaigning. To
succeed, planners and operators must embrace the realities of this
security environment, including its complex informational aspects,
and operate with clarity from within. The hyperconnected global
security environment of today mandates a flexible, adaptive approach to
military planning and ever-greater cooperation between all the elements
of national power, coordinated with that of our Allies, partners,
and various intergovernmental, nongovernmental, and regional
security organizations.
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On “The Politics of Oath-Taking”
David J. Wasserstein
This commentary responds to Marybeth Ulrich’s article “The Politics of Oath-Taking”
published in the Summer 2020 issue of Parameters (vol. 50, no. 2).

M

arybeth Ulrich’s article, “The Politics of Oath-Taking” raises
questions important to any democracy, especially to the United
States, and even more so, as she points out, as we navigate a
period of what Steven Metz in the same issue labels “the decline of
authority structures, political hyperpartisanship, and the coalescence
of new ethical structures” (“The Future of Strategic Leadership,”
Parameters, Summer 2020, 61). These questions touch on the obligations
of the citizen, the soldier, and the civil servant in relation to the state,
its governing institutions, and its orders. While she highlights problems,
her responses, however, do not resolve them but imply an ease about
solutions belied by thought and historical experience.
Two central issues stand out. In the first, Ulrich distinguishes
between what she labels professional and political oath-taking/takers.
And the second concerns the primacy of legal over other obligations.
As to Ulrich’s assertion of a difference between professional and
political oath-takers, the distinction is artificial at best, dangerous at
worst. The former are obliged to give impartial, nonpartisan service
to their country, while the latter give explicitly partisan support to
the political agenda for which they or those who appoint them are
elected. Ulrich mentions Ambassador William B. Taylor Jr. who took
an oath twice, once as a professional and later as a political appointee.
Her argument does not, however, draw any conclusions from his case,
which glides tellingly between her two positions. (It is also noteworthy
Taylor was, at over 70 years old, far from risking his career in defying a
presidential prohibition on testifying before Congress).
There is certainly a difference in the persons and the tasks involved.
Professional appointees are skilled experts possessed of relevant
qualifications for their jobs. Political appointees, by contrast, need not
have any special qualifications for their posts, beyond enjoying the
confidence of the president and, when relevant, winning Senate approval.
But no difference exists in the legal (and the moral/ethical) obligations
to the state and the people of this country that come with these jobs
and the oath, regardless of whether the oath-taker is a professional or a
political appointee. The real world does not alter these obligations.
The second issue is far larger than the first. The question is not
whether those who take oaths are obliged to follow through and obey
them. Obviously they are—except when they are not. The real question,
therefore, is when may they, when must they, not. The problem is very
often the answer to that question boils down to a matter of perception:
when do we, when must we, place our moral/ethical obligations above our
legal ones? When do we place our legal obligations as we understand
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them above our legal obligations as they are understood by others? And
when may government or the president compel such obedience?
These questions have worried and harried human beings for
millennia. Twenty-four centuries ago, Sophocles showed us Antigone, in
his play of that name, faced this central issue—in the terms of that time,
the law of the state versus the law of God—and offered one answer.
We admire her decision and her action, not least because it threatens to
cost her her life. But hers is not, or not always and not necessarily, the
only possible or right answer. This dilemma, rather than the answers
themselves, is why the decisions of now retired US Army Lieutenant
Colonel Alexander Vindman and Taylor are important. It is also why
those who think those decisions wrong are not so handily to be dismissed.
The questions matter not just in the personal realm, but also, as
Ulrich points out, in what she labels the “civil/military relations norms”
field. Like other Western nations, the United States is a democracy in
which the military is firmly subordinated to civilian control. We can
even say that to be a so-called Western nation, a state must subordinate
the military to civilian control. But as the current situation shows,
there may come times when devotion to country and the Constitution
demands an individual break an oath and disregard norms of civilmilitary relations. That devotion may demonstrate an oath—quite
apart from its legal aspects—is really just confirmation of a universal
obligation (The famous Great Loyalty Oath Campaign in Joseph Heller’s
Catch-22 is not irrelevant here).
It may occasionally, as the United States itself has asserted in
many countries around the world, be necessary to destroy democracy
temporarily in order to save it permanently (the example of the dictator
in ancient Roman legal tradition is pertinent here). If democracy or the
state is threatened from within by the actions of a commander in chief
gone wild and the civilian arm has no means or desire to remove that
individual, the military may have a responsibility—a loaded term—to
step in. That is what German officers (without Allied support) tried
and failed to do in 1944—far too late, for the wrong reasons, and
with terrible results for themselves. It is also, less admirably, what
Chilean General Augusto Pinochet—with American support—did in
Chile in 1973. The moral/ethical dilemmas for soldiers, as for others,
are complex.
Additionally, the obligations Ulrich describes in the oath-taking
of soldiers and public servants are not as special as she thinks. Oaths
simply add another layer of obligation to those that exist already under
the law. Being a soldier or a professional or political civil servant does
not exempt anyone—including the president—from the obligation to
obey the law.
Ulrich’s essay is timely and useful. The United States faces major
problems, especially internally, that confront citizens—soldiers,
professional civil servants, political appointees, everyone—with the
legal and moral challenges she addresses. How Americans face those
challenges will determine more than the careers of a few soldiers or
retired ambassadors. It will determine the future of the Constitution,
America’s system of checks and balances, and the place of the United
States in the world.
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On “The Politics of Oath-Taking”
Jimmie R. Montgomery, retired US Air Force colonel
This commentary responds to Marybeth Ulrich’s article “The Politics of Oath-Taking”
published in the Summer 2020 issue of Parameters (vol. 50, no. 2).

M

arybeth Ulrich’s article, “The Politics of Oath-Taking”
presents much to unpack and does more than promote the
idea that oath-takers are obligated to abide by their oaths.
Let me react. First, what American military officer would fail to support
democratic institutions and our constitutional processes? How is it
possible to allege such actions are a violation of our nonpartisan norms?
I reject that notion! Supporting our institutions is inherent in our duty.
Characterizing it as patriotic seems overkill. It is just expected.
I agree a military officer can testify before Congress if lawfully
subpoenaed. I do not agree with the assertion Congress is a “second
and coequal civilian master.” This assertion is a wholly different and
distracting inclusion. The Department of Defense is in the executive
branch. In her discussion regarding Constitutional foundations, Ulrich
cites herself in restating the theory of two masters. (I disapprove of the
term master in this context.) Then Ulrich asserts any action violating
constitutional norms violates our oath. I agree, but the challenge for us
all is the lack of clarity or consensus on such norms. Ulrich ignores this
challenge, and the fact she does not address it undermines her argument.
I have no heartburn with her paragraphs on the stated purpose
of the presidential impeachment inquiry or the distinction between
the two oath-taker types postulated. (I do have less confidence in our
nonmilitary oath-takers.) And the scholars cited, David Barno and
Nora Bensahel, warn of consequences resulting from a loss of trust
in our military institutions due to partisan activities by oath-takers.
The referenced article importantly notes such activities are not new.
(As an aside, does calling them scholars mean their views carry
extraordinary weight?)
Several paragraphs are spent building up Ambassador William B.
Taylor Jr. as a righteous example of a good, responsible oath-taker. I
would not argue with that conclusion. But citing Timothy O’Brien, a
well-known Democratic loyalist, undermines the buildup. Taylor, in
his testimony, was explicitly upset for two reasons. First, an irregular
channel of policy making was used by the administration. Frankly, get
over it. Taylor executes policy, and while he may have an input to the
policy process, he does not make it.
Second, Taylor asserted military aid he considered vital was being
withheld for “domestic political reasons.” It is worth noting the aid was
delayed about seven weeks. Taylor thought, as characterized by O’Brien,
the president was undermining the national interest. For me, Taylor’s
testimony before the impeachment inquiry was far from convincing.
No mention was made by Ulrich of Ambassador Gordon Sondland’s
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testimony/recollection, which was often at odds with Taylor’s. Perhaps
Sondland is not a good, responsible oath-taker.
Ulrich uses now retired US Army Lieutenant Colonel Alexander
Vindman as the second example of a good oath-taker. Again, Vindman
was responding to a lawful subpoena, and he should have testified. He
was not insubordinate. He did his duty. He expressed his judgments. I
listened to Vindman’s testimony and viewed his demeanor; he does not
lack self-confidence and was borderline arrogant in his responses. He
believed what he said. Whether his judgment was correct on what he
believes he heard in the phone conversation between the president of
Ukraine and US President Donald Trump will be evaluated by history.
Finally, I wholeheartedly disagree with the concluding assertion that
the current view of our military officers is that loyalty to the president
outweighs the duty to testify before Congress when lawfully subpoenaed.
(I had to smile at the use of “trumps” in the paragraph.) I agree a robust
education is needed on oath-taking, but the concluding paragraph in the
article should have been omitted. The tone is melodramatic.

The Author Replies
Marybeth P. Ulrich

I

n my essay, “The Politics of Oath-Taking,” I introduced the concept
of political oath-takers (political appointees) and professional oathtakers (civil servants including the uniformed military) and argued
understanding their constitutional obligation is uneven. I also raised the
basic question of whether participating in the constitutional process in
support of democratic institutions violated the professional military
norm of nonpartisanship. I concluded fulfilling one’s oath to the
Constitution, even if such an act was contrary to the commander-in-chief ’s
wishes, did not violate professional military norms. On the contrary, acts
such as now-retired US Army Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Vindman’s
testimony before the House of Representative’s impeachment inquiry
support Congress’s impeachment power to protect the presidency from
an occupant who may abuse presidential power. Several readers took
issue with some of the arguments raised. This brief essay seeks to address
their concerns.

Political versus Professional Oath-Takers

David Wasserstein writes the distinction I proposed between
professional and political oath-takers was “artificial at best, dangerous
at worst.” He went on to offer a distinction, “The former are obliged
to give impartial, nonpartisan service to their country, while the latter
give explicitly partisan support to the political agenda for which they or
those who appoint them are elected.” This definition is in fact consistent
with my own, but I also emphasize whether or not the role is a partisan
one, the obligation to uphold the oath is the same. As such, political
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oath-takers cannot be excused from not following their oaths simply
because they are political appointees.
Members of Congress are political oath-takers who have a
particular obligation beyond political appointees. As elected officials,
they are accountable to their constituents and are ascribed specific
constitutional powers in order to check executive power. Members of
Congress who choose to attack the character of witnesses and engage in
hyperpartisan rhetoric, instead of questioning professional oath-takers
on the issue at the heart of the inquiry, abdicate their constitutional
responsibility. Professional oath-takers offer the nonpartisan objectivity
critical to establishing the truth. Members of Congress true to their oaths
balance their partisan loyalties with their constitutional obligation to
check a president who abuses the power of his or her office. Unfortunately,
the impeachment inquiry featured a number of politicians unable to
exercise the restraint necessary to conduct an objective proceeding
capable of producing the constitutional remedy the founders intended.
The readers criticize Ambassador William B. Taylor Jr. and Vindman
for interjecting their policy expertise into the proceedings. It is important
to clarify the responsibility that career national security professionals,
both uniformed and civilian, have in the process. Vindman and Taylor
both possessed expert professional knowledge relevant to the inquiry
uniquely acquired through their national service. Professional norms
and the oaths of each man to the Constitution required such expertise
be shared in the form of professional advice with the executive and
Congress. Indeed, as part of the confirmation process senior military
officers promise to be forthright when questioned before Congress.
Jimmie R. Montgomery rejects the “two masters” argument that the
military is subject to the control of both the president and the Congress,
citing the fact the Department of Defense is part of the executive
branch. This position highlighted the president’s commander-in-chief
role atop the military chain of command but did not pay sufficient
attention to the founders’ intent to place significant authority to fund,
regulate, and even create military forces, such as the nascent Space
Force, uniquely in Congress’s hands.
Montgomery also took issue with Vindman’s demeanor while
testifying, chiding him for arrogance. I witnessed some of my War
College students raising such objections, including the critique he
wore his uniform to testify. Vindman responded he was testifying in
his professional capacity. His choice was in line with Army regulations
and the norm that active duty officers testify in uniform. Critics may
dispute his preference, but focusing on his attire and demeanor detracts
from full consideration of the issues at the center of the inquiry.

Implications

Vindman retired from the Army in the aftermath of President
Donald Trump’s attempt to deny him promotion to full colonel and
Army officials’ communication to him his future assignments would
be restricted. Vindman determined his Army career was no longer
viable, ultimately sacrificing his career for remaining loyal to his oath.
Vindman told the Atlantic, “I had to choose between the president and
the Constitution. I was aware of the fact that I could be compelled to
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testify. But I chose the Constitution. No Army officer wants to be put in
that position, but there I was” (Jeffrey Goldberg, “Alexander Vindman:
Trump is Putin’s ‘Useful Idiot,’ ” Atlantic, September 14, 2020). Given
the inability of the secretary of defense to protect Vindman sufficiently
from retaliation for his participation in the impeachment query, future
professional oath-takers may not choose a path of government service if
such a choice is perceived to be career ending.
The founders understood merely stating the rules of the
game in the Constitution would not be enough. They also thought it
was important to socially construct an emotional commitment to the
document—the oath—in order to buttress the rules with supporting
norms. But the current American political scene lacks oath-takers in
sufficient numbers who understand the obligations of their oath and
its associated norms for civil-military relations in a democracy. Without
such understanding those “who choose loyalty to American values
and allegiance to the Constitution” may be punished, contributing to
the further erosion of democratic institutions (Alexander Vindman,
“Alexander Vindman: Coming Forward Ended My Career. I Still Believe
Doing What’s Right Matters,” Washington Post, August 1, 2020).
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Armed Forces and Society
The Sexual Economy of War: Discipline
and Desire in the U.S. Army
By Andrew Byers
Reviewed by Dr. Jennifer Mittelstadt, professor of history, Rutgers University

T

hree years ago, I taught a course at the US Army War College that
explored the history of the US military’s relationship to economics
markets. Of all our topics, the lesson that generated the liveliest
discussion was the one on sex—how the US military had historically,
both formally and informally, regulated the market for prostitution.
Our historical readings generated tough questions about the military
and its perceived need to regulate sex work to preserve morale, protect
individual and unit readiness, and ensure global military effectiveness.
I wish we had been able to read Andrew Byers’ powerful book to help
us answer our questions. The Sexual Economy of War offers a broad
history of the US Army’s attempt to define and regulate sexual activity—
from the beginning of the twentieth century to the cusp of World
War II. Its case studies and conclusions provide a fruitful perspective
on the military’s complicated relationship to human sexuality.

Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2019
290 pages
$39.95

Byers’s book joins an increasingly robust subfield of histories
on gender and sexuality in the US military. Most studies of sexuality
and the military explore only one topic: prostitution, the regulation
of military family life, the regulation of homosexuality, the treatment
of women military personnel by male military personnel, marriage of
local women abroad to US military personnel, or sexual relations
within the military among personnel. Like no historian before, Byers
combines these different aspects of sexuality under one umbrella and
examines the US Army’s treatment of them as an interconnected whole.
His broad vision reveals sexuality as an unavoidable field in which the
Army must operate.
Through his wide scope and careful research, Byers presents an
argument that will capture the attention of military historians and
historians of US foreign relations: the US military in the decades before
World War II could not modernize or achieve political acceptability,
operational effectiveness, or national and global strategy goals without
regulating sex. In order to professionalize, improve effectiveness,
and expand overseas, the military controlled same-sex desire among
soldiers, supervised officers’ wives and daughters, managed sex work,
monitored sexual health, and censored servicemen’s relationships with
local women in the United States and abroad. Byers reminds readers
that just as the military operates within a political economy of war—a
regulation of who produces what materiel and weapons, who performs
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which services, what these goods and services cost—the military also
operates within a sexual economy of war.
From a deep dive into the records of courts-martial, the US Army
JAG, Inspector General, World War I training camps, and more,
Byers reveals rich and surprising stories of the sexual concerns the military
dealt with from the Spanish-American War until the onset of World
War II. At Fort Riley, Kansas in the 1920s, the Army court-martialed
soldiers who wed surreptitiously to enforce the ban on marriage for
enlisted men. In the Philippines, the military subjected brothels to daily
health checks and price controls to ensure servicemen’s access to sex
without compromising their health and readiness.
During World War I, the Defense Department Committee on
Training Camp Activities imprisoned 30,000 American women
whose potential sexual relationships with doughboys were felt to
imperil relations with the local community and the sexual health
of soldiers. In Europe, the AEF banned sexual relationships with
nonprostitutes, monitored soldiers’ sexualized street behavior, and
discouraged troop marriages to foreign national women to avoid
antagonizing local communities and national alliances. In Hawaii, the
military cracked down on hundreds of men for same-sex relations as
the military increasingly defined homosexual sex as a threat to morale
and discipline.
Byers’s survey of five locations and 50 years of military regulations
and courts-martial reveals how the military regimes of sex regulation
were sharply differentiated based on nationality and locale, class and
rank, homosexuality versus heterosexuality, and racial identity.
He explores how the military tried to stamp out legal and regulated
prostitution in its post communities in the United States but created
elaborate legal and regulated structures in the Philippines and worked
within existing legal regimes in Europe.
The military treated its African American soldiers more harshly
than its White soldiers everywhere, treating Black sexuality as more
dangerous to local relations and unit readiness and morale than White
sexuality. The military prosecuted all forms of nonheterosexuality
brought to its attention, whereas it let some of the same acts pass for
heterosexual soldiers. In France and Germany during and after World
War I, the military prosecuted officers for nonmarital sex and sexually
related conduct unbecoming, but not enlisted personnel. Still, at its
permanent posts in Hawaii, the military prosecuted no officers for
nearly 40 years—only enlisted personnel. And the military veered wildly
between pursuing sexual regulation to preserve health and readiness
versus pursuing morality and its perceived impact on military morale.
Byers shows readers both resilient patterns and stark anomalies.
These patterns and anomalies might be easier to comprehend if
Byers had organized the book thematically rather than geographically.
Instead of centering each chapter on a different type of sexual behavior
in the Army from 1900–41, Byers presents case studies of individual
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posts in Kansas, the Philippines, Louisiana, France, Germany, and
Hawaii. As a result, the book feels choppy and repetitive, as some
chapters march readers through very short sections on the treatment of
each type of sexual regime in each locale.
To account for every issue comprehensively, Byers sometimes misses
opportunities for comparison and deeper causal argument. In the end,
these weaknesses are overcome by the overall impact of Byers’s careful
chronicling of the many sexual regulation efforts over time and across
the globe. Readers cannot put down the book without acknowledging
the sexual economy of war was central to the US military’s earlytwentieth-century development, expansion, and performance.
Current military leaders should read Byers’s history of the US Army’s
pre–World War II struggles to regulate sex to rethink the challenges
facing the US military in recent decades. Today’s efforts—and failures—
to regulate and shape sexuality, sexual activity, sexual violence, and
more have often been treated as novel problems resulting from the
incorporation of women and gay, lesbian, and trans servicemembers into
the military.
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Irregular Warfare
The ISIS Reader: Milestone Texts
of the Islamic State Movement
By Haroro J. Ingram, Craig Whiteside, and Charlie Winter
Reviewed by Robert J. Bunker, instructor at the Safe Communities Institute
at the University of Southern California

T

he purpose of The ISIS Reader is simple yet effective: “to present
the Islamic State movement in its own words, through the texts
and speeches that shaped its evolution from the late 1990s through
the second decade of the twenty-first century,” to provide clarity and
nuance on ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham) thought and emotive
processes, and to stress the critical importance of analyzing the primary
sources produced by violent nonstate political actors (1–2). The ISIS
Reader represents an ethnographic study—a strategic red teaming deep
dive—into the hearts and minds of the ISIS intelligentsia who adhere
to Salafi-jihadi norms and values bereft of a separation of church—
here mosque—and state. As a result, all political matters are religious in
nature, all religious matters are political in nature, and ISIS leaders and
common fighters are viewed as holy warriors of God carrying out his will
on Earth never as agents of the state as in the West.

New York: Oxford
University Press, 2020
288 pages
$44.95

Authors Haroro J. Ingram, a senior research fellow at George
Washington University’s Program on Extremism, Craig Whiteside,
an associate professor at the US Naval War College resident program
at the Naval Postgraduate School and a retired Army lieutenant colonel,
and Charlie Winter, a senior research fellow at the International
Centre for the Study of Radicalization at King’s College London, have
extensive military and national security careers. Collectively, they have
produced numerous professional and academic publications on the
Islamic State and possess the requisite research expertise to produce
this work. Anas Elallame of the Middlebury Institute of International
Studies at Monterey, the translator of a number of the ISIS works in the
book originally published in Arabic, should also be singled out for his
vital contribution.
The work is divided into acknowledgements, an introduction, four
parts (representing the bulk of the book), a conclusion, a glossary of
Arabic terms-ISIS usage, and an index. The four parts are subdivided
into two chapters on multiple ISIS works from 1994 and 2004; three
chapters on multiple ISIS works from 2006, 2007, and 2009; five chapters
on multiple ISIS works from 2013 through 2016; and five chapters on
multiple ISIS works from 2016, 2018, and 2019. Each of the 19 readings
is sourced to a speech, document, video communiqué, or other media
with background on whether the reading represents an ISIS translation
into English (which is given precedence), a US governmental translation,
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or a translation specifically undertaken for readers and includes detailed
analysis to place it into context and discuss its significance.
The content of the readings ranges from being laden with
mystical metaphors and tribal rituals to presenting a practical strategic
assessment and action plan to offering Caliphate gender guidance to
utilizing strategic messaging to bolster the righteous cause of global
jihad. From a strategic military perspective, the most important readings
are “Zarqawi’s Strategy” (chapter 2), “Advice to Leaders of the Islamic
State” (chapter 4), and “Media Jihad” (chapter 10). Readers will likely
skim the more esoteric and religiously skewed material and rely on the
analysis section to interpret their meaning.
The concluding chapter highlights “Several recurring trends . . .
that are pertinent for scholars wishing to understand the movement and
strategic-policy architects seeking to devise strategies to confront it”
(303). These trends are strategic opportunism, a deft use of propaganda,
and a willingness to openly disclose its future intentions as follows:
“. . . the group’s strategic culture of critical reflection and innovation,
evidence of which continually emerges and re-emerges throughout its
history,” “ . . . the central role afforded to propaganda a mechanism
by which the Islamic State movement competes against foes who are
conventionally superior to it by almost any measure,” and “. . . that [the]
Islamic State has a history of telling its supporters exactly what it intends
to do” (303, 304, 306).
The telegraphing of the strategic intentions of ISIS—like a
boxer providing cues for the next punch he is going to land—is
an important trend to isolate related to this entity. As we know, the
global insurgent Salafi-jihadi struggle with ISIS, or al-Qaeda for that
matter, is far from over.
Faults with the book are minimal. The glossary is missing some
Arabic terms from the text but this omission represents a small
oversight. The footnotes for the analytics section supporting each
reading are solid, however, a “references cited” master listing at the
end of the book would have proven beneficial. Further, no tables or
diagrams were evident and could have been used to better organize
conceptually the numerous readings appearing in the text, their
relationship to ISIS evolutionary phases, and their sourcing and strategic
significance in the introductory and concluding sections of the book.
The Isis Reader is a unique and well-executed resource on
translated Islamic State primary milestone texts and their analysis.
It will serve as an extremely useful primary reference for War College
and related graduate-level program courses focused on a strategic
analysis of the Islamic State as well as a secondary text in courses
focused on Salafi-jihadi radicalization or al-Qaeda and Islamic State
strategic competition.
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Small Arms: Children and Terrorism
By Mia Bloom with John Horgan
Reviewed by José de Arimatéia da Cruz, professor of international relations and
international studies, Department of Political Science and International Studies,
Georgia Southern University

S

mall Arms: Children and Terrorism addresses an important issue
in terrorism literature—the use of children to carry out acts of
terrorism worldwide. Traditionally, terrorism is a weapon of the weak
and a tool used by groups to coerce a population or overthrow a
regime either through military means or in a more clandestine fashion.
Focusing on children who are recruited, kidnapped, or sold into slavery
and turned into terrorists by organizations such as Boko Haram, the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, the Islamic State, and al-Qaeda
authors Mia Bloom and John Horgan, both professors at Georgia State
University, note that “children in violent extremist movements, [often]
referred to as ‘child terrorists,’ are not born. Rather, they are made, and
they learn to want to be a part of a violent group, either with or without the
knowledge and support of their families” (1). The book further “explores
the extent of children’s involvement in terrorist groups and examines
their transition from victims to perpetrators, while demonstrating the
interchangeability of these roles” (3).
Using an economic approach, Bloom and Horgan agree that
“children are not used as substitute goods . . . but as a complementary
goods able to accomplish something adults could not” (15). In many
attacks against infidel forces, children are used for several reasons,
including the fact that children are less likely to arouse suspicion and
can act innocently. “ ‘The Taliban prized child operatives’; one Pakistani
fighter explained, ‘children are innocent, so they are the best tools
against dark forces’ ” (15).
The book also examines the social ecologies of children and their
socialization processes. It focuses on their “parents, families, peer
groups, religious leaders, and other community based institutions, and
how structural conditions pressure children to participate in hostilities”
(5). Children who are recruited or forced into terrorism, especially
the “Ashbal al-Khilafa” (or Cubs of the Caliphate), are groomed and
exploited to victimize others (1). Several channels allow children to be
recruited into terrorist organizations, either against their will or with the
consent and encouragement of their parents or caretakers. It is important
to note that “terrorist leaders across a variety of regions and cultures
tend to shield their own children from involvement, instead focusing
recruitment on young people to whom they are not related” (14).
Another important factor facilitating the recruitment of innocent
children to do the dirty job of adults in terrorist organizations is the
push and pull factors in many areas where the recruitment takes place.
Push factors are “the structural conditions that facilitate involvement

Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2019
248 pages
$27.95
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in terrorism” while pull factors are the “things that make involvement
appear personally attractive to the individual” (16). Finally, recruitment
does not take place ex nihilo. Instead, recruitment is a long process
that “requires years of indoctrination by the media, sources of religious
authority, schoolteachers, and the larger community” (21).
The connectivity explosion, which is shrinking the world and
making sovereignty more porous, has been a force multiplier for terrorist
organizations. As Bloom and Horgan note “the deliberate targeting of
youth online, especially through social media, has exploded in recent
years to near critical proportions, as terrorist groups have become
increasingly savvy at using the internet to disseminate propaganda and
attract new recruits” (25).
Another important contribution by Bloom and Horgan is the
six stages of socialization into a terrorist organization and how the
social ecology of terrorism enhances the appeal of child recruitment:
“seduction, schooling, selection, subjugation, specialization, and
stationing” (140). In the seduction stage, children are enticed to join
a terrorist organization. The process, mainly through propaganda and
outreach activities, shows potential recruits how their lives will be
different once they join the organization.
A similar process takes place in Brazil’s notorious favelas, or
shantytowns, where poor favela youth often join criminal organizations
as a way out of poverty and a means for acquiring quick cash. Many
terrorist organizations shower children with “toy/candy giveaways” and
give speeches and “shows of strength” in addition to shows of executions
and “indirect exposure to IS personnel” (140).
It is also important to remember many terrorist organizations,
like gangs in the United States and worldwide, provide recruits with a
sense of belonging and a purpose in life. Obviously, the outcome of
joining is not optimal since most terrorists are usually captured or killed
and leaving the organization can be complicated if not impossible.
Bloom and Horgan, in their attempt to provide a solution to the very
complex issue of children involved in terrorism, propose eight practical
steps or best practices that could win hearts and minds in order to
reintegrate children who served in terrorist organizations (179).
With the implosion of the Soviet Union and its replacement with
Russia and the “end of history,” the United States, the newly lone
superpower, must confront a new reality—not only terrorism, but
also child terrorism. As Bloom and Horgan state “the ability to win
hearts and minds is what has allowed many of the extremists to operate,
by providing social services and offering benefits where states have
failed to, but also by outlining what they are for and whom they
are against” (181).
In conclusion, Small Arms: Children and Terrorism should be read
by students at the US Army War College. It highlights a topic rapidly
growing in prevalence around the world, and future military leaders
must learn how to deal with this new pandemic problem.
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Niche Wars: Australia in Afghanistan and Iraq, 2001–2014
Edited by John Blaxland, Marcus Fielding, and Thea Gellerfy
Reviewed by Dr. Russell W. Glenn, director, plans and policy, deputy chief of
staff G-2, US Army Training and Doctrine Command

I

n addition to its availability as a free download, Niche Wars is unique
for the breadth of its authors’ expertise—a blending of strategic,
operational, and tactical insights and a frankness rarely seen in such
collective efforts. It provides a valuable opportunity to learn from one of
the United States’ closest and ablest military partners as they confronted
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Niche Wars is organized into four sections and three appendices
(two of which provide helpful chronologies of Australia’s commitments
in the two conflicts). The first section, “Policy and Strategy,” presents
a strategic overview of the country’s national leadership decisions
to commit forces from the perspectives of a minister of defence,
a secretary of the department of defence (generally a long-serving
senior bureaucrat). and a former chief of the defence force. This
trio of chapters sets the strategic context for what follows, making it
clear Australia’s participation was a response to what its government
perceived was, in the words of Minister of Defence Robert Hill, “not
only an attack on our ally the United States but also, and fundamentally,
an attack on our shared values” (23). Significantly, Hill addresses the
failure of the leaders in Washington to include key partners in critical
decisions, observing “I do not think we were even consulted on what
turned out to be two of the most unwise decisions following the
conflict: to disband the Iraq army and the Ba’ath Party,” while admitting
“I think we preferred to pass these responsibilities to others” (28).
There is much wisdom to be mined between these lines.
US officials—civilian and military alike—too often default to a “not
invented here” approach during both preparation and execution;
a default that deprives them of what can be invaluable insights from
knowledgeable parties who might assist in avoiding unfortunate
missteps. Yet, ultimately, the responsibility for outcomes rests with
the coalition lead nation. While partners might be hesitant to assert
their views, lead partner solicitation of input constitutes a win-win.
Resulting views often provide options those immersed in day-to-day
planning or management of operations overlook. Solicitation also
overtly recognizes the truth that the lead nation and partners alike
are in this together and all legitimately have a right to be heard.
Authors of the second section have muddier boots than the
authors of the opening chapters. Here special operations forces—
air and maritime activities—and conventional ground force
challenges in Iraq receive attention along with a rarely heard vantage
point of an international officer embedded in a US headquarters.
The tensions a tactical commander experiences in a coalition

Canberra: Australian
National University Press,
2020
377 pages
$70.00
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environment are clear in Anthony Rawlins’s chapter recalling his
tour of duty as commanding officer of the Overwatch Battle Group
West (Two) in southern Iraq. His force served alongside British and
other partners to whom he felt a justified obligation to support in
extreme cases. Those tensions came to the fore when guidance from
the senior Australian officer restricted his force if commitments were
thought to threaten casualties amongst Rawlins’s soldiers. It was a
situation exacerbated by the battle group’s discomfort in not having
full access to strategic intentions from Canberra—to include those
regarding casualty concerns. A situation presenting a conundrum
never fully resolved during the unit’s time in-country.
Section three delves into specific functional areas spanning
operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Military functions such as
intelligence, command and control, and civil affairs find complements
rarely provided in conflict compilations; the chapter on the military and
media perhaps being an exception in that regard. Two authors address
undertakings by the Australian Federal Police in Afghanistan during
the period 2007–14, making clear the value of civilian law enforcement
experts who are able to complement military training for a host
nation’s other-than-military security forces. It is a task more difficult
than it might appear. This reviewer’s interviews regarding the British
Army’s experience in the early years of its coalition commitment to Iraq
reflected that while military police can undertake such training, the
differences between military and civilian law enforcement are such that
this approach is not the preferred solution.
The third section concludes with chapters analyzing Australian
Agency for International Development (AusAID) operations and
gender considerations, the latter being particularly significant when
dealing with populations in which female-to-female interactions are
essential to successful intelligence collection, gauging local attitudes,
and not violating social norms. Here as elsewhere throughout the
book, readers will find observations that might stir unpleasant
memories while also constituting worthy reminders of lessons too
valuable to lose.
Dave Savage’s “AusAID Stabilization,” for example, rightly
observes, “often enough, the provision of aid is the easiest part.
The real challenge is ensuring the aid is what is really required, is
compatible with the mission, is not supporting the insurgency, and
is both viable and sustainable over time. Indeed, aid that is poorly
delivered can often be worse than no aid at all” (232). This
observation is again in keeping with several interviews this reviewer
conducted during visits to Iraq and Afghanistan over the past now
nearly 20 years, an observation that calls for providing effective
training to personnel who might be tasked with the authority to
disperse Commander’s Emergency Response Program funds or some
equivalent thereof during future contingencies.
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The fourth section includes several essays that do not fall
into the above three categories with two essays focused exclusively
on lessons thought to be of value during contingencies yet to come.
The five chapters in the closing section are an apt topper to a
worthy collection of essays that will be of interest to readers seeking
a better understanding of these ongoing conflicts and to other
readers with specific functional area interests. Their value, and
that of the book as a whole, extends to conflicts beyond those
involving counterinsurgency to touch on coalition leadership,
occupation responsibilities, and interactions with local populations
and governments—in short, virtually any contingency the future
might hold.

Cities at War: Global Insecurity and Urban Resistance
Edited by Mary Kaldor and Saskia Sassen
Reviewed by Dr. John P. Sullivan, senior fellow, Small Wars Journal El Centro

U

rban warfare is a constant feature in current and future conflict.
Ranging from civil strife and chronic insecurity to terrorist attacks,
sectarian violence, and components of broader campaigns, urban war
spans both international and noninternational armed conflicts and
criminal armed violence. Most texts look at urban warfare challenges
from the view of the combatant warfighter; others look at the tactical
challenges, including those involved with protecting the populace. This
edited collection, however, looks at urban insecurity from the perspective
of the civilians inhabiting the cities at war.

New York: Columbia
University Press, 2020
264 pages
$30.00

Editors Mary Kaldor and Saskia Sassen are influential contemporary
urban scholars. Kaldor is known for her theoretical work on networked
conflict and new wars, while Sassen is noted for her work on global
cities. Both scholars are concerned with global security, violence,
and assemblages of power. Here they articulate the concept of urban
capabilities through the metaphor of the “yogurt run” as seen in the
ability of a farmer in Ghouta, Syria, to negotiate the distribution of dairy
products to residents in embattled Damascus (1). Such urban capabilities
epitomize community resilience and are key to understanding the
dynamics of urban insecurity and conflict.
Kaldor and Sassen use the term new wars to describe a social
condition involving conventional and irregular forces ranging from
militias, private military companies, terrorists, warlords, and criminal
gangs. These new wars are increasingly networked and urban. The global
networks of transnational organized crime and the global economy
connect seemingly disparate conflicts through a range of spaces and
flows. Identity politics and fragmented spaces—including enclaves—
are a means of negotiating the resulting global political economy.
Informal and criminalized markets are integrated into global circuits
and networked assemblages of power. Communities and combatants
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adapt to these realities creating new threats and importantly new
opportunities to forge security and political access.
These new opportunities are a means of coping with, and
managing, perpetual war. Two major models for doing so are the “war
on terror”—militaries directly engaging nonstate forces—and “liberal
peace”—formal stabilization and peacekeeping (11–13). The interaction
between these two models is explored in selected case studies on a range
of conflict scenarios over time.
Chapter 1 by Ruben Andersson looks at Bamako, Mali, a West
African city of almost two million citizens that became a safe haven for
peacekeepers and humanitarian aid organizations. Andersson reviews
the security mechanisms employed by international actors in context of
the geography of intervention and assesses the fragility of the safe zone
established for intervention and the social dynamics that can mitigate
the perception of barricaded enclaves of remote intervention.
Chapter 2 on Kabul, Afghanistan, by Florian Weigand compares
perceptions of security between urban and exurban residents of
Kabul Province’s “zones of (in)security” (54). He argues that inclusive
security practices can “enhance the level of perceived security and
[state] legitimacy” (54). In Kabul both insurgent and criminal violence
contributed to perceptions of security. Police are not always successful
in meeting community perceptions. At times, state intervention—or
misintervention when police are viewed as corrupt or predatory—raises
levels of perceived insecurity. The Taliban is seen as a source of insecurity
and security. Cooperation and community engagement are key.
In Chapter 3 Ali Ali assesses insecurity in Baghdad, Iraq, in the
wake of US intervention and the establishment of green and red security
zones. The “green zone” is a walled secure enclave that shelters its
inhabitants from lawlessness. Citizens living outside the walls in the
“red zone” are subject to violent assaults, terrorists, insurgents, and
gangsters (85–87). State capacity is limited and the need for integrated
and inclusive security measures based upon active engagement has
been established.
Chapter 4, “A Tale of Two Cities” by Mary Martin, examines
insecurity in the twin border cities of Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua,
Mexico, and El Paso, Texas. “Narco-insecurity” is explored in light of
border securitization, the war on terror, and “neoliberal security”—
including privatization and the interaction between globalization and
development—as a prelude to reviewing community responses to
counter the insecurity (123–28). Additional discussion on the role of
criminal cartels, cross-border gangs, and narcocultura, as well as allegations
of police collusion with cartels, torture, and corruption would have
enhanced this chapter.
Sobia Ahmad Kaker surveys enclave making in Karachi,
Pakistan, in Chapter 5. Social fragmentation leads to disparate (in)
security perceptions and enclaves heighten insecurity and marginalize
the urban poor. Chapter 6 by Karen Büscher assesses insecurity in
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Goma, Democratic Republic of Congo. Goma became a safe haven
for peacekeepers and humanitarian nongovernmental organizations
and a refuge for internally displaced persons fleeing active conflict
thus driving increased urbanization. Rebels exploited this stability
to exert political and economic influence and as a foundation for
financial support, recruitment (especially of child soldiers known as
kadogo), and political action.
Chapter 7 by Johannes Rieken, Efraín García-Sánchez, and Daniel
Bear looks at restoring perceptions of security in the aftermath of
insurgent and criminalized conflict in Bogatá, Colombia. Communitybased approaches show promise. Chapter 8 by Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic
explores how (in)security in Novi Pazar, Serbia, is exacerbated
by economic decline, the influx of refugees, identity politics, and
clientilistic governance.
In their conclusion, Sassen and Kaldor emphasize the need for
“tactical urbanism” in response to urban insecurity and future urban
wars and adaptive community responses to conflict (227–29). It also
requires military, diplomatic, and humanitarian actors responding to
urban conflicts recognize the global assemblages of power needed to
integrate local features and actors. Engagement must be direct and
sustained to build trust. In all cases, as in evolving conflicts worldwide,
criminals exploit and participate in conflict. Military leaders at the
strategic level, intelligence and civil affairs personnel, military and
civilian police, and humanitarian actors will benefit from reviewing
this important text to recognize opportunities to enable future “yogurt
runs” (231).
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Military History
Brotherhood in Combat: How African Americans
Found Equality in Korea and Vietnam
By Jeremy P. Maxwell
Reviewed by Douglas Bristol Jr., associate professor of history, and codirector,
Center for the Study of the Gulf South, University of Southern Mississippi

B

rotherhood in Combat is the first comparative history of racial
integration during the Korean and Vietnam Wars. It views
Black military service through the aspirations of Black soldiers, who
hoped to prove their right to full citizenship. Jeremy Maxwell argues
Black and White GIs in both wars forged bonds of care and trust in
combat that created racial equality in frontline units, concluding they
“found equality of experience in combat” (18). Maxwell, however,
does not claim the experience of fighting beside men of a different
skin color ended racial tensions in the military. He also distinguishes
carefully between the environment in frontline units and in rear units—
where racial tensions proliferated, especially toward the end of the
Vietnam War. This distinction is important as the evolving civil rights
movement increasingly politicized Black soldiers in Vietnam.

Norman: University of
Oklahoma, 2018
224 pages
$29.95

Chapters 5 and 7 substantiate the book’s thesis by analyzing the
experience of combat in Korea and Vietnam through the soldiers’
personal accounts. Maxwell is the first scholar to use the oral histories
of Black veterans from the Veteran’s History Project of the Library of
Congress. Their stories are gripping: “Harold Bryant, a [B]lack combat
engineer operating with the 1st Cavalry Division” during Vietnam,
remembered “one of his platoon members,” who “was a card-carrying
Ku Klux Klan member” (130). The platoon ended up in a firefight,
and the Klansman was cornered. Although Bryant and others “laid
down a base of fire to cover him,” he froze (130). A Black member of
the platoon came to his rescue. The White soldier later said that action
changed the way he viewed Black people. Maxwell uses stories like
this one to demonstrate how the constant threat of danger on the front
lines fostered cohesiveness beyond racial ties.
In contrast, the situation Maxwell describes in the rear units was
racially divisive. To explore these racial tensions, he draws on research in
military records at the National Archives, contemporary news articles,
and oral histories. Enlisted men tended to self-segregate, which when
combined with boredom, resentment against discrimination in the
military, and widespread alcohol and drug use, lessened constraints on
expressing racial animosity. In fact, most racial incidents in Vietnam
happened between off-duty soldiers drinking at service clubs, although
it should be noted Maxwell also discusses riots in stockades and aboard
ships such as the USS Kitty Hawk.
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Despite its broad scope, the book is narrowly focused in some
ways. Maxwell concentrates on the experience of African Americans in
the Army and the Marines, with occasional comparisons to the Navy
and the National Guard. He does not cover the Air Force or the Coast
Guard, nor does he examine women in the military. He explains their
exclusion from combat in the period he studies means their experiences
are not directly relevant to an analysis of Brotherhood in Combat.
Less justifiably, Maxwell does not examine gender, or to be
more specific, masculinity. The recent trend in scholarship on Black
soldiers in Korea and Vietnam has been to explore the impact of the
desire of Black soldiers to have their masculinity recognized on their
perceptions of military service. A study of men bonding in combat
would benefit from investigating whether shared identities as men
performing the ultimate masculine activity—fighting in war—helped
lessen racial differences.
Senior members of the defense community will be interested in
this book for three reasons. First, it illustrates through numerous
examples the importance of placing constraints on expressions of
racial animosity and the consequences of failing to do so. Second, it
discusses the experience of Black and White soldiers in terms familiar
to the defense community, taking into account the practical realities of
the battlefield and rear units. Lastly, it briefly reviews the history of racial
integration through the end of the Vietnam War for readers unfamiliar
with the subject. The first chapter provides background on the issues
facing Black soldiers from the Civil War to World War II. The next
three chapters outline the forces driving integration in Korea, and
another chapter highlights racial issues in Vietnam. Maxwell’s graceful
prose, moreover, is clear and free of social science jargon.
In conclusion, Brotherhood in Combat sheds new light on race
relations in the military during the Korean and Vietnam Wars by
exploring the impact of combat on troops. Maxwell concludes the
military—despite ongoing discrimination—made greater progress
toward racial equality than civilian society through the early 1970s. The
book will be enlightening for anyone working for greater diversity in the
military and trying to understand the persistence of racism.
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Women of Empire: Nineteenth-Century Army
Officers’ Wives in India and the U.S. West
By Verity McInnis
Reviewed by Jody M. Prescott, colonel, US Army (retired)

V

erity McInnis’s monograph on the role of army officers’ wives in
the 1800s in British India and the American West is a must-read
for anyone who wants to better understand the evolution of gender
roles among soldiers and spouses in the contemporary US Army.
McInnis pulls no punches in addressing gender, ethnicity, race, class, and
sexuality in these two different historic military contexts—topics still
relevant today as the US military works to maintain a force driven by
equal opportunity based on merit. Gender, for example, is increasingly
important operationally because of the Women, Peace, and Security Act of
2017 and the Department of Defense strategy that implements it.

Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 2017
304 pages
$34.95

With thorough and careful research, McInnis illustrates her
points through observations from the writings and journals of these
women—and some of their husbands. She preserves their language and
nuance, brings their voices to life in breadth and detail, and humanizes
certain points of view modern readers will find unenlightened—and
likely offensive—that must be considered for there to be a rich and
meaningful discussion. Most importantly, the accounts make the book
interesting to read.
McInnis identifies two important similarities between these two
groups of women, bringing them together in her assessment of their
impacts on the administration of both armies and the very different
areas those armies helped administer. First, both groups of women
largely bought into national ideologies based on notions of white racial
and cultural superiority that legitimized the armies’ roles in civilizing
these conquered non-European territories. Significantly, as McInnis
points out, these roles were fostered and implemented in large part by
the officer products of the military academies of each country.
Second, these women, operating within a masculine military
value system that emphasized selfless service and military professionalism
on the part of gentlemen officers, did not merely reflect the prejudices
of their times. Instead, in their complementary role, the women were
active agents who reinforced these prejudices as a means of maintaining
social control over indigenous people and even their own civilian
nationals. This second point is significant when objectively assessing
the women’s impact on their military communities and in the societies
these armies helped govern.
McInnis shows the officers’ wives in these two nineteenth-century
armies enjoyed a degree of responsibility and respect their civilian
counterparts did not. It was common for officers’ wives to derive
authority and status from their husbands’ ranks and create a mirrored
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rank hierarchy within their gender. Within the armies, and particularly
in garrison settings, these women formed effective influence and
communication networks that flowed around the military rank structure.
For example, they often played an essential role in determining whether
other women would make suitable brides for young officers (61–62).
External to the armies, McInnis shows how officers’ wives often
found themselves serving as ambassadors of their particular national
values—from how they comported themselves in ceremonies and social
settings to how they dressed and decorated their homes to how they
interacted on a daily basis with their working-class servants. These
roles all offered opportunities for agency when played well, but they
were not without cost. McInnis notes that “Working within the military
system, however, required the women to live highly regulated lives and
to observe codes of conduct appropriate to their partners’ position in the
imperial hierarchy” (9). In addition, these women often keenly noted a
decrease in their social stature and scope of responsibilities when their
husbands took positions outside military garrisons or retired from active
duty and returned to civilian life.
McInnis does not oversell her argument on the exercise of female
authority in these two armies. She recognizes the women’s accounts
reflect their biases regarding their husbands’ roles as officers
and gentlemen. She also acknowledges these accounts are highly
individualized and cannot fully cover the depth of experience of all
the women who were married to officers serving in India or the
American West. McInnis also appreciates that the voices of those
whom these women considered their social or racial inferiors are
generally not represented in their own words, such as the perspectives
of enlisted men’s wives or those of their African American, Native
American, Mexican, or Asian servants.
The role of Army officers’ spouses today is quite different than it was
in the 1800s, or even in the 1980s, when officers’ evaluation reports might
include information about their spouses’ work with unit functions or
charitable causes. Other things have not changed, such as the challenges
of moving families every couple of years to new duty stations. Today
this challenge also presents professional disadvantages for spouses as
they try to find new jobs, or in the case of dual-career military couples,
equally career-enhancing positions. The military lifestyle is not easy. To
make it work for their families, officers’ spouses still need a system of
shared positive military values to which they can subscribe.
Women of Empire is a valuable contribution to understanding the
history of others who lived and managed the military life in their times.
It provides a well-researched and well-documented launching pad for
honest discussions today about the role of military spouses, both officer
and enlisted, as the US Army evolves to reflect the diversity of the
American people.
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1774: The Long Year of Revolution
by Mary Beth Norton
Reviewed by Colonel Gerald J. Krieger, US Army, associate dean, Near East
South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University

M

ary Beth Norton, a historian who specializes in the history of
the early American republic, is a history professor at Cornell
University and the former president of the American Historical
Association. Her latest book, 1774: The Long Year of Revolution, examines
the 16 crucial months between the Boston Tea Party (December 16,
1773) and the Battles of Lexington and Concord (April 19, 1775) and
captures the voices of the colonists who debated and fumbled along the
path to independence before fighting the formidable British Empire—
the most powerful country at the time.

New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
2020
528 pages
$32.50

Norton shows the varied opinions among the colonists, from their
concerns over the authority of England to the justness of British policy
to the condemnation of London’s attempts to levy taxes upon the
colonies. Citing pamphlets, newspapers, and personal correspondence
from the period, she skillfully weaves this material into her narratives,
using the header “Advices from London” to highlight source materials.
She also claims most historians gloss over the details of this pivotal
window in American history and miss the variance of opinions and facts
surrounding the events.
The book is divided into nine chapters, beginning with “The
Cursed Tea” and the early colonial obsession for the dark beverage.
Norton shows the divided public opinion on how to best deal with
the tax on tea and how tea was issued as payment, purchased, and
consumed—though many colonists abstained from using the tea.
In each chapter of the book, Norton highlights the divided public
perceptions in the colonies, leading up to the final chapter, “All Our
Liberties at Stake,” prompting the inception of the conflict that became
the American Revolution.
Norton details how London taxed colonists in North America
with the Molasses Act of 1733, along with a series of subsequent taxes,
including the Cider Tax of 1763 and the Sugar Act of 1764. These taxes,
however, were loosely enforced and circumvented by smugglers. She
believes the issue of taxes in the colonies was most closely associated
with tea.
As late as the early 1770s, the colonists viewed themselves as loyal
British subjects of King George III. Even years later, many Americans
maintained that view—although the colonists were adamant, the British
Parliament did not have the authority to tax them. Surprisingly, some
raucous New Englanders were eager to purchase and consume the
tea, much to the chagrin of the activist group Sons of Liberty. This
issue served as a foundation for the larger problem and debate about
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the authority of the British Parliament to tax the colonies, along with the
mixed public reaction around the colonies.
The North American colonies officially drank over 265,000 pounds
of tea in 1771; they also consumed another 575,000 pounds of smuggled
tea. Most narratives only cover the seven ships loaded with East India
Company tea bound for the colonies. The Boston Tea Party dictates
that many authors primarily focus on the three ships (the Dartmouth, the
Elanor, and the Beaver) that arrived in Boston laden with over 100 chests
of British East India Company tea that would end up in Boston Harbor.
Norton reveals there is much more to the story.
Through a rigorous review of source documents, Norton splendidly
traces the cargo of the four other ships, including the William, the
seventh ship that sank off the coast of Cape Cod in the middle of
December. She pieces together the details of the shipwreck and the
disposal of the tea down to the individual chest. She also provides
vignettes of lesser-known figures, like Jonathan Clarke and John
Greenough from Provincetown, Massachusetts, who oversaw the
distribution of the salvaged tea—much to the frustration of Samuel
Adams who wanted all the tea destroyed. Ultimately, the men used the
Eunice, a Salem fishing schooner, to move the 54 chests and one barrel of
tea to Castle William, located on an island in Boston Harbor.
Norton’s conclusion points out that although Americans did not
draft a Declaration of Independence when the first shots rang out at
Lexington and Concord, colonial leaders had thought and functioned
independently since the founding of the colonies. She closes with the
poem “The Glorious 74,” which extols 1774 as the crucial period leading
up to American independence.
Students of military history and the American Revolution will
appreciate 1774: The Long Year of Revolution. Norton’s in-depth research
and varied source documents serve as a lens into the complex nature and
multiple emotions of independent-thinking colonists who did not fully
comprehend the implications and consequences of their actions.
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Regional Studies
The Battle for Pakistan: The Bitter US
Friendship and a Tough Neighbourhood
By Shuja Nawaz
Reviewed by James P. Farwell, associate fellow, Centre for Strategic
Communication, Department of War Studies, Kings College, University
of London, and non-resident senior fellow, Middle East Institute,
Washington, DC

A

distinguished fellow at the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council,
Shuja Nawaz earned high praise for Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its
Army, and the Wars Within (Oxford University Press, 2009), in which he
provided unique insights into the complex dynamics of Pakistan’s army.
His new book, The Battle for Pakistan, validates those accolades and reviews
many topics familiar to readers interested in Pakistan: the assassination
of Benazir Bhutto in 2007 and its repercussions; the challenges Pakistan
faced, from floods to internal security confronting her husband Asif
Zardari, who took control of the People’s Party upon her death and who
refrained from investigating the assassination; the political maneuvers by
former presidents Pervez Musharraf and Nawaz Sharif as they jockeyed
for power; the byzantine relations between successive chiefs of army
staff and their civilian counterparts; the fraught tensions with India; and
throughout, the often contradictory and complicated relationship that
exists between the United States and Pakistan.

London: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2020
428 pages
$89.00

While distinguished authors in multiple books have covered these
topics well, The Battle for Pakistan stands apart. First, Nawaz knows
Pakistan inside and out. He understands its byzantine politics—long
dominated by the Bhutto and Nawaz families—in which confecting and
unraveling conspiracy theories is as popular a preoccupation in Pakistan
as NFL football is in the United States. Second, his work stems from
a detailed exploration of these events through a wealth of first-hand
accounts in the United States and Pakistan. Third, he possesses an
unparalleled knowledge of Pakistan’s military. And finally, he applies
wisdom and insights to these events as only an expert with his knowledge
and expertise can do.
Nawaz’s dissection of how Pakistan perceives its relationship with
the United States and the war in Afghanistan packs a punch. Too many
American leaders, he argues, view Pakistan as a nation whose alliance
can be purchased through aid leveraged to influence Pakistani security
policy. American naivete, he notes, is well illustrated by the use of
“Af-Pak” to identify the conflicts in Afghanistan and Pakistan (57).
Richard Holbrooke, who considered himself the house expert on the
region—and on probably most topics that drew his interest—was
taken aback when the astute Bruce Riedel explained the tendency of
some Americans to call Pakistanis “Pakis” was like using the N-word
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in America (67). It is a small item, but readers can draw broader
conclusions from these insights about misfires in forging partnerships
and alliances.
Nawaz is critical of the United States’ failure to forge a coherent
strategy for winning in Afghanistan, a reality Pakistan recognized and
factored strongly into its posture in dealing with Americans. The United
States prosecuted the war on a short-term basis, driven by domestic
politics and the inability to persuade Pakistan to seal the border or
adequately equip the Pakistan army to fight against the Taliban.
Nor, as Pakistani military commanders—especially Chief of Army
Staff General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani—repeatedly complained, did
the United States credit Pakistan with sustaining the huge losses its
military suffered in fighting Islamic extremists. The failure created
bitterness and mistrust, even with the intellectual Kayani, whom Nawaz
views as pro-Western in his outlook. Nawaz argues the United States
was blind in expecting Kayani, for any reason, would put US interests
ahead of Pakistan’s welfare. Kayani understood the conflict would be
drawn out. Like many countries in the region and members of Pakistan’s
political and military establishment, he doubted the United States would
stick it out for the long-term.
Kayani was right, although his insight overlooks the broader
strategic question of how deeply and for how long a strong US presence
in Afghanistan made sense. In the meantime, nerves were rubbed raw
by the takedown of Osama bin Laden, the Raymond Allen Davis affair
in which an American—whom the Pakistanis branded a CIA agent—
killed two Pakistanis, and miscommunications that led in November
2011 to the deaths of two dozen Pakistani soldiers at the hands of
American forces.
Nawaz clarifies the strategic importance of this nuclear-armed
nation of over 220 million citizens to stability in Southwest Asia and the
tremendous work required to strengthen and stabilize relations between
the United States and Pakistan. Improved relations are important even
as Pakistan looks to strengthen its ties with China, which has dealt with
Pakistan by providing aid more adroitly.
In a book laden with rich analysis of pivotal events, the final chapter
with recommendations for the future bears close reading. There is not
space here to recount all of Nawaz’s suggestions, but the bottom line is
that Pakistan must streamline its government, strengthen transparency
and integrity, and bring civilian and military power into equal balance.
While Pakistan’s army has made strides in modernization to address the
current threat environment, the Pakistan government needs to do more
diplomatically, especially in persuading India to reduce the number of
its forces facing Pakistan to stabilize relations more permanently
and avoid a catastrophic nuclear war. Ultimately, Nawaz writes,
“Pakistan’s future lies in emphasizing and building a strong economy
and creating opportunity.”
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Battle for Pakistan is required reading for students of Pakistan and
professionals who deal with this byzantine nation of immensely talented
but—to this observer—strangely insecure inhabitants. The nation’s
stability is essential not only for Pakistan but for the region and the rest
of the world.

China’s Western Horizon: Beijing and
the New Geopolitics of Eurasia
By Daniel S. Markey
Reviewed by Dr. Andrew Scobell, RAND Corporation

D

uring the past two decades, great-power rivalry for the United
States meant intensifying competition with China. This rivalry for
many American military professionals focused on the military realm,
especially in the Western Pacific maritime domain. Yet, in recent years
there has been greater awareness that the US-China rivalry entails
competition in multiple realms. As the 2017 National Security Strategy
observed, bilateral rivalry with China also includes economic and
political competition. This reality underscores China’s much-hyped “Belt
and Road Initiative”—an ambitious and extensive effort to expand its
economic presence and enhance its political influence worldwide.

New York: Oxford
University Press, 2020
336 pages
$29.95

China’s Western Horizon: Beijing and the New Geopolitics of Eurasia
makes important contributions to our understanding of the processes
and outcomes of China’s unprecedented and growing involvement in
countries far beyond its western borders. This timely volume examines
Chinese activities in three regions, focusing on a single country of
particular importance to each region (Kazakhstan in Central Asia,
Pakistan in South Asia, and Iran in the Middle East), and explores in
detail the interactions between these countries and China.
The dominant Belt and Road Initiative narrative in the United
States portrays China as the malevolent economic colossus consumed
with waging “debt-trap diplomacy,” duping defenseless and gullible
governments worldwide into signing predatory loan agreements to
finance desperately needed infrastructure projects in these developing
states. In a variant of this narrative, Beijing bribes local elites to
mortgage their country’s future. The logic undergirding this narrative is
that China fully intends for these governments to default on the massive
debts, ensuring Beijing will own, or at least control, these countries.
China’s Western Horizon is a valuable corrective to this one-sided
narrative. Countries such as Iran, Kazakhstan, and Pakistan are far from
helpless or gullible and often hold significant sway over Chinese decisions
and actions. Markey recounts the origins of the Gwadar port project
in Pakistan. Contrary to conventional wisdom in the United States,
China neither initiated the project nor propelled it forward. Almost
20 years ago, then Pakistani President Musharraf aggressively lobbied
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Beijing to invest in Gwadar, and China reluctantly acceded. According
to Markey, “Gwadar may eventually serve a variety of Chinese goals,
but the port was initially the product of a Pakistani effort launched for
Pakistani reasons” (ix).
Markey effectively captures the domestic dynamics in Kazakhstan,
Pakistan, and Iran. He is especially adept at analyzing Pakistan’s
internal workings and illuminating how the array of governmental and
societal actors shape the outcomes of negotiations between Beijing and
Islamabad. He also deftly maps the geopolitical landscape in the
three regions showing local competitors within each region as well as
external great-power rivals. With his extensive knowledge of South
Asian dynamics, Markey also provides readers invaluable insights into
three key dyads—China-Pakistan, China-India, and Pakistan-India.
He concludes that Beijing’s growing influence and involvement in the
subcontinent could likely produce the “worst of all possible worlds” by
generating greater instability in an already tumultuous region (79).
Moreover, Markey’s nuanced discussion of the soft competition
between Beijing and Moscow is fascinating and on point. While ChinaRussia ties may be the best they have been in many years, underlying
tensions persist, and Central Asia lurks as the issue most likely to bring
these tensions to the surface.
The final chapter outlines implications for the United States and
offers policy recommendations. Markey’s assessment is ominous.
South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East are all “primed for greater
Chinese involvement, less reform, and more geopolitical competition”
(156). Moreover, “Beijing shows little appetite for assuming responsibility
for the many existing conflicts within and among Eurasian states” (164).
This assessment means Chinese actions are unlikely to contribute to
stability in many countries and may prove destabilizing for others.
Whether other great powers will be willing to assume responsibility
for these regions is not clear. In the coming years, American military
professionals should anticipate heated debates inside and outside the
Beltway regarding the appropriate role and military posture for the
United States on the Eurasian landmass. Markey’s primary advice for
US policymakers is worth restating: acquiring “a clear grasp of local
histories, interests and relationships will be essential to advance
America’s specific . . . interests in Eurasia” (189).
China’s Western Horizon is a tour d’horizon and should be required
reading for anyone grappling with the enormity of America’s China
challenge—whether they sit in Carlisle Barracks, Camp Smith, MacDill
Air Force Base, the Pentagon, or elsewhere.
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Moscow Rules: What Drives Russia to Confront the West
By Keir Giles
Reviewed by Captain Jake Shelton, US Army Special Forces

T

he US relationship with major nuclear power Russia is at its
worst point since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In Moscow
Rules, Keir Giles offers a unique perspective through his assessment of
the sources of confrontation and shows how Westerners could better
understand Russia and prevent conflict. Widely lauded in academic and
diplomatic circles, the book also has applications for military leaders
focused on countering Russian aggression and should be added to their
reading lists.

Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution Press/London:
Chatham House, 2019
256 pages
$34.45

Moscow Rules diverges from the popular claim that tension with
Russia is based on Putin’s incursions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria
or election meddling as seen recently in The New Tsar: The Rise and
Reign of Vladimir Putin (Vintage Books, 2016) by Steven Lee Meyers
and Putin’s World: Russia against the West and with the Rest (Hachette
Book Group, 2019) by Angela Stent. Instead, Giles suggests “The
West” mistakenly views Russia as “Western” and incorrectly applies its
standards as it would for other European nations. Through citations
and extracts from Russian leaders and experts, he describes how Russia
is not Western and operates by a different set of rules. While the book’s
sections cover topics from Mongol occupation to recent protests, two
rules summarize the content military leaders can use to help craft their
campaign plans. First, Russia views security as a finite resource, and
second, Russia is culturally nondemocratic.
For the first rule, to Russia security is finite and “History Matters”
(21, 117). This history long precedes the classically cited German
invasions of the twentieth century. For thousands of years, Russia
fell victim to its vast undefendable geography through invasions from
every direction. Giles claims this historical context manifests itself today
through Russia’s continued effort to weaken and destabilize geographic
neighbors and create a security buffer zone (13).
Military leaders who understand this rule can improve upon recent
strategic failures. Russia views a destabilized Ukraine and Georgia
unable to join NATO as directly beneficial to their security. While
countering actions on the border of any country are difficult, the first
rule could have anticipated Russian involvement in Syria and Crimea
to maintain the strategically vital deepwater ports at Latakia on the
Mediterranean Sea and Sevastopol on the Black Sea.
For the second rule, Giles argues the historical oppression of the
Russian people has ingrained state servitude to the near “genetic level”
and highlights public indifference to rigged elections, whitewashed
history, state-sponsored assassinations, and Moscow-backed party line
propaganda to support this assertion (64). An appreciation of this
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cultural difference can aid military leaders in predicting Russia’s actions.
In retrospect, Moscow seems far less rogue for annexing Crimea in 2014
when viewed from their perspective. The Kremlin simply combined
ambition with its indifference to public accountability and annexed what
they had long claimed was already Russia.
Additionally, this nondemocratic culture allows Russians to accept
the “ends justify the means,” such as barrel bombing Syrian cities,
so leaders should not assume Moscow would adhere to the Law of
Armed Conflict (91). Finally, the state oppression of the population
has resulted in an inherent distrust of “outsiders,” which could
diminish the effectiveness of unconventional warfare, psychological
operations, and civil affairs in campaign plans (111).
The book’s only flaw is the author’s bias against President Trump.
While Giles cites facts, quotes, and excerpts throughout Russian
history, he only criticizes the Trump administration. A more robust
argument would include the influence of previous administrations
on Russian relations. This criticism does not significantly detract
from the validity of the book’s arguments, however, as Giles identifies
his bias and acknowledges Russia is only one country in the larger
geopolitical world.
Moscow Rules can help Western leaders gain initiative over Russia
in two ways. First, the sequential nature of Russia’s foreign incursions
indicates direct involvement by leadership at the highest levels. By
creating “competent societies and militaries” across Russia’s border, the
West can overwhelm Moscow’s ability to micromanage (169).
Second, Putin understands excessive defense spending caused the
downfall of the czars and the USSR (156). Moscow, therefore, will
increasingly pursue its interests through proxies and electronic means
further from its periphery. By imposing costs on Russia’s indirect
approach, the West can counter future incursions. Combining these
two approaches will force Russia into a dialogue, as Giles hopes, while
avoiding direct conflict by simply understanding “Moscow’s rules.”
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Strategic Leadership
The Return of Great Power Rivalry: Democracy versus
Autocracy from the Ancient World to the U.S. and China
By Matthew Kroenig
Reviewed by Colonel Gerald J. Krieger, US Army, associate dean, Near East
South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University

M

atthew Kroenig argues the United States will prevail in the greatpower rivalry with China because democratic governments are
superior to all other political systems. In his newest book, The Return
of Great Power Rivalry, Kroenig surveys seven historical examples that
highlight democratic superiority over autocratic governments. The book
is well researched, though written primarily for laymen as it avoids jargon
and terms familiar to international relations theorists. Kroenig, however,
does highlight key works by Joseph Nye, Paul Kennedy, and James
Robinson, to name a few.

New York: Oxford
University Press, 2020
304 pages
$29.95

Kroenig’s thesis is that “democratic countries are better able
to amass power, wealth, and influence on the world stage than
their autocratic competitors,” though many scholars might suggest
China has the potential to provide a unique system that surpasses
democracies (4). Many scholars point out the conclusion is not
preordained, and the outcome is uncertain, contrary to Kroenig’s
claim. This topic is generating volumes of books, with some critics
suggesting China’s one-party system will more closely resemble
Singapore’s hybrid system that blends democratic characteristics with
rule by an elite group. This timely book provides more data to fuel
continued conversations on the topic.
The book is organized into four parts. The first part highlights
potential benefits of each system, and the three remaining parts
concentrate on democratic advantages presented from historical,
contemporary, and future perspectives. The term democracy is
deceptive, and Kroenig reviews one key distinction cited by political
scientists “in which political officeholders are selected through
competitive, popular elections” (18). The distinction, however, is
more nuanced, and he should have added the qualification that the
popular vote for key leadership positions in the government, given the
emergence of hybrid forms of government.
A point of clarification for the layman is the fact that if one were
to ask average Chinese citizens on the street about democracy, they
would say China is democratic, while it will likely grow more democratic
in the future. The confusion is based on a unique understanding of
democracy in China. Economic progress is the crux of the ideological
divide between occidental and orientalist conceptions of statecraft,
and one underscored by the influence of Confucian influence via the
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notion of moral economy. In other words, most Chinese citizens view
the social contract with the government and the people as one that is
predicated on material support and opportunities provided by the state
rather than individual freedom.
Kroenig’s detailed study of key transformations in the European
world will inform students of history while highlighting the benefits
of democracies in European history. His survey of ancient Greek
political theory is useful, though Sparta ultimately won the
Peloponnesian War and the dual monarchy was not democratic and
Athens (a democracy) was defeated. Sparta’s oligarchy, however, did
not last long and fell to Alexander the Great. Kroenig’s claims stretch
the truth at times, such as when he writes, “[D]emocratic states
produce better soldiers,” and “Democracies also enjoy a military
advantage due to their innovation edge,” though most of Europe
between 1939 and 1942 might have disagreed when the Wehrmacht
rolled through Europe with their innovated combined arms blitzkrieg
and panzer divisions (30).
If China’s economy is the largest in the world, other metrics are
meaningful when contemplating international influence. Soft power
is one area where America continues to rank number one for several
reasons including premier secondary learning institutions that are
among the best in the world and an entrepreneurial spirit that is closely
affiliated with democratic forms of government.
The literature surrounding the rise of China and the decline of the
United States continues to be popularized by academics like Andrew
Bacevich and countless others. In 2008 Fareed Zakaria warned we
were entering a post-American world where the United States must
share the world stage with emerging actors like China, India, and
Russia. Since then, geopolitical specialists have highlighted China’s
growing economy and cited statistics from the World Bank to support
their argument that China’s authoritarian one-party system is more
efficient than American democracy.
To cite an example, scholars point to World Bank reports that
highlight the growth in China’s share of the world’s gross domestic
product—in purchasing power parity terms—that skyrocketed from
4.5 percent in 1990 to 18.6 percent in 2018, while noting America’s
share dropped to 15 percent. Since 2011 Chinese patent applications
have surpassed America’s patent applications and have been climbing
higher ever since (World Bank, https://www.worldbank.org/).
Senior-level leaders will find The Return of Great Power Rivalry
helpful as a great summary of democratic governments from ancient
Greece to the present, though its real value is in providing case
studies for war theorists. Kroenig does not present a convincing
argument that American democracy will prevail. He admits early in
the book that “Perhaps China will be the sole exception, but every
other state-planned economy in history has hit a wall at some point”
(22). While this statement is true, the jury is still out.
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The Last Card: Inside George W. Bush’s
Decision to Surge in Iraq
Edited by Timothy Andrews Sayle, Jeffrey A. Engel, Hal Brands,
and William Inboden
Reviewed by Steven Metz, professor of national security and strategy,
US Army War College, and nonresident fellow, Quincy Institute for
Responsible Statecraft

T

he 2003 invasion of Iraq and the long stabilization operation that
followed were seminal events in the evolution of American strategy.
These events naturally spawned a growing genre of analytical literature—
which, in broad terms, developed in three waves. Initial quick looks, most
written by journalists, were published soon after the invasion and in the
early stages of the insurgency. The second wave consisted of more
detailed and rigorous academic assessments and participant memoirs on
tactical and strategic operations. The third wave has only just begun and
reflects newly available information and a greater degree of frankness
made possible by the increasing distance from the conflict.

Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2019
416 pages
$34.95

An initial contribution to the third wave was The US Army in the Iraq
War (Strategic Studies Institute, 2019), a two-volume study based on
thousands of declassified documents and dozens of new interviews with
key participants and leaders. The Last Card: Inside George W. Bush’s Decision
to Surge in Iraq is another important part of the third wave, but it looks
at a very different aspect of America’s involvement in Iraq—President
George W. Bush’s decision in late 2006 to shift from a strategy based
on training Iraqi security forces and disengaging as quickly as possible
to the “surge.” This decision increased the number of US military forces
in Iraq and committed them to working directly with Iraqi security
forces. The surge was based on recognition that the conflict had
changed from an insurgency primarily targeting US forces to a
sectarian civil war; political progress—the ultimate determinant
of success or failure in Iraq—was impossible without improved
population security.
While President Bush gradually accepted the idea that the
United States needed a new strategy over the course of 2006, he knew
a major strategic shift would require adroit management and
salesmanship. The Department of Defense and many senior military
leaders still believed the old “train-and-leave” strategy was working,
and the State Department remained skeptical of sustainable political
reconciliation in Iraq. Additionally, the American public and Congress
were increasingly frustrated by the cost of the operation. This book is
a detailed study of how President Bush decided on the surge and how he
brought the public and the rest of the government on board.
There have been other studies of the surge but none structured
like The Last Card. The first half summarizes 28 interviews—completed
in 2015 and 2016—with key participants in the surge decision. Nearly
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every major player, except former Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld and US Army General George Casey, was interviewed,
including President Bush. The second half of the book provides
analytical essays by an all-star cast of security experts.
While the book’s contributors vary on their acceptance of the
idea that the surge snatched victory from the jaws of defeat for the
United States, and was a textbook case of how to undertake a major
strategic shift, most contributors agree the shift was an impressive
performance by Bush. He united all the senior policymakers except
Rumsfeld (who left government service shortly before the formal
surge decision), all elements of the government, and much of the
public and Congress behind this shift. Political scientist Robert
Jervis outlines in his chapter that the process demonstrated Bush’s
“extraordinary skill . . . not in his making the decision, but in his ability
to craft what he was doing so that it would minimize the opposition and
allow him to proceed with a united government” (273).
While there are no stunning new revelations in the book, it does
pull together much of what was already known about the surge
decision and fills in additional details, however, it suffers from
two problems. First, the editors rely on oral histories rather than a
blend of oral histories and documents like the Army’s Iraq study.
Interviews are valuable but they are susceptible to selective memory
by those being interviewed. Second, the editors have allowed extensive
redundancy in the analytical chapters. All the chapters are valuable
stand-alone studies of the surge, each with a different perspective or
focus, but since the chapters rely on the same oral histories, identical
narratives—and even quotations—show up many times.
Given the unusual structure of the book and the redundancy of
information, few readers other than researchers performing in-depth
analysis of the surge will find it useful to read cover to cover. That
said, The Last Card is an excellent resource for scholars. It provides
important and authoritative insights into one of the seminal events in
American history.
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Strategy
Adaptation under Fire: How Militaries Change in Wartime
By David Barno and Nora Bensahel
Reviewed by Major Zachary Griffiths, operations officer, 2nd Battalion,
10th Special Forces Group (Airborne)

I

n fall 2020 the US Army terminated the Asymmetric Warfare
Group and the Rapid Equipping Force. Both organizations adapted
the Army to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, but no longer seemed
necessary in the Army’s turn toward “great power competition” (1).
Was this a mistake? In Adaptation under Fire, authors David Barno
and Nora Bensahel explore whether the US military is adaptable enough
to prevail in the wars of the twenty-first century.

New York: Oxford
University Press, 2020
440 pages
$34.95

Barno and Bensahel present a credible case that American
military reform should include building a more adaptable force
in preparation for twenty-first-century conflicts—and they bring
tremendous credibility to the project. Barno commanded US forces
in Afghanistan, while Bensahel achieved tremendous acclaim for her
defense policy expertise.
Employing a comparative case methodology to validate their
recommendations for both practitioners and policymakers, Barno and
Bensahel analyze operational level wartime adaptation. Borrowing
from Amy Zegart’s work on military and intelligence adaptation,
they define adaptability as “a dynamic process that must keep up with
the rate of change” during war with two parts (9). First, adaptations
must have sufficient magnitude to change what an organization does
or how it does it. Second, the change must improve the fit between
an organization and the environment. Big changes that fail are not
adaptation. Small changes that work locally but fail to scale are
not adaptation. Wartime operational level adaptation drives the
entire project.
The book is divided into three parts, with the first part being the
strongest. In the first part, Barno and Bensahel define their terms
and identify the three components for their analytic framework:
doctrine, technology, and leadership. They demonstrate the validity
of their framework by comparing cases of successful and unsuccessful
twentieth-century wartime adaptation. In the second part, they evaluate
American adaptability in Afghanistan and Iraq through their framework.
Finally, in the third part, they explore emerging trends and argue that
the “adaptation gap”—the difference between the anticipated war
and the war that will actually be fought—will continue to grow. They
conclude with recommendations for improving doctrinal, technological,
and leadership adaptation in the US military.
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Structure is one strength of Adaptation under Fire. From the outset,
the book proceeds logically, defining the argument, validating each
component of the framework in existing literature, exploring each
component in the modern context, and then concluding. The early
chapters defining the doctrinal, technological, and leadership elements
of adaptability do this especially well. They start with a bulleted list of
factors associated with adaptability and a two-by-two matrix of the cases
to be explored. For example, the chapter on doctrine lists flexibility,
assessment, inclusive development, and rapid dissemination of changes
as crucial to innovation before exploring the cases. The matrix then
buckets the four cases by whether they are or are not examples of
adaptable doctrine and accurate doctrine. Because of the time the
authors invested in laying out the chapter’s argument, readers can
rapidly advance through the material.
Thorough research is another strength of the book. The authors
draw upon a rich array of sources, including history, political science,
peer-reviewed academic articles, military journals, military doctrine,
and interviews. Nearly 115 of the book’s 430 pages are reserved for
notes and the bibliography. The authors, however, sometimes lean
heavily on one source for a particular case. For example, Steven
Zaloga’s Armored Thunderbolt accounts for seven of 10 citations in
that chapter’s supplemental tank armor case. Notwithstanding the
occasional overuse of a single source, the bibliography is a valuable
resource for scholars and practitioners.
Despite the book’s strong structure and detailed research, the
case selection deserves further scrutiny. As Barno and Bensahel never
explicitly define their case selection criteria, they open themselves
to criticism of either drawing on familiar cases or not fully considering
the full range of possible cases. Despite the lack of criteria, some
comparisons make intuitive sense. For example, the chapter defining
technological adaptation compares four cases of tank innovation: the
World War II “Rhino tank” plow, World War II supplemental tank
armor, World War I French tank development, and World War II
American tank development. With all cases focused on the same type
of technological adaptation in roughly the same time period and
theater, readers can assume omitted variables matter less.
The chapter defining leadership adaptability, however, does this
less well. Can we directly compare the leadership of a captain
in Grenada to a battalion commander in Vietnam, and then to
theater-level commanders in Vietnam in the 1960s and India during
World War II? The varying levels of command, the types of units
(elite volunteer troops versus draftees), the theater of conflict,
political conditions, and the time period wildly differ. While leadership
adaptation may have been the critical variable explaining success, the
large number of other factors at play challenge the conclusion that
adaptive leaders must build a “climate of openness, trust, and candor”
(97). Justification of case selection would better persuade readers of the
argument and help them understand competing factors.
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In all, Adaptation under Fire effectively argues for adaptability’s
importance in future conflicts. Barno and Bensahel identify and test
doctrine, technology, and leadership as key components of adaptation
analysis before evaluating the American military’s recent performance
and offering recommendations. Readers interested in understanding
how the American military adapted (or failed to adapt) during the
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq must read this book. Likewise, scholars
of military adaptability may lean on the common sense doctrine,
technology, leadership framework, detailed notes, and bibliography.
Finally, both uniformed and civilian policymakers may find the
recommendations of Barno and Bensahel helpful as the services
reorient away from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq toward greatpower competition.

Ten Lessons for a Post-Pandemic World
By Fareed Zakaria
Reviewed by Colonel Gerald J. Krieger, US Army, associate dean, Near East
South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University

F

areed Zakaria is a prolific author, political analyst, host of CNN’s
Fareed Zakaria GPS, and a contributor for the Washington Post. His
latest book, Ten Lessons for a Post-Pandemic World, uses the COVID-19
pandemic as a springboard to reflect on broader globalization challenges
and the evolving nature of human interaction in the world. The book’s
title is deceptive. Although the book is about COVID-19 and other
communicable diseases, it focuses more on globalization and world
politics than diseases.

W. W. Norton & Company,
2020
307 pages
$26.95

The book’s main thesis is that American exceptionalism has
fostered complacency and inefficiencies that manifested during
the COVID-19 outbreak. Zakaria argues eloquently that the
US government is in vital need of an overhaul, though he does not
outline specific policy recommendations or revisions that would
be useful for senior leaders in the defense community. Overall, he
provides a solid argument that would have benefited from more
detailed analysis and potential solutions. Nevertheless, all senior
leaders should read the book for a superb summary of the impact of
globalization and the challenges framed by a more connected society.
Readers will also gain a better understanding of epidemics that military
practitioners will face in the future.
Zakaria organizes the book into 10 “lessons,” reviewing the
influence of effective governance, why we should listen to experts, the
impact of the digital life, the social nature of people, rising inequality,
and the transformation of international politics, to cite just a few. He
begins with an overview of global epidemics—from the mysterious
plague described by Thucydides to the infamous bubonic plague
that wiped out half of Europe. Globalization transformed the world,
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virtually eliminating national borders, integrating trade, connecting
remote regions of the world to megacities, and underscoring the nature
of modern intermeshed society.
One conclusion Zakaria draws (lesson 6) is the social nature
of human beings, which became a source of frustration for many
Americans locked in their homes in some parts of the country during
the COVID-19 pandemic, who craved human contact and interaction.
They learned Zoom calls are a pale substitute for social contact. Solving
this crucial human need must be factored into future productivity and
innovative technologies moving forward.
The economic lessons of globalization come with a dire
warning. Zakaria writes, “We have created a world that is always in
overdrive . . . All of these strains and imbalances produce dangers—some
that can be foreseen, and others that cannot” (15–16). Technologist Jared
Cohen’s lesson that only two of the three characteristics of open, fast,
and stable systems are viable without a system spinning out of control
provides insight into modern trade networks (14–15). It is illustrative
to use Cohen’s model to capture the challenges of capitalism that are
open and fast but unstable which is a concern, though serving as a
launching point for the spread of epidemics that will continue to haunt
future generations.
As the global population moves up the income ladder, they will
relocate to dense urban areas with modern technologies. At the same
time, much of the rest of the planet will remain poor and without access
to refrigeration so “wet” markets where animals are kept, killed, and
sold will not be eliminated. The proximity of humans to animals is an
elusive vector to control. Most new diseases, 75 percent of them, such as
AIDS, Ebola, SARS, MERS, the bird flu, and the swine flu, originated in
animals. Future pandemics will become more common, though Zakaria
does not propose specific policies that will help world leaders manage
these events more effectively in the future.
A Facebook post by the Norwegian University of Science and
Technology that was quickly deleted reveals the unspoken reality
of European derision with American systems, specifically health
care systems. At the inception of the COVID-19 pandemic, school
administrators directed students abroad to return home if they were
in a nation with a poorly developed health-care infrastructure, like
the United States. The message highlighted the fact that America is no
longer the shining city upon a hill.
A Stanford study concluded the likelihood of someone moving
from the bottom fifth of income distribution to the top fifth is only
7.5 percent for those born in the United States while Canadians are
almost twice as likely to make the transition (70). Zakaria’s argument
would be more effective if he had examined the same trends in
China where young entrepreneurs have growing opportunities, given
the shifting world demographics. The reality is the future is full of
promise and uncertainty while globalization reminds us that the new
TOC

Book Reviews: Strategy

151

reality has shifted to an information age where knowledge is the critical
determiner for success.
Zakaria reminds readers of the powerful scene in Lawrence of
Arabia when Peter O’Toole, playing an unforgettable T. E. Lawrence,
turns back to rescue a lost man, reminding those present that we are in
charge of our destiny when he tells them “Nothing is written . . .” (234–35).
He closes Ten Lessons of a Post-Pandemic World by capturing the new
reality of globalization, rising inequality, and changing world
leadership that is a shell of the post-American world. This liminal
period in world history will provide unique opportunities and
challenges as the world emerges from the COVID-19 pandemic. The
future is filled with uncertainty and new opportunities. It is up to
American leaders with public support to take advantage of them.
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Technology and War
Killer Apps: War, Media, Machine
By Jeremy Packer and Joshua Reeves
Reviewed by Dr. Zac Rogers, research lead, Jeff Bleich Centre for the US
Alliance in Digital Technology, Security and Governance, Flinders University,
South Australia

B

iological evolution, and its branch of human epistemology, is
not the work of any naturally occurring optimization function.
It is purposeless drift—adapting and changing as contingencies arise—
with no specified goal or end state. Artificial evolution and machine
epistemology, on the other hand, is pure optimization function. This
distinction is critical in understanding the profound implications of our
techno-anthropological reality. The latter emerged by way of the former
but is in no way determined, controlled, or contained by it. The two
natural forces are inimical—not complimentary or coconstructive in
the way many popular accounts of our technological civilization would
conceive. Part polemic, part historical analysis, part exploration, Killer
Apps, in delivering this news, adds timely perspective to the existing
discourse while avoiding several pitfalls.

Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 2020
280 pages
$26.95

The machine episteme is binary and goal oriented—it contains
within it an approximate rationality in which the annihilation of
human life becomes axiomatic. Crucially, the decision of the authors
to position the book’s conceptual center around media is their most
important and original aspect. They show, using well-researched
historical and contemporary examples, how the proliferation of machine
media—any technology that selects, collects, stores, processes, and
transmits information and incurs a manipulation of time and space—
has accumulated via the escalating strategic games of military
competition, to the point where human existence now takes place inside
the confines of an alien and inimical machine episteme.
Chapter 8 clearly states this point: “War is the condition of media
escalation. Media technology propels competition between military
powers in order that it may evolve” (108). Our world and the machine’s
world are codetermined, coproduced, and deeply entangled by our
shared media—but in no way commensurate. In this hybrid world, we
have cocreated, humans are the weak, the slow, the stupid, and the soft
(4). Yet we continue to behave and think, in a tragedy exceeding farce,
as if we are master and conductor.
Within the machine episteme, humans are the noise and the fog.
Our elimination is therefore simply a byline of the machine logic our
strategic escalations have engendered. When expressed in geopolitical
terms, this episteme holds, in the first instance, that the optimal way to
make the world safe for Americans is to depopulate it of non-Americans.
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Something akin to what Carl Schmitt described as a state of “absolute
enmity” (“The Political Character of Absolute Enmity”). Packer and
Reeves show how this binary process of elimination by filtration was
prefigured in early postwar continental air defense, continues in the
ongoing expansion of automated drone warfare and spills over in the
vanguard shift to low-cost, low-energy, fully autonomous AI-driven
swarms. The corollary of this process has been steady human
subordination to the binary machine episteme.
Continuing with the machine logic, the only way to make the
world safe for the machines is to depopulate it of humans—or at least
minimize the “human factor” to the point of its effective irrelevance
(17). Packer and Reeves argue that existing legal constraints, such as
the Department of Defense “human-in-the-loop” policy, are little
more than ornamental (3). The machine episteme and its internal logic
of operational speed and error elimination have overwhelmed any
regulatory expression of normative or ethical prudence. They address
head-on the misguided humanism of the techno-optimists and the
swollen cohort of AI ethicists, who cling to the belief that this regime—
any regime—of scaled media technology can be subordinated to human
intentions. Their demolition of the naive anthropocentrism in this
popular line of thought in Chapter 4 is alone worth the cost of the book.
In expressing this existential fear, Packer and Reeves join a litany
of historical voices, to realize again that knowledge, activated and
materialized via media, is a Promethean gift. They echo C. S. Lewis who
wrote: “Each new power won by man is a power over man as well. Each
advance leaves him weaker as well as stronger. In each victory, besides
being the general who triumphs, he is also the prisoner who follows
the triumphal car” (The Abolition of Man, 1943). While modernity and its
wake has proceeded under denial of this truth, Packer and Reeves have
updated the insight with penetrating acuity.
For the national security, intelligence, and defense communities,
Killer Apps presents both a valuable scholarly resource and a deeply
ambiguous set of questions. As the authors presage in the preface, are
they friend or foe of this community? Defined as it is by the imperative
of knowing the difference, the national security, intelligence, and
defense communities might take Killer Apps as an opportunity to
reflect. The media we have inherited from our forebearers—both
human and machine—incarcerates us in an episteme in which
the prospects of a peaceful existence is itself increasingly subject
to automated annihilation. At a minimum, we should reflect on
the incongruity that thinking of strategic futures might preclude the
very possibility of being human. If it does preclude the possibility,
what does winning mean?
A definitive account of this subject matter will remain elusive—
such an undertaking is yet to be attempted by any authors, past or
present. Reading Killer Apps alongside other related perspectives,
however, such as Philip Mirowski’s Machine Dreams: Economics Becomes
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a Cyborg Science (Cambridge University Press, 2002), Bruno Latour’s
Pandora’s Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies (Harvard University
Press, 1999), and John Gray’s Enlightenment’s Wake: Politics and Culture
at the Close of the Modern Age (Routledge, 1995)—which converges in its
final pages with Killer Apps in its appeal to Heideggerian Gelassenheit—
will reward readers seeking to fill out and augment their understanding
of the phenomena at hand. The task of grappling with the technoanthropological reality is immense.
Stylistically, some readers will find the combined narrative,
historical, and analytical approach deployed in Killer Apps unappealing.
Without doubt, critics will complain of the dearth of solutions
offered. Misanthropes will relish the dystopian tones. But these
types of responses suffer precisely the anthropocentric orientation to
which Packer and Reeves are taking an ax, and for that their
contribution is invaluable. They force readers to transcend the
humanist epistemological orientation in order to understand what
the machine age has truly ushered in.

TOC

TOC

Contributor’s Guidelines
Article Submissions
Content Requirements
Scope

Audience
Clearance

Concurrent
Submissions

Submissions to the US Army War College Press must address
strategic issues regarding US defense policy or the theory and
practice of land warfare while exhibiting the highest standards
of research and scholarship. Actionable strategic, policy, or
instructional recommendations must be included. For more
information, visit https://press.armywarcollege.edu.
US Army War College graduates, other senior military
officers, policymakers, and members of academia concerned with
national security affairs.
Members of the US military and employees of the US
Department of Defense must provide a memo from the local
Public Affairs Office stating a submission is appropriate for
public release (see AR 360-1, ch. 6).
Submissions must not be available on the Internet or be under
consideration with other publishers until the author receives
notification the submission will not be published or until the
work is published through the US Army War College Press.

Formatting Requirements
Length

File Type
Visual Aids

Citations

• Monographs (accepted from USAWC faculty and staff only):
20,000 words (15,000-word main text, 5,000 words in the
foreword and executive summary).
• Articles: 5,000 words or less.
• Commentaries: 2,500–3,000 words.
• Book reviews: 800–1,000 words.
Text must be provided in a single MS Word Document (.doc).
Charts, graphs, and photographs may be provided to clarify or
amplify the text. Tables must be presented in the body of the
Word document. Microsoft-generated charts and graphs must be
submitted in Excel. And photos must be provided as .jpg images
of not more than 9MB (at 300 dpi). If any table, chart, graph, or
photograph has been previously published, written permission
from the copyright holder to republish the content must be
included with the submission.
Use the Chicago Manual of Style format to document sources.
Indicate all quoted material by quotation marks or indentation.
Reduce the number of footnotes to the minimum consistent with
honest acknowledgement of indebtedness, consolidating notes
where possible. Lengthy explanatory footnotes are discouraged
and will be edited.

TOC

158

Parameters 51(2) Summer 2021

Submission Requirements
Address
Include

usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@mail.mil
1. For each contributor, provide the following information: full
name, mailing address, phone number, email address, areas of
expertise, and a brief biography or curriculum vitae.
2. Attach all files, including graphics.
3. For book reviews, include the author, editor, or translator’s
name, the book’s title, the publisher, and the publication date.
4. Abstract requirements, approximately 200 words, including
the following information:
a. What is the thesis/main argument of the piece in
one sentence?
b. How does this piece differ from what has already been
published on the topic?
c. What methodology and sources are/will be used?
d. Why will this piece be of interest or useful to the
readers of the USAWC Press, who are mainly policy
and military practitioners?

Timelines
Receipt
Review

Please allow 1 business day for confirmation of receipt.
Articles: 4–6 weeks.
Monographs (accepted from USAWC faculty and staff only): 10–12 weeks.

TOC

US Army War College Quarterly
Parameters

47 Ashburn Drive | Carlisle PA 17013-5238
717-245-4943
http://press.armywarcollege.edu
e-mail: usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@mail.mil
The US Army War College Quarterly, Parameters, is a refereed forum for contemporary strategy and Landpower issues.
It furthers the education and professional development of senior military officers and members of government and
academia concerned with national security affairs. Parameters is indexed in, inter alia, Air University Library Index to Military
Periodicals, US Government Periodicals Index, LexisNexis Government Periodicals Index, Worldwide Political Science Abstracts, Lancaster Index
to Defence & International Security Literature (UK), and PAIS Bulletin. Book reviews are indexed in Gale Group’s Book Review Index.
Parameters is also available through ProQuest and UMI.
Periodicals postage is paid at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, and additional entry offices. ISSN 0031-1723 | USPS 413530 | Library of
Congress Catalog Card No. 70-612062.
Subscriptions: US Army War College graduates who are actively employed by the government, as well as select
organizations, may receive a gratis subscription. For eligibility requirements, visit the website listed above.
Nongraduates, retired graduates, and the general public may subscribe through the Government Publishing
Office (GPO).
Address Changes: Submit address changes for unpaid subscriptions to the Parameters office by e-mail or phone.
Reprint Requests: For permission to reprint articles, contact the Parameters editorial office by e-mail or phone. Be
prepared to provide the article’s title, author’s name, publication date, intended use, quantity, and means of distribution.
Reviews and Replies: We invite reader commentaries on articles appearing in Parameters. Not all commentaries can
be published. For those that are, the author of the article will be invited to provide a reply. For additional information,
visit the website listed above.

The US Army War College
The US Army War College educates and develops leaders for service at the strategic level while advancing knowledge in the global
application of Landpower.
The purpose of the US Army War College at this time in our nation’s history is to produce graduates who are skilled critical
thinkers and complex problem solvers in the global application of Landpower. Concurrently, it is our duty to the Army to also act
as a “think factory” for commanders and civilian leaders at the strategic level worldwide and routinely engage in discourse and
debate on ground forces’ role in achieving national security objectives.

The School of Strategic Landpower develops strategic
leaders by providing a strong foundation of wisdom
grounded in mastery of the profession of arms, and
by serving as a crucible for educating future leaders in
the analysis, evaluation, and refinement of professional
expertise in war, strategy, operations, national security,
resource management, and responsible command.

The Center for Strategic Leadership develops senior leaders
and supports the strategic needs of the Army by educating
senior military and civilian leaders on Landpower at the
operational and strategic levels, developing expert knowledge
and solutions for the operating and generating force, and
conducting research activities, strategic exercises, and
strategic communication.

The US Army Heritage and Education Center acquires,
conserves, and exhibits historical materials for use to
support the US Army, educate an international audience,
and honor soldiers—past and present.

The Army Strategic Education Program executes General
Officer professional military education for the entire
population of Army General Officers across the total force
and provides assessments to keep senior leaders informed
and to support programmatic change through evidencebased decision making.

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes national security
and strategic research and analysis to influence policy debate
and bridge the gap between military and academia.

TOC

PARAMETERS (USPS 413530)
US Army War College
ATTN: Parameters
47 Ashburn Drive
Carlisle, PA 17013-5238
Periodicals Postage Paid

The US Army War College

The Quarterly

FOR THIS AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS, VISIT US AT
https://press.armywarcollege.edu

